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Using data from 730 farm households in Shaanxi province collected in November 2010, 
three studies focusing on a policy reform allowing Chinese farmers to transact land use rights 
and its impact on risk rationing in a rural credit market and entrepreneurial intention in China are 
presented. 
The first study is “On the Transaction Values of Land Use Rights in Rural China under 
Rural Policy Reform”. This study examines the economics of transaction in LURs, estimates the 
value at which LURs could transact in equilibrium, and analyzes factors that would affect these 
price changes. We evaluate farmer‟s intention to buy and sell LURs and how much they are 
willing to pay and receive for LURs. 
The next study is “Risk Rationing in China Rural Credit Markets” providing a specific 
test of  the Boucher et al. (2008) framework to determine the extent of risk rationing amongst 
potential rural borrowers. We find the incidence of risk rationing in rural China is in the order of 
6.5%, with about 14% being quantity rationed and the remainder being price rationed. We 
investigate factors associated with risk rationed, quantity rationed and price rationed farmers and 
provide evidence that the elasticity of demand for credit is different among them. 
The final study draws a comparison between entrepreneurship and technology adoption. 
We apply an „entrepreneurship as technology adoption‟ model to a unique dataset collected in 
 Shaanxi province, China and Kentucky, USA. The uncertainty in household income and changes 
in economic environment during the Chinese Land Use Rights Regime and the US Tobacco 
Transition Payment Program lead many individuals into entrepreneurial activities. We examine 
the factors associated with entrepreneurial intention and compare entrepreneurs‟ attitude between 
two countries. 
 
 
 iii 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
 
Sivalai Vararuth Khantachavana was born in 1977 in Bangkok, Thailand where she spent 
most of her childhood. After graduating from Trium Udom Suksa School in 1995, she enrolled at 
the Department of Economics, Chulalongkorn University. While attending Chulalongkorn 
University, she had internship with the Bank of Thailand in the financial institution regulations 
department. She graduated from Chulalongkorn University with a Bachelor of Economics, First 
Class Honors, in December 1998. After working for the Ministry of Finance as an economist, 
and the National Economic and Social Development Board as a policy and plan analyst, she was 
awarded the Royal Thai Government Scholarship to pursue a Master of Science degree in Policy 
Economics at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in 2000. Upon completion of her 
Master of Science degree in 2001, she worked for the Department of Highways, Ministry of 
Transport, as an economist. Her main responsibilities were doing feasibility studies of the 
highway projects in Thailand and international highway networks connecting neighboring 
countries. In 2006, she was awarded the World Bank Graduate Scholarship to pursue a Master of 
Science degree in Economics at the London School of Economics and Political Science. She 
subsequently began her doctoral study at Cornell University in the Charles H. Dyson School of 
Applied Economics and Management in 2007. While attending Cornell University, she received 
a research assistantship and a teaching assistantship during August 2008 – May 2011. She is a 
co-author, with David Just and Richard Just, of “Empirical Challenges for Risk Preferences and 
Production” published in the Annual Review of Resource Economics in October 2010. She 
plans to stay in Thailand with her family and work in the field of Economics after receiving a 
Ph.D. degree.   
 iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I dedicate this work to my parents, Nakorn and Veerawan Vararuth,  
and my husband, Ruthaphol Khantachavana. 
 v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
This doctoral dissertation would not have been possible without the help and support of 
the kind people around me, to only some of whom it is possible to give particular mention here. 
Above all, I would like to express my deep and sincere gratitude to Professor Calum Turvey, co-
chair of my dissertation committee, for his excellent guidance, constant encouragement, patience 
and care throughout my work. He was always ready to help and gave me untiring support during 
my difficult moments. I appreciate all his contributions of time and ideas to make my Ph.D. 
experience productive and stimulating. I wish to express my warm and sincere thanks to 
Professor David Just, another co-chair of my dissertation committee, for his valuable advice and 
friendly help. His kind support and guidance have been of great value in this dissertation. I am 
deeply grateful to my dissertation committee member, Professor Robert Jarrow, for his detailed 
and constructive comments, and for his important support throughout this work. 
I would like to acknowledge the financial, academic and technical support of the Charles 
H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management (AEM), Cornell University, 
particularly in the award of a research and teaching assistantship that provided the necessary 
financial support for my Ph.D. study during 2008-2011.  
I am grateful to Professor Helen Pushkarskaya and University of Kentucky for providing 
me with the survey of Kentucky farmers during the tobacco buyout program and its data. I would 
also like to thank Xin Gao, Professor Linping Wang, and Professor Nie Rong for the help in 
translating the survey of Shannxi farmers from English into Chinese. I greatly appreciate the 
assistance of Professor Rong Kong and her graduate students in conducting the household survey 
in Shaanxi province.  
 vi 
My fellow Ph.D. students in AEM have contributed immensely to my personal and 
professional time at Cornell. Dr. Itthipong Mahathanaseth, Ying Cao, Marc Rockmore, Xi 
Chen,Yusi Ouyang, Alberto Lamadrid and I spent many long hours studying for the Economics 
qualifying exam during my first year, and for the AEM qualifying exam during my second year 
at Cornell. Members of our study group were always willing to share the economic knowledge 
and mathematical expertise with each other.  
My time at Cornell was made enjoyable in large part due to the many friends that became 
a part of my life. I am grateful to Dr. Chanin Manopiniwes, AEM alumni, for a significant 
guidance that made me finally decide to come to Cornell. I wish to extend my warmest thanks to 
a lovely couple, Nij Tontisirin Anantsuksomsri and Sutee Anantsuksomsri for offering their 
generous help, personal support and encouragement since I was a first year Ph.D. student. I am 
grateful for time spent with Supree Srisamran and Dr. Paitoon Wongsasutthikul who are friendly 
reliable companions. I wish to thank Chayanee Chawanote and Dr. Thanasin Tanompongphandh 
for their friendship and for providing both academic and personal supports. My time at Cornell 
was also enriched by Marjorie Cummings, Anutchanat Jaroenjitrkam, Dr. Warong Sukchotrat, 
and Dr. Surin Maneevitjit. I would also like to thank Dr. Sommarat Chantarat and Pimbucha 
Rusmevichientong for all kind support. I can still recall the first day arriving to Ithaca when they 
picked me up at the Short Line bus stop. I owe my most sincere gratitude to Chularat 
Niratisayakul and Anuk Serechetapongse for their kindness, friendship, and encouragement, 
especially their warm hospitality during my last three months in Ithaca and their emotionally 
support during my dissertation defense. 
 
 
 vii 
Last but not least, I would like to thank my family for all their love and encouragement. 
My parents, Nakorn and Veerawan Vararuth have raised me with an unconditional love and 
supported me in all my pursuits. My mother has provided the excellent example as a successful 
working woman, and she has always been my best role model. My sister and brother, Kannaporn 
and Niruth Vararuth, have been my best friends all my life. They are particularly supportive and 
always willing to listen to my complaint. I know I always have my family to count on when 
times are rough. I also wish to thank my parents-in-law, Dr. Pachon and Praphanrat 
Khantachavana for providing a valuable support and advice as I am one of their daughters. Most 
importantly, I am greatly indebted to my devoted husband, Ruthaphol Khantachavana. He is the 
one who inspired me to pursue a Ph.D. study in the first place, and has always motivated and 
helped me to remain focused for the entire study. His love, perpetual support, guidance and 
encouragement make me feel confident to fulfill my desire and to overcome every difficulty I 
encounter. Without him it would not have been possible to finish my Ph.D. study and 
dissertation. 
 
 viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 Page 
Biographical Sketch  iii 
Dedication  iv 
Acknowledgements v 
List of Figures xi 
List of Tables xii 
Chapter One: Introduction 1 
Motivation  
Research Objectives  
References 
3 
   7 
  11 
Chapter Two: On the Transaction Values of Land Use Rights  
in Rural China under Rural Policy Reform 
 
12 
Introduction 
The Political Economy of Land Use Rights in China 
Background of Land Use Rights 
Methods and Data 
Multiple Bounded Discrete Choice Approach 
The Market of Land Use Rights  
Contingent Valuation Method 
Determinants of Farmland Value and Regressors 
Estimation of Land Value: Willingness to Buy and Sell Land Use Rights 
Propensity to Buy or Sell Land Use Rights 
12 
13 
17 
21 
23 
28 
32 
37 
43 
57 
 ix 
Determinants of Land Use Rights Buyer and Seller 
Summary 
Appendix 
References 
60 
65 
71 
73 
Chapter Three: Risk Rationing in China Rural Credit Markets 76 
Introduction 
Risk Rationing Definition  
Model 
Credit Rationing Status 
Survey and Data 
Testable Hypotheses  
The Model and Determinants of Credit Constraint Status 
Empirical Results 
Conclusion  
Appendix 
References 
76 
78 
80 
82 
85 
88 
90 
93 
99 
102 
106 
Chapter Four: Livelihood Disruption and Venture Creation: Entrepreneurship as 
Technology Adoption, A Comparison between Shaanxi Farmers and Kentucky 
Farmers 
 
 
107 
Introduction 
Learning by Doing and Learning by Using  
Technology Adoption 
Entrepreneurial Attitude 
107 
109 
113 
116 
 x 
Determinants of Entrepreneurial Intention 
A Conceptual Model of Entrepreneurship 
Survey and Data 
Results 
Conclusions  
Appendix 
References 
124 
129 
135 
138 
143 
145 
150 
Chapter Five: Conclusion 154 
Chapter 2: On the Transaction Values of Land Use Rights in Rural China  
      under Rural Policy Reform 
 
155 
Chapter 3: Risk Rationing in China‟s Rural Credit Markets 
 
159 
Chapter 4: Livelihood Disruption and Venture Creation: Entrepreneurship  
           as Technology Adoption, A Comparison between Shaanxi Farmers and   
            Kentucky Farmers 
 
 
 
163 
Final Thoughts 
 
166 
  
Appendix A: Participant Surveys in English 169 
Appendix B: Participant Surveys in Chinese 199 
 
 
          
          
                  
 xi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 Page 
Figure 2.1: Estimated logit distribution 28 
Figure 2.2: Demand and Supply of Land Use Rights  29 
Figure 2.3: the diagram of willingness to buy and sell land use rights of selected farmers 58 
Figure 3.1: Sample survey questions to identify credit constraint status  84 
Figure 4.1: A Typical Diffusion Curve 145 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xii 
LIST OF TABLES 
 Page 
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.2: Multiple bounded question format 
Table 2.3: Actual response distributions   
Table 2.4: Esimated logit model 
Table 2.5: Power function linear transformation: OLS regression results 
Table 2.6: The example of WTB and WTS value assignment of a polychotomous choice  
      response 
Table 2.7: Summary statistics for the CVM 
Table 2.8: Crosstabulation results 
Table 2.9: OLS regression results: self declare maximum WTB 
Table 2.10: OLS regression results: self declare minimum WTS 
Table 2.11: Tobit regression results: polychotomous choice maximum WTB 
Table 2.12: Tobit regression results: polychotomous choice minimum WTS 
Table 2.13: Summary of expected land use rights value by models 
Table 2.14: Frequencies of respondents indentifying WTB and WTS at 300,000 RMB  
                   and 20,000 RMB 
Table 2.15: Identification of a potential buyer and seller 
Table 2.16: The logit model results 
Table 2.17: Potential net seller and net buyer OLS results  
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics 
 
23 
24 
25 
27 
 
 
27 
30 
 
34 
35 
46 
48 
50 
52 
54 
57 
 
59 
59 
63 
 xiii 
Table 3.2: Summary of household characteristics and frequencies by credit constraint  
                 status 
Table 3.3: Linear probability Model 
Table 3.4: Logit Model 
Table 3.5: Measure of inelasticity at lower interest rates * Borrower Type  
                 Crosstabulation 
Table 3.6: Measure of inelasticity at higher interest rates * Borrower Type  
                 Crosstabulation 
Table 4.1: Level of support for new businesses in community 
Table 4.2: Possible start-up problems 
Table 4.3: The certainty of new business accomplishment  
Table 4.4: Entrepreneurial abilities and business situation in community 
Table 4.5: Business activity in community 
Table 4.6: Entrepreneurial characteristics of Shaanxi and Kentucky farmers 
Table 4.7: Bivariate Probit Results 
Table 4.8: List of the dependent and independent variables 
 
 
 
 
 
72 
85 
87 
97 
98 
 
99 
99 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
141 
145 
 
  
 1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
China's transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy began at the 
end of 1978. Chinese government launched its economic reforms in an effort to increase the 
efficiency of its economy and speed up economic growth. Agriculture was the first sector to be 
reformed in 1978 and the reforms were rapidly introduced to the whole country. Successes have 
been achieved on a broad front, in terms of such criteria as output growth, living standards, 
poverty reduction and inflation. 
The most important change in China rural reform and agricultural sector was the 
replacement of collective farming with a household-based system (Lin et al. 1996), also known 
as the household responsibility system that helps encourage farm investment, and decrease the 
land-tenure insecurity. It has been recognized that the land-tenure insecurity has several effects 
on agricultural production. For instance, it reduces productivity of the land by decreasing 
investment and discouraging land transfers from low to high productivity producers. In addition, 
because farm households do not own their land, they cannot use it as collateral in the credit 
market. Therefore, the rural land reform in China and the effort to increase the land-tenure 
security have facilitated independent transfer and affected the markets for other important farm 
inputs, such as credit and labor markets.  
During the economic transition toward a market system, the Chinese labor market is 
evolving.  As an important means to facilitate efficient allocation of labor resources, the 
development of the labor market has important implications for the success of the economic 
reform.  In particular, the urbanization in China has increased tremendously following the 
initiation of the reform and opening policy. China‟s rural labor market and employment structure 
 2 
 
have changed dramatically in the last 30 years as millions of rural workers have migrated to 
urban areas to find nonfarm employment. A variety of policies is thought to restrict permanent 
migration to cities but allows a large amount of temporary migration. For example, the land-
tenure system has helped discourage labor movement out of agriculture because households will 
lose their land use rights (LURs) if they leave the village. However, the Chinese labor market is 
moving toward a market mechanism. The employment in a state-owned sector is declining but 
the private sector and entrepreneurial activities are rising rapidly.  
The relaxing of the state‟s control over the economy allowed the emergence of 
entrepreneurs, who have transformed the economy into one increasingly driven by competition, 
innovation and productivity. Moreover, the most important source of the economic growth was 
from firms that were begun by local leaders and from collectively-run township and village 
enterprises. Nevertheless, an institutional challenge faced by entrepreneurs has been a limited 
access to credit. Certainly, increasing access to credit affects farm households‟ agricultural 
production decisions and entrepreneurial intentions, but formal credit institutions in China are 
still poorly developed, while households increasingly rely on informal credit institutions. The 
financial reforms have not succeeded in creating a modern and efficient financial sector.  
Since the economic reform and urbanization in China‟s economy generate changes in 
China‟s rural markets for land, labor and credit as well as entrepreneurial activity, we are further 
interested in examining the policy change focusing on the transaction of LURs and its impact on 
risk rationing in a rural credit market and venture creation in China. With the institutional and 
policy changes in the land, labor, and rural credit markets, farmers are able to take advantage of 
the new economic environment and improve their agricultural productivity to increase their 
incomes and economic growth. 
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1.1 Motivation 
Since the end of the 1970s, with the reform of China's rural land system, agricultural 
production and the rural economy of China have greatly developed and flourished. In the early 
1980s the adoption of the “household contract responsibility system” dramatically altered the 
relationship between China‟s farmers and the land they cultivated. The system has realized the 
separation of land ownership from the LURs. In addition, it has adjusted the production and 
distribution relations in rural China, changed the way of agricultural production and 
management, motivated the peasants‟ enthusiasm for production, and fully utilized technology 
and resources. The household contract responsibility system has contributed to the development 
of China‟s agricultural and rural economy and its industrialization in the following several 
aspects. First, it brought about extraordinary growth in agricultural production. Second, the rapid 
growth of agricultural production has caused a corresponding increase in farmers‟ income. Third, 
the system has driven China‟s industrialization and the massive transfer of rural surplus labor.  
Despite these benefits of land reform, there is a growing concern about China‟s ability to 
allocate land efficiently and to reduce the wasteful use of scarce farmland in a period of rapid 
economic and social change. This has stimulated a host of new research focusing on land use, 
property rights and land management in China. Previous researches have examined whether the 
land management system has been providing sufficient incentives for farmers to utilize land 
efficiently and to make investments, while simultaneously helping to improve welfare and equity 
as well as to protect agricultural land (see Brandt et al. (2002); Ho and Lin (2003)). 
In 2008, The Chinese government has considered the policy and possibility of LURs 
transfer and transactability as farmers are allowed to buy and sell LURs for the first time. This 
could draw hundreds of millions of farmers more firmly into the market economy. Some 
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economists believe that the policy reform allowing Chinese farmers to buy and sell LURs would 
lead to more efficient land use and allow much larger farms to be established. High productive 
farmers are more likely to buy LURs while low productive farmers are more likely to sell LURs 
and work off-farm. Therefore, it is interesting to see what would happen if the Chinese 
government made it legal for farmers to buy or sell LURs, who would be buyers, who would be 
sellers and at what price. This analysis is represented in Chapter 2 investigating the structure of a 
LURs market should LURs contracts become widely transactable. This study is the first to 
provide a preliminary assessment of farmers‟ willingness to buy and willingness to sell LURs. 
In recent years, China's government has made improving the welfare of rural residents a 
priority, but the debate over the best way to help farmers get better access to bank credit has been 
questionable. In order for farmers to make long-term, productivity-enhancing and income-
generating investments on land, improved access to a credit market is a key. Secure property 
rights which can be pledged as collateral for loans would facilitate farmers' application for loans 
from financial institutions. A collateral loan is often offered at a lower interest rate than an 
unsecured loan, because there is a guarantee of repayment should the borrower default on the 
loan. 
Nevertheless, previous literature has shown the existence of risk rationing and its 
significance as the borrower voluntarily withdraws from the credit market even he has the 
collateral wealth needed to qualify for a loan contract. Boucher et al. (2008) (BCG) provide an 
economic definition for „risk rationing‟ and through a utility theoretic model present some 
specific and testable hypotheses. In fact, in a 2009 survey of Chinese farmers in Gansu and 
Shaanxi provinces we asked a small number of questions related to the hypothetical possibility of 
the mortgagability of LURs as a form of collateral (Turvey et al. 2011).  It was found that a large 
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number of farm households would not use LURs as loan collateral. The results strongly implied 
of the possibility that risk rationing was wide spread in rural China, and if so this would dampen 
the overall impacts of credit reforms currently under way in China.  
In 2010, we designed survey questions applying the direct elicitation methodology 
(DEM) so that each credit rationing status could easily be extracted. It was constructed to 
specifically isolate risk rationing under the specific conjectures and hypotheses raised by BCG. 
Chapter 3 provides an empirical assessment of risk rationing theory and hypotheses proposed by 
BCG. Evidence of risk rationing in rural credit markets would suggest that the effectiveness of 
land titling policy encouraging farmers to pledge their rights as collateral security may be 
overestimated. The study is believed to be among the first empirical validation of the risk 
rationing theory. 
As mentioned above, the Chinese government has considered the possibility to liberalize 
farmers‟ land use right to enhance rural development. The issuance of a policy concerning the 
Advancement of Rural Reform and Development approved by the Central Committee on 
October 12 2008,  allowed farmers to "lease their contracted farmland or transfer their LURs" to 
boost the scale of operation for farm production and provide funds for them to start new 
businesses. A significant increase of private enterprises has ensured a rapid and sustained growth 
of rural enterprise and the non-agricultural employment opportunities for rural residents.  
Moreover, the policy allowing farmers to use rights to farmland and residential land as 
collateral for loans would increase access to a credit market. Rural credit helps rural poor 
economy in a variety of ways. First, access to credit can considerably increase the ability of 
households with no or few savings to meet their financial needs for agricultural inputs and 
productive investments. Second, it could also increase rural poor households‟ willingness to 
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adopt new technologies that raise both average levels and riskiness of income. Finally, it allows 
rural households to smooth their consumption in the case of unexpected event. However, the 
existence of credit and risk rationing may have significant negative impacts on income and 
welfare, especially for poor households. Credit constraints prevent individuals from undertaking 
desired activities and from realizing profit-maximizing investment levels in the activities they do 
engage in. Thus entrepreneurially talented but poor individuals are prevented from starting 
businesses.  
Chapter 4 attempts to analyze the impact of structural changes on farmers‟ 
entrepreneurial decision. We compare the similarities of venture creation and the adoption of a 
new technology and investigate the factors influencing farmers‟ entrepreneurial adoption 
decision during the transition period of the local economy. In this chapter, we employ two novel 
data sets consisting of a survey administered to Chinese farmers in Shaanxi province and tobacco 
farmers in Kentucky. The first survey has been carried out in Shaanxi province in November 
2011. The survey collected detailed information of the Chinese farmer on entrepreneurial 
decision and attitude toward the hypothetical implementation of LURs transaction in China. The 
second survey collected detailed information on the socioeconomic background, entrepreneurial 
decision and attitude, livelihood disruption, ability levels and personality traits of the Kentucky 
farmer at the time of tobacco buyout program. We compare entrepreneurial attitudes and factors 
associated with entrepreneurial decision between Chinese and Kentucky farmers. The 
uncertainty in household income and changes in economic environment during the Chinese Land 
Use Rights Regime and the US Tobacco Transition Payment Program lead many individuals into 
entrepreneurial activities. 
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1.2 Research Objectives 
The purposes of this dissertation and the key questions that we attempt to investigate in 
this dissertation are as follows.  
 
1.2.1 Chapter 2: On the Transaction Values of Land Use Rights in Rural China under Rural 
Policy Reform 
Objective 1: examine how Chinese farmers might respond if the Chinese government made it 
legal for farmers to buy or sell LURs. The Chinese government has considered the possibility of 
liberalizing farmers‟ ability to transact LURs including selling and mortgaging the rights, to 
boost rural development. 
Objective 2: examine the economics of transaction in LURs, estimate the value at which LURs 
could transact in equilibrium. Land use rights requires a complex understanding of market 
transparency, credit markets, farm size-productivity relationships, agency conflicts, market risks, 
covariate risks, contingent markets, rent seeking, government intrusion and market distortions 
(Binswanger et al. 1993), many of which are absent in rural China. It is important to understand 
how, in the presence of these complexities, a market for transactions in LURs will evolve in rural 
China, who would be buyers, who would be sellers and at what price.   
Objective 3: analyze the price elasticity of LURs and factors that would affect changes of LURs 
value. We determine some baseline characteristics that define and differentiate buyers and sellers 
and WTP and WTB values. Factors of interest are demographic factors, farm attribute and 
production factors, profitability factors, debt, credit and liquidity factors, attitude toward risk 
factors, and other variables including business climate, migrant farm labor, entrepreneurship, 
computer and internet, politics, and urban factor.  
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Objective 4: evaluate farmer‟s intention to buy and sell LURs and how much they are willing to 
pay and receive for LURs. Because no formal market exists to transact LURs, this study is the 
first to provide a preliminary assessment of farmers‟ willingness to buy and willingness to sell 
LURs. We employ a self-declare questions approach and a Multiple Bounded Discrete Choice 
(MBDC) approach, and use contingent valuation (CV) techniques to extract measures of 
willingness to sell (WTS) and willingness to buy (WTB) LURs. 
Objective 5: examine characteristics of potential buyers and sellers. Understanding the similarity 
and difference of these characteristics between LURs buyers and sellers will help the 
government formulate a better policy to directly support a target group. 
Objective 6: explore potential policy implications. More detailed investigation of the factors 
affecting the implementation of legal and institutional change aiming to make property rights 
more secure could provide important insights for policy makers. 
 
1.2.2 Chapter 3: Risk Rationing in China’s Rural Credit Markets  
Objective 1: provide a specific test of Boucher et al. (2008) framework on risk rationing. We 
find risk rationing as a topic of inquiry to be critically important in understanding borrower 
behavior and credit decisions.  
Objective 1.1: explore whether the insurance markets, asymmetric information, risk and 
collateral are essentially related to risk rationing in economic context. From definition, they 
assume these conditions are important for risk rationing to occur. 
Objective 1.2: test hypotheses that describe the most important factors explaining the 
existence of risk and quantity rationing, namely 1) Wealth-biased quantity rationing, 2) Risk 
rationing and financial wealth, 3) Risk rationing and productive wealth. 
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Objective 2: use the direct elicitation methodology (DEM) where a set of questions directly 
elicits the household‟s status as either credit constrained versus unconstrained. 
Objective 3: estimate credit demand elasticities by credit constraint status. We want to explore 
the sensitivity to interest rate of risk rationed, quantity rationed, and price rationed farmers. 
 Objective 4: examine the attributes of risk rationed, quantity rationed, and price rationed 
farmers. Independent variables designed to capture the effects on credit rationing are 
demographic variables, measures for wealth, measuring for risk aversion and prudence, measure 
of insurance market participation, asymmetric information, elasticity of demand for credit, 
formal and informal credit, the willingness to borrow if they can use their LURs as collateral for 
a loan, and entrepreneurial activity. 
Objective 5: explore potential policy implications. 
 
1.2.3 Chapter 4: Livelihood Disruption and Venture Creation: Entrepreneurship as 
Technology Adoption, A Comparison between Shaanxi Farmers and Kentucky Farmers 
Objective 1: propose the conceptual model of entrepreneurship based on the technology 
adoption literature. We compare the similarities of the adoption of a new technology and the 
venture creation. Specifically, when a new technology is available, decision-makers continuously 
evaluate whether or not to adopt. The technology will be adopted when the discounted expected 
benefits of adoption are greater than the cost. Similarly, when the expected profit of new venture 
is greater than current activities, decision-makers will start new businesses.  
Objective 2: examine and compare entrepreneurial characteristics and attitude of Shaanxi and 
Kentucky farmers to better understand their entrepreneurial uniqueness, opinion and business 
environment among two regions.  
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Objective 3: examine factors influencing entrepreneurial adoption decision and estimate the 
effect of internal family events on the decision to start a new business. We draw an analogy 
between factors affecting technology and entrepreneurial adoption and investigate whether 
Shaanxi and Kentucky farmers are influenced by different factors when making decisions to 
enter entrepreneurship. Key determinants of entrepreneurial intention are demographic factors, 
economic factors, farm structure, human capital, social network and learning, distance and 
geography, tenure, credit constraint, and attitude toward risk. 
Objective 4: explore potential policy implications. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ON THE TRANSACTION VALUES OF LAND USE RIGHTS 
IN RURAL CHINA UNDERE RURAL POLICY REFORM 
2.1 Introduction 
The Chinese government has considered the possibility of liberalizing farmers‟ land use 
rights to boost rural development. Understanding land markets in developing regions requires a 
complex, not mutually exclusive, combination of market transparency, credit markets, farm size-
productivity relationships and other agency problems, market and covariate risks and the 
presence of contingent markets, rent seeking, government intrusion and market distortions 
(Binswanger et al 1993). The issuance of a policy concerning the Advancement of Rural Reform 
and Development allowed farmers to "lease their contracted farmland or transfer their land use 
rights" to boost the scale of operation for farm production and provide funds for them to start 
new businesses. Consequently, markets for the lease of contracted farmland and the transfer of 
farmland use rights shall be set up and improved to allow farmers to sub-contract, lease, 
exchange and swap their land use rights, or joined share-holding entities with their farmland. 
Such transfers of land-use rights must be voluntarily participated by farmers, with adequate 
payment and in accordance with the law” (Chinareview.cn 2008). Some economists believe that 
the policy reform allowing Chinese farmers to buy and sell land use rights would lead to more 
efficient land use and allow much larger farms to be established. Part of this optimism likely 
arises from the growth observed in agricultural output and grain output immediately following 
the 1978 reforms through 1984 and the disappointing growth thereafter (See Brandt et al. 2002). 
If a market for trading farmland use rights developed, farmers could gain a new source of cash 
income that could help alleviate the poverty in rural economy. This would also create more asset 
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wealth for farmers and strengthen land security, which would in turn provide access to credit 
markets and encourage farmers to invest in farming and increase productivity.  
The purpose of this study is to investigate the structure of a land use rights market when 
land use rights contracts become transactable. The main objectives are to 1) examine the 
economics of transaction in land use rights; 2) evaluate farmer‟s intentions to buy and sell land 
use rights and how much they are willing to pay and receive for land use rights; and 3) examine 
factors associated with potential buyer and seller of land use rights. Based on a household survey 
of 730 farm households we employ a polychotomous choice and contingent valuation techniques 
to extract measures of willingness to sell and willingness to buy land use rights. We show that 
there is a great disparity between the minimum price at which a farmer will sell and that at which 
a buyer is willing to buy. The disequilibrium is so significant that we doubt that an equilibrium 
matching buyers and sellers would obtain any time soon. This study is the first to provide a 
preliminary assessment of farmers‟ willingness to buy and willingness to sell land use rights.  
 
2.2 The Political Economy of Land Use Rights in China 
The recent discussions of land use right reform is not new to political debate in China and 
is discussed in detail in Kung (1995), Liu, Carter and Yao (1998), Ho (2001), Brandt et al. 
(2002), and most recently by Wang (2008) and  Chau and Zhang (2011). In China the Western 
notion of property rights when measured against urban growth, industrialization, population 
migration and food security is a tenuous balancing act between competing policies and political 
sacrifices must be made. These are the common arguments, but Ho (2001) argues that it is much 
more complex in China, with a targeted policy of what he refers to as institutional indeterminacy. 
This provides the Central Party the flexibility to respond to societal developments, and to retain 
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this flexibility it employs a system of deliberate institutional ambiguity (see also Kung 1995). In 
other words the wavering of the Central Committee over whether to permit mortgaging land use 
rights, or to permit inter-farm (as opposed to farmer-SME)  sales of land use rights is by 
necessity.  The most obvious problem faced by the Central Party is the balancing between 
urbanization and the depopulation of rural areas. If the rate at which farmers would sell their 
rights and migrate to urban areas exceeds the rate at which they can be absorbed by the newly 
urbanized centers conditions might very well be worse. The vastness of the rural population in 
China is not conducive to the natural migration for economic benefit that came about with 
defined property rights and industrial growth in Western democracies.  
It is, however, unrealistic to demagogue the second-best realities of the socialist system 
that is in place and has been evolving since 1949. By allowing buy-sell transactions the 
government (state or collective) is essentially relinquishing control over its ownership position in 
the land. This is no easy task as Ho (2001) and Deininger et al. (2006) point out. Under the old 
collective regime land ownership was allocated between the commune, the production brigade 
and the production team, but in the decollective period these were ambiguously reallocated in 
terms of ownership and managerial responsibility to the township/town, administrative village 
and natural village, each with their own industrial objectives and infrastructure responsibilities. 
In addition there are often conflicting rights in forestry, grassland wasteland and waterways that 
are owned by the State yet occupied by the collective. How can such a system in practice operate 
when not only are ownership rights ambiguous, but property rights (as defined by the terms of 
the land use rights) are not easily reconciled? It is unlikely that such a market could exist without 
legal and social conflicts.   
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Based on a 1994 survey Liu et al. (1998) report that nearly 75% of villages permit 
individuals to rent out land for compensation (with 1/3
rd
 requiring administrative approval) and 
50% of villages permitted the actual sale of use rights, with most requiring administrative 
approval. Since 1999 it has been legal to sell and transfer use rights on state lands for real estate 
development and agriculture, and within the collective system transactions in the form of lease 
contracts is in principle legal, but as indicated in Liu et al.‟s (1998) survey, in the majority of 
cases legal exchanges would likely need approval from the village committee
1
. Informal hand-
shake transactions (zhuanbao) are quite common and are (in our experience) overlooked by the 
village committee (Ho 2001; Brandt et al. 2002). In Kung‟s (1995) 1993 survey the majority of 
these transactions were within families and it is also noted that a reason not to acquire new land 
was due to transactional cost burdens in taxes (see also Kung and Liu 1997). Brandt et al. (2002) 
using surveys conducted in 1988 and 1995 found that between the two survey periods formal 
rental contracts (mostly between relatives as well) rose from only 0.6% to 3%, despite the fact 
that 75% of villages had unrestricted opportunities to lease. Even with the potential in place to 
buy land use rights this does not necessarily mean that all of the traditional benefits arising from 
recognized property rights and land ownership will be recognized by farmers. In a 2009 survey 
for Shaanxi and Gansu farmers, Turvey et al. (2011) report that only 21.2% of farm households 
indicated willingness to sell the land and 39.8% indicating agreement to buy additional land use 
rights. The leveraging affect, or collateral value, may be overstated however, with only 35.4% of 
farmers agreeing that they would use the land use rights as collateral for loans. This is actually 
                                                 
1
 In Liu et al (1998) it is not clear whether the sale of land use rights were between farmers as we investigate in this 
paper. It is unlikely that these sale transactions were amongst farm households since this would permanently disrupt 
the egalitarian allocation of land amongst villagers (i.e. newborns, or new spouses). Rather, these transactions were 
most likely approved to develop housing units or small and medium size enterprises (SME) on village-owned lands 
with any monies going towards the village funds for infrastructure and further development (see Ding 2003). 
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lower than about 47% of Sichuan and Hunan households who agreed to use land rights as 
collateral in a 1993 survey by Kung (1995). 
Kung (1995) notes that of the two conditions required for the emergence of private 
property rights, increasing population and commercialization, the first has been met in China 
while the second had, in 1995, not. Of course the rapid expansion of commercialization and the 
expansion of the industrial base from the eastern coastal provinces towards the west have much 
improved since 1995, and in part this is one of the drivers of land reforms. Even so, Ho (2001) 
points out that in large swaths of China the pricing of rural land is an „ideological taboo‟ which 
inhibits an economically meaningful exchange of farmland in a liquid and transparent form. 
Any land use rights market will have several unique characteristics. The market is much 
less liquid than agricultural product markets, meaning that transactions take longer to occur and 
are often more complex than most agricultural products. The major factor driving the farmland 
market is the return to agricultural production. However, some land markets can also be 
influenced by a number of factors such as land attribute, demographics, profitability, credit 
access, attitude toward risk of the land contract owner and the potential conversion to urban 
development. Risk does not only apply to market and the environment but insecurity also arises 
from the village committee‟s powers (albeit reduced in 1997) to re-divide holdings depending on 
family size, village populations and available village lands (Kung 1995). Brandt et al. (2002) 
provide evidence that these allocations and the unbalanced divisibility of land amongst family 
members (labor) leads to static inefficiency. The uncertainty around future earnings potential can 
also significantly reduce the amount of transactions that take place in the market (see Jin and 
Deininger (2009) on rental contracts and ambiguities and uncertainties about land use rights).  
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2.3 Background of Land Use Rights 
Throughout the pre-1949 revolutionary years and for a few years after independence land 
was reallocated from the land rich to the land poor. However shortly thereafter staring in the 
early 1950‟s these lands were re-accumulated into the Soviet-style collective model where it 
remained through 1978. By then the inefficiencies due to lack of property rights and incentives 
was weighing on the central party. Between 1978 and 1984 farmers were allocated, according to 
egalitarian principles, small parcels of land on year to year leases. So long as regional quotas on 
productivity were met farmers could sell excess commodities into the market place. This 
provided the incentives to increase production but with land use rights allocated on yearly 
certificates and the propensity for village cadres to reallocate land parcels on a frequent basis, the 
lack of property rights eliminated all incentives for capital improvements (Kung 1995, Brandt et 
al. 2002)
2
. To counter this problem land use rights were extended to 15 years in 1984 and then to 
30 years in 1993 and a proposed 70 years in 2008
3
.  
In China, land use rights are the rights for natural persons, legal persons or other 
organizations to use land rights for a fixed period of time. China adopted a dual land tenure 
system under which land ownership is independent of land use rights. The land is either owned 
by the state ("State Land") or by rural collective economic organization ("Collective Land"). The 
term of land use rights varies depending on different land use purpose. For example, if a piece of 
                                                 
2
 Indeed, in our study area in Shaanxi there has been rapid conversion of grain land to fruit lands (e.g. kiwi fruit) and 
greenhouses for tomatoes, peppers, and other vegetables, not because of incentives from enhanced property rights 
but from low interest loans issued under specialized programs. While the mortgageability of land use rights has 
frequently been discussed, this is permitted only in some pilot areas in China, and even so there are few incentives 
for lenders to actually lend against the ownership of a right rather than the ownership of the land itself. 
3
 In practice the 30-year contract was modified in 1997 to offer protections against redistribution of land. 
Furthermore, it was acknowledged that the 30-year right was in essence a perpetual right since it would be renewed 
in perpetuity. Even so, a 70-year contract, using the present value model of Wang (2008) would essentially be 
equivalent to a perpetual lease on the economic value of production. In essence the present value of a 70-year right 
would be only marginally indistinguishable from the present value of economic rents on the land itself. But with 
farm sizes averaging, for example 4.9 mu (approximately 5/6th an acre) per household in this paper’s sample, even 
with a 30 or 70 year right capital improvements would not universally lead to the technical, allocative, and economic 
efficiencies required to meet food security objectives. 
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state land is used for industrial, educational, scientific and technological, health, and athletic 
purpose, the term is 50 years while if it is used for residential purpose, the term is 70 years. 
According to Zhang and Masons (2007), land use rights are distinct and separate from 
land ownership. The land use rights are property rights enjoyed by private parties and protected 
by law. However, compared with leasehold, it has significant restrictions and limitations, 
particularly when it comes to the use of the land. In addition, having land use rights does not 
include with it the right to use the natural resources, minerals or treasure under the land. There is 
no central land registry for the registration and public search of the rights, but; there are county-
level land registration departments, normally part of the local land administration authorities. 
Their responsibilities include handling the registration of the land-related rights and issuing what 
is called the „certificate of land use right for state-owned land‟. 
Generally, there are three types of land use rights that apply in the case of land use in 
China: „granted‟, „allocated‟ and „tenant‟ land use rights. They are different in how long they 
last, how they can be acquired and how much they can be acquired for, and how they can be 
marketed. Our interest is in land use rights awarded to rural citizens at birth by the village 
committee as established under the household responsibility system of the post Mao reform 
period. 
Granted land use rights (GLUR) is the most common way to acquire land use rights 
from the state in return for a fixed fee. The state, as the owner of the land and represented by the 
local land administration authority, can grant companies, organizations or individuals within or 
outside China the exclusive right to use the land for a defined period. The maximum period of 
the GLUR depends upon the proposed use of the land such as forty years for commercial, 
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tourism and entertainment use; fifty years for industry, education, science, technology, culture, 
health and sports use; and seventy years for residential use.  
An application to extend the GLUR must be made no later than one year before its 
expiry. When the parties renew the contract, another fee becomes payable. In cases where the 
GLUR is not renewed, all buildings, fixtures, structures and improvements over the land are 
taken back by the state without payment of compensation. A private party can enter into land use 
rights grant contract with the state by auction, tender or negotiation. However, the most common 
way is open competition, i.e. auction, tender or listing on the land use rights exchange market. If 
the proposed project is for a commercial purpose, it is compulsory to go through the open 
competition. 
GLUR is marketable. Generally the GLUR can be transferred, let or mortgaged to other 
private parties without having first to get approval from the authorities. If the right is transferred, 
the duration will be the remaining years in the original land use right grant contract. If it is let, 
the conditions will be those that the original holder has developed and used the land in 
accordance with the land use rights grant contract. In addition the original holder will retain 
liability for the performance of the land use rights grant contract after letting the GLUR. 
In addition, GLUR can be mortgaged. If there is no building or other fixed structure over 
the land, the mortgage of the GLUR must be registered with the land administration authority 
which issued the certificate. If there is a building or structure, these must be mortgaged together 
with the land. The mortgage must then be registered with the registration department indicated 
by the county level government (normally the land administration authority or the housing 
administration authority). The mortgage contract will only come into effect from the time of 
registration. 
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The GLUR can be terminated before the end of the due period in certain cases, usually 
when the state has decreed that the land is to be used for the public benefit or if the land is to be 
redeveloped. The state pays compensation if this happens. 
Allocated land use rights (ALUR) is the right allocated by the state for an indefinite 
period and no fee is payable. The rights holder will be involved in land for governmental use, 
military use, urban infrastructure projects and facilities for public interest, energy, transportation 
or irrigation infrastructure projects. The Ministry of Land and Resources has published a 
catalogue of the detailed types of permitted use of land for allocated land use rights. The law 
does not expressly prohibit foreign companies or individuals from getting allocated land use 
rights. However, this is rarely done because of the restrictions on use. 
The marketability of ALUR is restricted as it can only be transferred, let or mortgaged in 
certain situations. The general conditions and requirements for the ALUR to be transferred, let or 
mortgaged are: the approval by the land administration authority must be obtained; the holder of 
ALUR must be a company, enterprise, or other commercial organizations or individual; the 
holder of ALUR has obtained a certificate of land use right for state-owned land; the legal 
ownership certificate for the building or structure over the land has been properly obtained; and 
the parties must enter into a land use right grant contract and the land use right grant fee must be 
paid.  
ALUR should only be taken in certain closely considered circumstances, where the 
business or individual obtaining that right is absolutely certain that this is really what they want. 
It will be difficult to dispose of so parties involved in a property transaction that incorporates 
ALUR must be absolutely certain that the transaction will get the approval of the land 
administration authority. Therefore, the market value of properties involving ALUR is 
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significantly lower than property involving GLUR. 
Tenant land use rights A private party which includes any non-government entities may 
also obtain a tenant land use right, which basically means paying rent rather than buying the right 
for a one-off payment. This type of land use right is also time-constrained and is usually for a 
shorter term than the GLUR. It can be assigned, sub-let or mortgaged to a third party following 
land administration authority‟s consent. 
 
2.4 Methods and Data 
As far as we are aware there are no estimates of how much farmers would be willing to 
buy or sell land use rights should they be given the opportunity. Consequently we examine the 
problem from different empirical angles using three, related yet independent, approaches.  
First, we specifically asked farmers the hypothetical „if the government made it legal for 
farmers to buy or sell land use rights, would you buy or sell land use rights?‟; „If you were to sell 
your land use rights today, what is the minimum amount you would be willing to receive for the 
land use rights?‟; „If you were to buy a land use rights today, what is the maximum amount you 
would be willing to pay for the land use rights?‟ For the remainder of the study, these questions 
are called “self-declare questions”.  
Second, a specifically designed „experiment‟ to evaluate farmers‟ willingness to buy and 
willingness to sell for land use rights of 15 scenarios is included in our survey. We apply the 
multiple bounded discrete choice (MBDC) elicitation technique where each scenario of land use 
rights value, the respondent is given a polychotomous choice response option, using a 5 level 
scale from “Definitely Buy”, “Might Buy”, “Neither Buy nor Sell”, “Might Sell” to “Definitely 
Sell” value. Each scenario indicates different value of land use rights ranging from 20,000 RMB 
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to 300,000 RMB, with the amortized payment based on a 10 year time horizon. This technique is 
described later in the multiple bounded discrete choice approach section. 
The first and second represent technical approaches to determine price break points 
between buyers and sellers to determine willingness to buy (WTB) and willingness to sell 
(WTS). The third component is more analytical in an attempt to categorize likely buyers and 
likely sellers and determine using multivariate regressions factors that affect these preferences. 
 
Survey and data 
The household survey was conducted in Shaanxi province in November 2010 with 730 
respondents. Each household was interviewed by either one or two graduate students from 
Northwest Agriculture and Forestry University. The survey itself dealt exclusively with 
transaction of land use rights and other issues including farm credit, risk perception and 
entrepreneurship. In order to identify the willingness to buy and willingness to sell for land use 
rights, two broad types of questions were included in the survey.  
Selected demographic and characteristics of respondent households are reported in Table 
2.1. The average age of respondents is approximately 49 years old and the average education 
level of respondents is between attending middle school and completing middle school. On 
average there are about 5 people living in each household. The average number of years farming 
is 28 years, and the average farm size is 5mu (about 5/6th of an acre). Household income average 
is 23,796 RMB/year with approximately 39% of household income coming from farm activities. 
The average profit per year earned from cropped land is 953 RMB/mu. The average asset per 
household is 318,904 RMB. There are 203 farmers indicating the amount of their debt and the 
average debt per household is 29,330 RMB.  
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
            
Sex (Female =1) 730 0.5452 0.4983 0 1 
Age 730 48.7200 11.3610 18 78 
Education 730 4.3712 1.8364 0 8 
Household member 730 4.8800 1.5120 2 18 
Years of Farming 726 27.6653 13.5471 0 65 
Farm Size (mu) 728 4.9302 2.8183 0 40 
Household Income 
(RMB) 721 23,796.44 23,048.36 0 248,000 
Percentage farm Income 720 0.3930 0.2933 0 1 
Asset Value (RMB) 703 318,904.4 1,897,610 0 50,000,000 
Farm Profit (RMB) 710 952.7394 1,915.0540 0 25,000 
Amount of Debt (RMB) 203 29,329.6014 58,190.0110 0.01 600000 
 
 
2.5 Multiple Bounded Discrete Choice Approach 
In this section, we want to examine how participants respond to each land use rights 
value in order to reveal their willingness to buy (WTB) and willingness to sell (WTS). We apply 
a multiple bounded discrete choice (MBDC) elicitation technique introduced by Welsh and Poe 
(1998) that allows respondents to express their level of voting certainty for a wide range of 
referendum thresholds. In our case the referendum thresholds are land use rights values. At each 
land use rights value, the respondent is given a polychotomous choice response option, using a 5 
level scale from “Definitely Buy”, “Might Buy”, “Neither Buy nor Sell”, “Might Sell” to 
“Definitely Sell”.   
An example of multiple bounded question format is provided in Table 2.2. The MBDC 
questions consist of series of 15 land use rights value thresholds ranging from 20,000 RMB to 
300,000 RMB. This response format allows the contingent valuation respondent to indicate the 
certainty of WTB and WTS at the different given prices of land use rights. When the land use 
rights value threshold is very high, the respondent might be very certain of selling the land use 
 24 
 
rights. Similarly, when the values fall at or below the maximum WTB values, then the 
respondent may be very certain that he would buy land use rights.  
 
Table 2.2: Multiple bounded question format 
Question: Suppose that you had the opportunity to either buy or sell your land use rights, would 
you buy or sell your land use rights at the following value of land use rights? 
 
    If Buy If Sell You would 
Scenario 
LUR 
Value 
(RMB) 
Borrow 
and must 
pay this 
amount 
for 10 
years 
Receive 
sell 
amount 
and 
receive 
investment 
income of 
10%/year 
definitely 
buy 
might 
buy 
neither 
buy 
nor sell 
might 
sell 
definitely 
sell 
1 300,000 44,709 30,000           
2 150,000 22,354 15,000           
3 100,000 14,903 10,000           
4 75,000 11,177 7,500           
5 60,000 8,942 6,000           
6 50,000 7,451 5,000           
7 42,857 6,387 4,286           
8 37,500 5,589 3,750           
9 33,333 4,968 3,333           
10 30,000 4,471 3,000           
11 27,273 4,064 2,727           
12 25,000 3,726 2,500           
13 23,077 3,439 2,308           
14 21,429 3,193 2,143           
15 20,000 2,981 2,000           
 
Table 2.3 also provides the percentages of respondents that would buy or sell at the stated 
price. The second column contains the referendum land use rights value thresholds. The last five 
columns provide the distribution of MBDC responses for each threshold. The distribution 
responses follow expected patterns. The proportion of “Definitely Buy” and “Might Buy” 
responses generally increase but the proportion of “Definitely Sell” and “Might Sell” responses 
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decline as threshold values decrease. The results show, as anticipated, that as the price falls farm 
households migrate from sellers to buyers. 
 
Table 2.3: Actual response distributions   
    If Buy If Sell You would 
Scenario 
LUR 
Value 
(RMB) 
Borrow 
and must 
pay this 
amount 
for 10 
years 
Receive 
sell 
amount 
and 
receive 
investment 
income of 
10%/year 
definitely 
buy (%) 
might 
buy 
(%) 
neither 
buy 
nor sell 
(%) 
might 
sell (%) 
definitely 
sell (%) 
1 300,000 44,709 30,000 2.2 1.4 30.3 12.2 53.9 
2 150,000 22,354 15,000 2.2 2.6 40.5 13.6 41.1 
3 100,000 14,903 10,000 3 3 47.9 13.8 32.2 
4 75,000 11,177 7,500 3.5 3.7 59.3 13.1 20.3 
5 60,000 8,942 6,000 3.7 4.3 63.7 10.9 17.3 
6 50,000 7,451 5,000 4.7 5.5 66.1 10.4 13.3 
7 42,857 6,387 4,286 5 7.3 68 9 10.7 
8 37,500 5,589 3,750 6.4 8.7 67.8 7.7 9.4 
9 33,333 4,968 3,333 7.3 9.3 67.5 6.6 9.3 
10 30,000 4,471 3,000 8.3 12.3 65.9 5.1 8.3 
11 27,273 4,064 2,727 11.1 14.8 62.4 4.2 7.5 
12 25,000 3,726 2,500 14.1 15 60.6 4 6.1 
13 23,077 3,439 2,308 16.1 16.9 58.5 3.1 5.4 
14 21,429 3,193 2,143 19.7 16.9 54.9 3.2 5.3 
15 20,000 2,981 2,000 23.7 15.7 52.3 3.1 5.3 
% sum to 100 within rows 
 
The MBDC allows contingent valuation respondents to express their certainty that they 
would buy or sell to provide the contingent valuation good for a range of dollar thresholds. 
Analysis of WTB and WTS data collected using the MBDC technique is conducted using a logit 
model. The purpose of applying a logit model is to estimate the probability of WTB and WTS 
response patterns associated with land use rights values. Estimation of “Definitely Buy”, “Might 
Buy”, “Neither Buy nor Sell”, “Might Sell” and “Definitely Sell” MBDC switching functions 
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use the bounded-likelihood function in equation (2.1);  
 
                                                            
 
                                     (2.1) 
 
where      is the maximum land use right value threshold that the ith individual would be willing 
to buy, and      is the lowest value threshold that the ith individual would be willing to sell. Let  
        denote a statistical distribution function for WTBi and WTSi with parameter vector   
and   is a specific land use right value. The standard logistic function for the cumulative 
distribution function presents in equation (2.2) 
 
                                                        
 
           
                                                   (2.2)  
 
Table 2.4 presents the estimated logit model. The estimated constant Alpha (   and slope 
Beta (  coefficeints are significant at 1% level. The estimated Beta (   coefficeints of 
“Definitely Buy”, “Might Buy”, Neither Buy nor Sell” responses are -0.0000167, -0.0000173, 
and -0.00000519 respectively. These values indicate that the estimated probability of “Definitely 
Buy”, “Might Buy”, Neither Buy nor Sell” responses significantly decrease as the land use rights 
values increase. Conversely, estimated Beta (   coefficeints of “Might Sell” and “Definitely 
Sell” responses are positive with the values of 0.00000378 and 0.0000103 respectively. 
Therefore, the estimated probability of “Might Sell” and “Definitely Sell” responses significantly 
increase as the land use rights values increase.  
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Table 2.4: Esimated logit model 
  Alpha Standard Error Beta Standard Error 
Definitely Buy -1.554061*** 0.0636733 -0.0000167*** 1.41E-06 
Might Buy -1.4771*** 0.0629797 -0.0000173*** 1.41E-06 
Neither 0.6563912*** 0.0273467 -0.00000519*** 2.91E-07 
Might Sell -2.727078*** 0.0491264 0.00000378*** 3.95E-07 
Definitely Sell -2.471121*** 0.0398994 0.0000103*** 3.12E-07 
*** Denotes 1% significance level. 
    
The corresponding logit models are graphically depicted in Figure 2.1. The graphical 
depiction indicates that there is a close correspondence between “Definitely Buy” and “Might 
Buy”. The estimated probability of “Definitely Buy” and “Might Buy” responses decline as the 
land use rights values increase. Similarly, the “Neither Buy nor Sell” curve has a negative slope 
implying that the estimated probability of “Neither Buy nor Sell” falls as the land use rights 
values increase. In contrast, the probability of “Might Sell” and “Definitely Sell” responses rise 
as the land use rights values increase. The gap between “Might Sell” and “Definitely Sell” 
increases as the land use rights value thresholds increase. This indicates that when land use rights 
values are very high, respondents are more likely to sell. 
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Figure 2.1: Estimated logit distribution 
 
 
 
2.6 The Market of Land Use Rights  
In a perfectly competitive market, the opportunity cost of an item would be its price, 
which is equal to the marginal value product of the item. If a non-traded item is bought and sold 
in a relatively competitive market, the market price is the measure of the willingness to pay and 
is generally the best estimate of an opportunity cost. Since, neither a transaction of land use 
rights nor the market of land use rights exists in China; we can generally accept the market price 
directly as our estimate of the economic value of land use rights.  
In this section, we examine the market structure of land use rights; that is “If land use 
rights are transactable, what does the market look like?”. We investigate the demand, supply and 
„equilibrium‟ values of land use rights using the results summarized in Table 2.3.  The response 
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distributions representing aggregate demand and supply curves are illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2 depicts the willingness to buy and the willingness to sell of land use rights. The 
demand curve is represented by the percentage of farmers who would definitely buy or might 
buy land use rights, whereas; the supply curve is represented by percentage of farmers who 
would definitely sell or might sell land use rights. Diagrammatically, market equilibrium occurs 
where the demand and supply curves intersect. This equilibrium is defined by the price at which 
the percentage of farmers willing to buy equals the percentage of farmers willing to sell land use 
rights. 
Figure 2.2: Demand and Supply of Land Use Rights  
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where Y is percentage of farmers, X is land use rights value, a and b are parameters. With the 
power function the variable base X is raised to a fixed power b. A parameter a is a scalar which 
simply moves the values of    up or down.  
Note that if b is positive and non-zero, the function passes through the origin. If the power b 
equals 1 then the relationship of Y and X is linear. However, for all other values the function is 
non-linear and its gradient varies. Now, take the natural logarithm on both sides of equation (2.3) 
we have: 
                                                                                                                                           (2.4) 
This is the linear transformation which is comparable to a single linear regression model: 
                                                                                                                                         (2.5) 
where   is a     vector,   is a     vector of regressor.      , and     which are unknown 
parameters.   is unobserved random variable which account for the discrepancy between the 
actually observed responses and the predicted outcomes. Assume further that the assumptions of 
classical linear regression model hold. Table 2.5 reports OLS regression to characterize demand 
and supply function of land use rights. 
Table 2.5: Power function linear transformation: OLS regression results 
  ln(Y) demand ln(Y) supply 
  Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t 
ln(X) -0.952*** 0 0.8623*** 0 
Constant   12.86682*** 0 -6.313195*** 0 
R-squared 0.9229   0.9456   
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Independent variables,     in both demand and supply equations are statistically significant at 
1% level. The coefficient of     or b is negative for the demand function and positive for the 
supply function. Take the exponential of  , we can recover the value of  ;     . 
The estimated aggregate demand or willingness to buy land use rights is 
                                                             
                                                            (2.6) 
And the estimated aggregate supply or willingness to sell land use rights is 
                                                                            
                                                             (2.7) 
Equating the estimated demand and supply equations we obtain the estimated market 
equilibrium. The equilibrium price of LUR is 39,156 RMB. At this price 16.43% of farmers 
would be willing to sell their land use rights while 16.43% of farmers would be willing buyers. 
Approximately 67% of farmers would not transact even at this price. 
Constant elasticity of power function 
The price elasticity varies along most demand and supply curves. Along a special type of 
demand or supply curve, however, the price elasticity is the same at every point along the curve. 
Consider the demand and supply power function;       , 
where a is a positive constant, b is the constant elasticity of demand or supply function, 
the land use rights value is raised to the b power, and holding income and other factors constant. 
Differentiating this expression with respect to land use rights value (price), we find 
that             . Thus, the elasticity of demand,(           , is 
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                                                                                    (2.8) 
This derivation holds for any land use rights value; hence the elasticity of demand and 
supply is constant at every point along this type of power function curve.  
According to the estimated demand and supply function in (2.6) and (2.7), The price 
elasticity of demand is -0.952 which means that a 1% decrease (increase) in the value of land use 
rights would increase the % of farmers willing to buy land use rights by 0.952%. Likewise, the 
price elasticity of supply of 0.8623 implies that a 1% decrease (increase) in the value of land use 
rights would decrease (increase) the % of farmers who are willing to sell land use rights by 
0.8623%. The demand and supply for land use rights is relatively inelastic as both values of 
elasticity are less than one (in absolute value): that is, changes in land use rights value have a 
relatively small effect on the changes in percentage of farmers willing to buy and sell land use 
rights. 
2.7 Contingent Valuation Method 
In this section, we pursue further estimates of farmers‟ average value of WTB and WTS 
land use rights by applying the contingent valuation method (CVM) using the Multiple Bounded 
Discrete Choice Approach. CVM can estimate money values to non-use values; values that do 
not actually involve market purchases. We design two survey options for estimating the value of 
land use rights; first, farmers answer a self-declarative question and second, farmers responded 
to a polychotomous choice response question. In the self-declare questions, we asked “If the 
government made it legal for farmers to buy or sell land use rights, would you buy or sell land 
use rights?”.  We further asked a potential buyer “If you were to buy a land use rights today, 
what is the maximum amount you would be willing to pay for the land use rights?” and for a 
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potential seller “If you were to sell your land use rights today, what is the minimum amount you 
would be willing to receive for the land use rights?”. The values that potential buyers and sellers 
indicate in the self-declare questions are self-declared WTB and WTS values.  
The polychotomous choice response option, as presented in Table 2.3, is a multiple 
bounded question format with 15 scenarios with land use rights ranging in value from 20,000 
RMB to 300,000 RMB. The way to identify WTB and WTS values of land use rights are as 
follows: The maximum WTB value for each individual is the highest value of land use rights that 
a respondent indicated he would “Definitely buy” or “Might buy”. The minimum WTS value for 
each individual is the lowest value of land use rights that a respondent indicate he would 
“Definitely sell” or “Might sell”. A respondent who identified that he would neither buy nor sell 
at every land use right value in all 15 scenarios is not assigned a value since this would indicate 
non-participation at any price. Table 2.6 illustrates the responses for 10 respondents. Summary 
statistics for the CVM are reported in Table 2.7.  
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Table 2.6: The example of WTB and WTS value assignment of a polychotomous choice 
response 
  Respondents 
LUR Value A B C D E F G H I J 
300,000 5 3 1 5 4 5 5 2 5 5 
150,000 5 3 1 5 4 5 5 2 5 5 
100,000 3 3 1 5 3 5 5 2 3 4 
75,000 3 3 1 5 3 3 5 2 3 1 
60,000 3 3 1 5 3 3 5 2 3 1 
50,000 3 3 1 5 3 3 5 2 3 1 
42,857 3 3 1 5 2 3 5 2 3 1 
37,500 3 3 1 5 2 3 5 2 3 1 
33,333 3 3 1 5 2 3 5 2 3 1 
30,000 3 3 1 5 2 3 4 2 3 1 
27,273 3 3 1 5 2 3 4 2 3 1 
25,000 3 3 1 5 1 3 3 2 3 1 
23,077 2 3 1 5 1 3 3 2 3 1 
21,429 2 3 1 5 1 3 3 2 3 1 
20,000 2 3 1 5 1 3 3 2 3 1 
Maximum 
WTB 23,077 - 300,000 - 42,857 - - 300,000 - 75,000 
Minimum 
WTS 150,000 - - 20,000 150,000 100,000 27,273 - 150,000 100,000 
Note: code 1 = definitely buy, 2 = might buy, 3 = neither buy nor sell, 4 = might sell, 5 = definitely sell 
 
Using this approach we define the Maximum WTB and Minimum WTS. In the Tobit 
regressions to follow the dependent variables are made up from these values. For example the 
dependent variable value recorded to respondent A for the WTB Tobit regression is 23,077 RMB 
and for the WTS Tobit regression it is 150,000 RMB. For respondent J the respective values for 
WTB and WTS are 75,000 and 100,000 RMB. Respondent B indicated neither buy nor sell at 
any price and was excluded from both Tobit models. Respondent C indicated a willingness to 
purchase at any price, with no willingness to sell and was therefore excluded from the WTS 
Tobit, but included in the WTB with a value of 300,000 RMB. In contrast respondent D 
indicated a willingness to sell at any price and was included in the WTS Tobit but excluded from 
the WTB Tobit. 
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Table 2.7: Summary statistics for the CVM 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Self-declare Max WTB 227 24,571.67 55,367.89 40 600,000 
Self-declare Min WTS 207 71,748.65 98,964.47 0 600,000 
Polychotomous choice Max 
WTB 295 58,443.16 72,845.45 20,000 300,000 
Polychotomous choice Min 
WTS 491 110,857.50 94,299.85 20,000 300,000 
 
 
We do not believe that land per mu, about 1/6th of an acre, will transact at anywhere 
near, let alone above 24,000 RMB. What the results actually indicate is that the spread between 
the price at which potential sellers will sell or potential buyers will buy are nowhere close. The 
suggested equilibrium is where the numbers of buyers equals the number of sellers, but this is 
not to say that this is the current equilibrium or whether such an equilibrium will actually arise in 
the near future.  In fact the results suggest the opposite; that in the near term there are not enough 
buyers (at a price of 24,000 RMB) to satisfy the price at which buyers would sell (at a price of 
72,000 RMB). These results indicate that at the present there is a significant excess demand for 
land use rights. 
To determine the contingent values of WTB and WTS land use rights in self-declare 
questions, we use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) in regression analysis. On the other hand, since 
the land use rights values in polychotomous choice with 15 scenarios are upper bounded at 
300,000 RMB and lower bounded at 20,000 RMB, the CVM studies of polychotomous choice 
maximum WTB and minimum WTS have treated the value of land use rights as if they were 
censored at 300,000 and 20,000, and estimated subsequent WTB and WTS functions using Tobit 
Model.  
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The Tobit Model 
The Tobit model identifies characteristics of farmers that determine WTB and WTS for 
the land use rights. Based on Cho et al. (2005) and Greene (2011), the Tobit model can be 
generally expressed: 
                                                                                                                              (2.9) 
 
where for the ith household,    is vector of WTB or WTS depending on ith is a buyer or seller of 
land use rights,    is a vector of explanatory variables,    is a random disturbance term, and   is 
a parameter vector common to all households. Assuming the random error is independent and 
normally distributed across respondents, the expected WTB or expected WTS for an observation 
drawn at random is: 
                                                                                                             (2.10) 
 
where   represents the normal distribution function,   represents the normal density function, 
and   represents the standard deviation. The expected value of WTB and WTS for observations 
above zero, here called E(Z*) is simply    plus the expected value of the truncated normal error 
terms, see Amemiya (1973). Then, the expected WTB and WTS can be expressed as: 
 
                                                                                                                         (2.11)  
 
The decomposition of this marginal effect that is obtained by considering the effect of a change 
in the ith variable of X on Z, see McDonald et al. (1980): 
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                                (2.12) 
 
The total change in Z can be disaggregated into two parts. First, the change in Z of the above 
zero value is weighted by the probability of being above the zero. Second, the change in the 
probability of being above the zero value is weighted by the expected value of Z if above the 
zero. Equation (2.11) can be evaluated at the mean of the Xs,    with estimates of   and  . The 
fraction of the total marginal effect due to the effect above the zero value of land use rights is 
 
                                                    
                   (2.13) 
 
2.8 Determinants of Farmland Value and Regressors 
Factors affecting farmland values have significant implications for the opportunity cost of 
agricultural production as farmland is the major asset in the agricultural balance sheet. Changes 
in farmland values imply changes in farmer‟s wealth which may influence the well-being of farm 
households. Previous literature has identified a number of possible factors associated with land 
value. For instance, Breffle et al. (1998) suggest that willingness to pay to preserve 
underdeveloped urban land is a function of income, household characteristics and location. Like 
other goods, important determinants of land values are those factors that affect supply, the 
amount of land offered to the market; and demand, the amount of land desired from the market.  
According to Gloy et al. (2011), there are several factors that affect the demand and 
supply, and thus price of farmland. The major drivers of farmland demand are farm income, the 
capitalization rate, development potential, and return on farmland investment compared to other 
investment. The higher net income resulting from higher productivity, higher product prices, or 
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lower cost of production would lead to the higher land value. Furthermore, a higher 
capitalization rate resulting from higher interest rates, higher risk premiums or lower expected 
rates of growth in income will result in lower land values. In addition, land plot with high 
development potential and high investment return would cause a higher land values. 
Farmland‟s price also depends upon the supply offered to the market. Offerings to the 
market depend significantly on the demographic such as age and investment behaviors of 
landowners. Further, the current financial position and the returns on alternative investments are 
also influence land value. If farmland generates a higher return than alternative investments, it is 
less likely to be offered to the market, whereas a lower return on farmland compared to 
alternative investments would suggest more land offered to the market. 
Based on the results reported by the prior studies, a number of important factors affecting 
the value of land use rights were reviewed. We also include other factors that were expected to 
correlate with WTB and WTS of land use rights. 
Demographic factors: We include sex and education level as independent variables. 
Gender differences and education level might be associated with the WTB and WTS of land use 
rights. Several studies examine gender's effect on WTP for economic, social or environmental 
goods and services and suggest that male, education and economic status positively influence 
WTP (see also Dong et al.  (2003) and Farreras et al. (2005)). 
Farm attribute and production factors: Farm attribute such as years of farming, farm size 
and farm rent dummy are included in the regression. O.I. (2008) examines the factors 
determining farmers‟ willingness to pay for agricultural extension services in Oyo state, Nigeria. 
Economic impact studies on agricultural extension have shown positive effect of extension on 
technology adoption, farm productivity and farm profits. The author finds that male farmers, 
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with longer farming experience and high proportion of crops sold will lead to a decrease in the 
probability of willingness to pay for extension services. As the farm size increases, the 
probability of the willingness to pay for extension services also increases as farmers would tend 
to be commercial oriented due to large farm sizes. Similarly, land tenurial right is positively 
related to the willingness to pay for extension services. The rent on land would have constituted 
additional cost of production that discourages willingness to pay for extension services. Jin et al. 
(2009) study the impact of rental markets in China‟s nine most important agricultural provinces 
and find that the gains in allocative efficiency and productivity of land use that can be realized 
through rental markets increases of some 60%. These lead to improvements in tenants‟ welfare 
of some 25%, and even larger increases in landlords‟ income. In our analysis, farm rent dummy 
is a binary variable taking value 1 if respondents rent farmland, and 0 otherwise. In addition, 
farmers were asked the best crop value grown in their farmland. The production of corn, wheat, 
tomato and kiwi dummy variables are also included as regressors. Since, tomato and kiwi are 
high profit crops, farmers who mainly grow tomato or kiwi are expected to have high WTB or 
low WTS of land use rights.  
 Profitability factors: Previous literature suggested that farm income and expected return 
from farm investment are major factor of land value. (see also Gloy et al. (2011) and Breffle et 
al. (1998)). Salois et al. (2010) compare the effect of farm income and population growth on 
farmland values and suggest that changes in farmland values are more strongly associated with 
changes in the distribution of returns. Farm income seems to be the more predictive factor of 
farmland value in most of the farm regions. We include household income, percentage of income 
from farming and asset value in regression.  
Debt, credit and liquidity factors: Farm real estate has served as collateral for farm 
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mortgages. In particular, secure property rights are important for collateralizing both formal and 
informal loans, Ferranti et al. (2005). The use of farmland as collateral for farm loans links the 
financial feasibility of many rural lenders to farmland values. We want to examine whether debt, 
credit and liquidity factor have a significant impact of WTB and WTS for land use rights, and 
thus land value. Therefore, the independent variables of formal borrowing, informal borrowing, 
saving, risk rationing and quantity rationing are taken into account in the analysis. Formal 
borrow variable takes value = 1 if respondents borrow money from formal lenders such as Rural 
Credit Cooperatives (RCC) or banks and takes value = 0 otherwise. In contrary, informal borrow 
variable takes value = 1 if respondents borrow money from friends or relatives and takes value = 
0 otherwise Risk rationing and quantity rationing are dummy variables for risk rationed farmers 
and quantity rationed farmers, which are compared relative to price rationed farmers, see how to 
classify risk rationed, quantity rationed and price rationed individuals in Khantachavana et al. 
(2011).    
Attitude toward risk factors: Previous studies suggest that the level of risk aversion and 
prudence are associated with WTB and WTS. Okada (2010) study the case of forward contracts 
and fixed-fee turnkey contracts and demonstrate that the discrepancy between the seller's 
willingness to accept (WTA) and buyer's willingness to pay (WTP) increases with the level of 
uncertainty about the exchange item's value and the exchange parties' level of risk aversion. Risk 
aversion is found to decrease the WTP while increase the WTA. However, high prudent farmers 
are expected to place relatively greater maximum WTB value of land use rights. Kimball (1991) 
finds that prudent individuals have precautionary saving motive that can cause them to respond 
to a risk by accumulating more wealth. Land is a valuable asset and a factor of production that 
can generate income for farm households. Hence, the precautionary demand can cause farmers to 
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respond to a risk by placing high maximum value of WTB and holding more farmland. 
We include risk aversion score and prudence score as proxies of risk attitude in the 
regression. Risk aversion score is calculated based on farmers‟ willingness to take risk, risk 
management options use and perceptions. In the survey form farmers were asked to identify their 
willingness to accept greater production risks in order to increase the chance of higher profits, to 
take risks with new technologies, and to take risks with new management practices before seeing 
good results in other farms. In addition, farmers indicated how important of risk management in 
their farm. Risk management options that we asked include farm diversification, geographic 
diversification, irrigation, marketing diversification, forward contract, participation in 
government programs, maintaining financial reserves and investing off-farm for other sources of 
income. Prudence score is calculated based on the purposes of their precautionary savings. 
Farmers specified their level of agreement or disagreement on a five-level Likert scale for a 
series of statements; I save in case my automobile break down; I save for unexpected medical 
emergency; I save to protect job loss; and I save for unanticipated crop loss. The higher the score 
would indicate that the respondent is more risk averse and prudence. 
Other variables of interest are as follow. First, Business climate variable is used to 
capture farmers‟ perception of macroeconomic environment. Business climate takes value = 1, 0 
or -1 if respondents indicate that the current business climate for farmers in your area compared 
to last year is getting better, about the same, or getting worse, respectively. Second, “migrant 
farm labor” variable represents employment status of whether respondents or their spouse are 
migrant worker farm labors. Migrant labor is of interest because we expect that migrant labor 
would be more likely to sell their land use right and work in the city. Thus, their maximum WTB 
and minimum WTS are relatively low. Third, entrepreneurship factors consist of “ever started 
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business” and “plan to start business” variables. If a respondent has ever started business, then 
“ever started business” takes value =1 and 0 otherwise. “Plan to start business” variable is a 
dummy variable to account for farmers‟ entrepreneurial decision. It takes value 1 if respondents 
are planning to start a new business, and 0 otherwise. Forth, computer and internet variables are 
included to capture information access. If respondents have a computer at home, then 
“computer” variable takes value = 1 and 0 otherwise. If respondents have internet access from 
home, then “internet” variable takes value = 1 and 0 otherwise.  
Next, political factors associated with WTB and WTS land use rights are considered in 
the study. Private ownership of land is not allowed under the Constitution, and rural land is still 
effectively controlled by township and village level leaders. Village leaders may also receive 
sizeable advantages through their control over the sale of village land for industrial development 
and other purposes, Brandt et al. (2002). Ravallion et al. (2008)
4
 find that having a household 
member with a government job or a job in a state-owned enterprise tended to increase 
consumption efficient land allocation but reduce the administrative allocation which resulted in a 
higher efficient land allocation – suggestive of greater access to credit or productive inputs by 
households. In 2003, the China Rural Land Contract Law was implemented with the purposes to 
strengthen individual rights and limit the ability of village leaders to exercise unconstrained 
power. However, results from Deininger et al. (2006) support the notion that it would be naïve to 
assume that village leaders whose discretionary power may be reduced by such new legislation 
would be very eager to implement it. Moreover, Ding (2003) argue that land policy reforms in 
China have yielded positive impacts on urban land use as well as negative socioeconomic 
consequences such as government corruption, see also Liu et al. (1998). Therefore, we include 
                                                 
4
 The authors of the book “Land in Transition: Reform and Poverty in Rural Vietnam”. Vietnam is the fast 
developing socialist economy in implementing market-based reforms which follow China’s pattern.  
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variables representing whether household members work for village leader, village committee, 
state government, county government, state enterprise, and RCC or bank as regressors. 
Finally, we include a binary variable to assess whether land located in villages within city 
limits affect WTB and WTS. According to the land valuation models of David Ricardo and 
Johann Heinrich von Thünen, the Ricardian rent is a decreasing function of the distance to the 
urban center. The von Thünen model also explains that land closer to the urban center is 
more valuable for conversion, given that farmland can be allocated to urban uses, Salois et al. 
(2010). Land location is represented by a “near city dummy” variable indicating whether the land 
is located within city boundary. We use Xi‟an city as a point of reference and assign the value of 
city distance variable =1 for 12 villages closed to Xi‟an and value = 0 for other 12 villages 
farther away from Xi‟an.  
 
2.9 Estimation of Land Value: Willingness to Buy and Sell Land Use Rights 
The OLS are reported in Table 2.9 – 2.10 and Tobit regression results are reported in 
Table 2.11 – 2.12. In OLS (1) and Tobit (1) column, only major factors are included in a model, 
namely demographic, farm attribute and production, profitability, debt, credit and liquidity, and 
attitude toward risk factors. In OLS (2) and Tobit (2) column, other variables also included 
except a village fixed effect. The OLS (3) and Tobit (3) are complete models that include all 
factors of interest. We pay attention to OLS(3) and Tobit (3) models. The factors that increase 
the maximum WTB or minimum WTS would cause the higher land user rights value. In contrast, 
the factors that decrease the maximum WTB or minimum WTS would cause the smaller land 
user rights value. 
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Self-declare questions: 
The maximum WTB and minimum WTS data obtained from self-declare questions are 
applied in the OLS analysis. The results suggest that farmers who grow tomato have a higher 
WTB land use rights. Though, tomato coefficient in OLS(3) is not significant but those in OLS 
(1) and OLS (2) are statistically significant at 10% level. This is because tomato farm makes 
higher profit to farmers. So, they would be willing to buy more land to grow tomato, and thus the 
value of land use rights would increase. Risk rationed and quantity rationed individuals would 
have higher WTB compared to price rationed individuals. Even though, risk rationed and 
quantity rationed farmers have liquidity constraint, they would be more likely to buy land use 
rights if they have enough money and can afford it. Risk rationed individual is a risk averse 
person who did not accept the approved loan because he is afraid of losing land as collateral. In 
this sense, if he is able to buy land use rights, his maximum WTB would be greater than that of 
other types of credit rationed individuals. This is consistent to previous literature finding that risk 
averse agents are more likely to hold assets. In addition, computer, village committee and near 
city dummy variables are positively related to WTB for land use rights. Since the impact of 
computer on WTB can also be considered as a wealth effect, farmers having a computer at home 
have high WTB and would be more willing to buy land use rights. Having family members work 
in a village committee would increase the WTB for land use rights because they are 
representative of farmers who may have insider information. Farmers living in village near a city 
are more willing to pay higher price for land use rights. These significant factors are expected to 
increase value of land use rights. 
The results of the OLS model presented in Table 2.10 shows that farmers who grow 
tomato have high minimum WTS for land use rights. Therefore, if they sell land use rights, they 
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will sell at a high price. This could predict that they are less likely to sell land use rights and buy 
more land use rights because tomato is a high value crop. Furthermore, profitability factors are 
associated with WTS. The coefficients of household income, percentage of income from farming 
and asset value are positively related to WTS of land use rights. The relatively rich farmers or 
those who can generate high income from farming would sell land use rights at a high price 
because their marginal productivity of land is relatively high. Formal borrowing and land 
location near the city are inversely associated with WTS. Farmers who can access to a formal 
credit or who reside near the city have a low minimum WTS indicating that they are more likely 
to sell their land use rights. This may imply that formal borrowers also need money from their 
land use rights. Farmers whose land located near the city want to sell land use rights because 
they have more opportunity to work in the city. On the other hand, farmers who have ever stated 
business have high minimum WTS indicating that they are less likely to sell their land use rights. 
This is consistent to the crosstabulation results presented in Table 2.8 indicating that 48.4% of 
farmers who have ever started a new business would be more likely to remain the agriculture.  
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Table 2.8: Crosstabulation results 
 
 
you ever started a new 
business 
Total No Yes 
If I could get adequate 
credit as I needed from 
a bank or RCC, I would 
be more likely to  
Leave agriculture and 
start a non-farm 
enterprise 
24.1% 34.8% 28.3% 
Leave agriculture and 
work as off-farm labor 
3.0% 8.2% 5.0% 
Remain in agriculture 
and expand agricultural 
production 
39.4% 25.1% 33.8% 
Remain in agriculture 
and also start a non 
farm business 
16.6% 23.3% 19.2% 
None of the above 16.9% 8.6% 13.6% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Polychotomous choice/ multiple bounded questions: 
The tobit model results using data from polychotomous choice questions are shown in 
Table 2.11 and 2.12. Crop types grown by farmers are significant indicator of WTB. Results 
show that corn and wheat farmers have relatively small maximum WTB and would be more 
likely to sell land use rights because corn and wheat are not high profit crops compared to tomato 
and kiwi. Also, farmers having more saving or having internet access at home place relatively 
greater maximum WTB value of land use rights. Relatively rich farmers would be willing to pay 
for land use rights at higher price. This result is consistent with the result from self-declare 
questions in OLS model. Having internet access would increase the willing to buy land use rights 
because internet can provide more information about the land market. Furthermore, having 
family members working for state enterprise also increase maximum WTB, though the 
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coefficient is not statistically significant. This is consistent with Ravallion et al. (2008) finding. 
Business climate and computer factors are inversely related to WTB. This implies that if the 
economy is getting better, farmers would place a lower maximum WTB and would be less likely 
to buy land use rights. This could be because of the marginal substitution between working in-
farm and off-farm. The economic boom would lead to an increase in employment opportunities 
and thus, farmers are encouraged to leave agriculture and work off-farm.  
The minimum WTS for land use rights depends on several factors. First, female 
respondents place relatively greater maximum WTB value of land use rights. The similar results 
from Barclay‟s Wealth reported by Frank (2009) show that women also are more likely to enjoy 
investing in real estate than men. From the survey of 2,000 investors world-wide, 44% of women 
surveyed find buying property more enjoyable than investing in other asset classes. Second, 
percentage of income from farming and saving are found to be negatively correlated with WTS. 
This result contradicts with the result in the OLS model. The result in a tobit model suggests that 
relatively rich farmers tend to sell land use rights at low price and would be more likely to sell 
their land use rights implying that they want to exit farming. Third, farmers having internet 
access place a high minimum WTS for land use rights, so the land use rights value would 
increase. The result is consistent with the OLS model suggesting the increase in maximum WTB 
and value of land use rights. Finally, having family members work as a village leader or work in 
a county government would cause a decrease in minimum WTS. This suggests that having a 
secure job encourages workers to sell land use rights at low price.  
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Table 2.9: OLS regression results: self declare maximum WTB 
 
 
OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) 
Self-Declare Max 
WTB Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t 
Sex (female = 1) 1989.856 0.823 7751.398 0.276 -873.7118 0.907 
Education 4607.344 0.194 433.5559 0.859 -466.1842 0.847 
Years of farming 66.78306 0.814 -101.5056 0.747 108.0724 0.73 
Farm size (mu) -481.7304 0.625 -209.6139 0.829 310.9898 0.752 
Farm rent dummy 8490.814 0.438 112.5298 0.991 -5547.707 0.657 
Corn -2553.107 0.85 11831.41 0.371 15558.32 0.526 
Wheat -15892.17 0.119 3500.967 0.792 10691.57 0.619 
Tomato 84016.81* 0.051 54689.43* 0.085 41023.04 0.103 
Kiwi -29959.62* 0.056 -23692.39 0.408 -28773.1 0.433 
Household income -0.209464 0.243 -0.0705865 0.61 -0.0840104 0.635 
Percent income 
farming 10330.07 0.465 18262.16 0.176 10262.58 0.542 
Asset value 0.0410925** 0.021 0.0376429*** 0.008 0.0183803 0.182 
Informal borrow -10502.03 0.162 -5996.901 0.431 1660.976 0.861 
Formal borrow -34090.08* 0.073 -21378.33* 0.072 -16993.88 0.197 
Saving -7824.25 0.27 -1307.03 0.742 -1904.828 0.606 
Risk Rationing 17340.59 0.365 23129.81 0.264 36662.7 0.103 
Quantity Rationing 11730.4 0.257 19415.37* 0.099 19262.42 0.113 
Risk aversion score -105.7657 0.554 -131.8169 0.473 -157.5361 0.544 
Prudence score 487.9448 0.145 272.2502 0.307 220.4291 0.483 
Business Climate 
  
4404.534 0.446 6451.253 0.211 
Migrant farm labor 
  
-10532.27 0.272 -11989.97 0.414 
Ever started business 
  
-542.2131 0.942 -297.8523 0.97 
Plan to start business 
  
-4161.853 0.577 7698.805 0.457 
Computer 
  
21525.97 0.399 42329.51* 0.098 
Internet 
  
-15045.37 0.557 -25289.08 0.317 
Village leader 
  
-15616.5 0.363 -10950.56 0.628 
Village committee 
  
27614.36 0.116 40014.61* 0.092 
State government 
  
-24397.42*** 0.008 -12461.99 0.302 
County government 
  
639.0494 0.976 5289.759 0.839 
State enterprise 
  
-16631.18 0.183 -23404.5 0.104 
RCC or bank 
  
70.80949 0.997 -1872.605 0.94 
Near city dummy     17594.27 0.115 56731.23* 0.078 
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(Continued) OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) 
Self-Declare Max 
WTB Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t 
bigong 
    
20387.48 0.547 
chenmayuan 
    
-27294.38 0.592 
datong 
    
31178.73 0.305 
han 
    
24506.9 0.343 
huangbao 
    
-51666.78** 0.011 
huangbu 
    
27849.57 0.374 
laoshang 
    
-16579.13 0.533 
laoxia 
    
-35439.08 0.118 
liaodi 
    
20681.2 0.449 
liaoshang 
    
-24167.81 0.468 
maying 
    
(dropped) 
 mengjiazhai 
    
6094.83 0.87 
pingxi 
    
-30174.96 0.118 
sihu 
    
26242.23 0.388 
taibai 
    
64495.76 0.194 
tangjia 
    
-33564.62 0.236 
xiaozhai 
    
28516.3 0.339 
xidazhai 
    
-9369.849 0.808 
xieshang 
    
31531.52 0.689 
xixiaozhai 
    
22033.04 0.387 
yindou 
    
22553.81 0.504 
zanfan 
    
(dropped) 
 zhaixi 
    
-28341.78 0.432 
Constant 7900.329 0.729 -9455.348 0.692 -40177.84 0.381 
Observations 171   146   146   
Expected LUR Value  24967.97    23996.23   23551.34   
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 2.10: OLS regression results: self declare minimum WTS 
 
 
OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) 
Self-Declare Min 
WTS Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t 
Sex (female = 1) 25983.39 0.139 48112.36** 0.031 16055.36 0.396 
Education 7110.483 0.273 10294.51 0.121 5876.519 0.406 
Years of farming -270.1117 0.731 1085.719 0.188 61.67728 0.947 
Farm size (mu) 601.6229 0.853 -1557.711 0.669 -4161.307 0.237 
Farm rent dummy 33675 0.193 33684.12 0.129 22137.64 0.274 
Corn -11498.94 0.56 -16181.9 0.512 -13936.98 0.664 
Wheat 4701.004 0.786 -3813.272 0.849 10268.99 0.691 
Tomato 102400.6 0.238 140747.9** 0.037 172276.2** 0.022 
Kiwi -4507.4 0.851 28281.28 0.411 29368.72 0.431 
Household income -0.1998493 0.394 -0.0351235 0.875 0.2861343 0.153 
Percent income 
farming -898.7404 0.977 9435.284 0.769 66935.55* 0.055 
Asset value 0.0689114** 0.024 0.0472253 0.112 0.0415075 0.139 
Informal borrow 5070.179 0.763 -9322.856 0.64 606.8493 0.976 
Formal borrow -59970.48*** 0.002 -73328.38*** 0.002 -106519.4*** 0 
Saving -2283.677 0.776 -9186.982 0.305 -3536.754 0.71 
Risk Rationing 40046.4 0.401 42001.44 0.229 -7586.325 0.802 
Quantity Rationing 2302.286 0.897 -10681.77 0.646 -9970.671 0.681 
Risk aversion score 73.49729 0.87 287.0733 0.538 637.3785 0.313 
Prudence score 938.7586* 0.051 499.6503 0.395 176.3827 0.762 
Business Climate 
  
5771.957 0.591 15364.04 0.185 
Migrant farm labor 
  
-132935.3* 0.082 -47912.03 0.332 
Ever started business 
  
34262.34* 0.085 43693.55** 0.028 
Plan to start business 
  
10214.45 0.589 -10264.1 0.614 
Computer 
  
1299.19 0.975 4584.232 0.905 
Internet 
  
-16175.46 0.713 22226.31 0.561 
Village leader 
  
100797.2** 0.049 16909.31 0.62 
Village committee 
  
-18148.62 0.72 38378.44 0.192 
State government 
  
50860.61 0.388 18074.28 0.652 
County government 
  
-26195.59 0.327 -20519.93 0.404 
State enterprise 
  
58520.13* 0.058 25462.65 0.388 
RCC or bank 
  
-42766.76 0.345 -9844.139 0.801 
Near city dummy     -25982.04 0.179 -84575.37** 0.042 
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(Continued) OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) 
Self-Declare Min 
WTS Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t 
bigong 
    
-31411.15 0.536 
chenmayuan 
    
(dropped) 
 datong 
    
-135053.1*** 0.003 
han 
    
-43074.73 0.471 
huangbao 
    
(dropped) 
 huangbu 
    
(dropped) 
 laoshang 
    
-35529.5 0.501 
laoxia 
    
22273.51 0.626 
liaodi 
    
-50577.23 0.342 
liaoshang 
    
(dropped) 
 maying 
    
-44074.94 0.203 
mengjiazhai 
    
-13687.67 0.676 
pingxi 
    
(dropped) 
 sihu 
    
16891.82 0.789 
taibai 
    
-14117.44 0.69 
tangjia 
    
86403.17** 0.023 
xiaozhai 
    
-92888.4** 0.039 
xidazhai 
    
126982** 0.014 
xieshang 
    
-93004.25 0.155 
xixiaozhai 
    
72431.53* 0.075 
yindou 
    
-110469.9* 0.058 
zanfan 
    
408211.1*** 0 
zhaixi 
    
6793.183 0.845 
Constant -40275.52 0.588 -76497.27 0.298 -6228.309 0.92 
Observations 145   127   127   
Expected LUR Value 61958.93   64999.36   68642.95   
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 2.11: Tobit regression results: polychotomous choice maximum WTB 
 
 
Tobit (1) Tobit (2) Tobit (3) 
Polychotomous Max 
WTB Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t 
Sex (female = 1) -11671.27 0.316 -9376.545 0.463 -8940.947 0.474 
Education -1607.546 0.641 -3049.735 0.43 -2037.732 0.566 
Years of farming -485.7963 0.333 -299.1931 0.605 -404.3269 0.457 
Farm size (mu) 1185.205 0.612 2066.231 0.451 224.9394 0.936 
Farm rent dummy 3376.125 0.794 3814.37 0.795 5141.855 0.723 
Corn -26139.35 0.155 -35216.93* 0.061 -66252.23*** 0.002 
Wheat -18308.11 0.243 -25075.45 0.158 -51995.98*** 0.007 
Tomato 9353.765 0.719 -12260.7 0.655 16243.64 0.556 
Kiwi -52806.5 0.501 -59723.4 0.434 1978.255 0.978 
Household income 0.0866004 0.728 0.1272882 0.638 0.1504057 0.57 
Percent income farming 8943.175 0.702 21124.6 0.413 22765.24 0.375 
Asset value 0.0100693 0.612 -0.0056808 0.782 -0.0117611 0.539 
Informal borrow -7729.877 0.558 3750.699 0.797 3112.923 0.831 
Formal borrow -13598.68 0.375 -10509.55 0.521 2498.246 0.874 
Saving 2347.83 0.674 9294.504 0.159 9874.4 0.124 
Risk Rationing -506.0844 0.979 -7946.966 0.693 7387.559 0.718 
Quantity Rationing -9051.046 0.554 -7046.448 0.687 -186.8524 0.991 
Risk aversion score -287.8146 0.386 49.94674 0.895 211.3823 0.606 
Prudence score 63.77366 0.853 -434.7502 0.32 -415.9749 0.325 
Business Climate 
  
-7436.495 0.397 -13670.73 0.117 
Migrant farm labor 
  
-21103.02 0.484 -7914.564 0.794 
Ever started business 
  
14333.85 0.236 6099.882 0.602 
Plan to start business 
  
-5167.986 0.719 -2067.971 0.883 
Computer 
  
-33315.89 0.223 -46871.92* 0.073 
Internet 
  
37006.47 0.212 58780.37** 0.038 
Village leader 
  
-23617.72 0.396 -25563.04 0.334 
Village committee 
  
5904.928 0.836 10944.99 0.683 
State government 
  
27650.58 0.334 25026.97 0.379 
County government 
  
12473.11 0.58 11617.41 0.588 
State enterprise 
  
32950.52* 0.054 26938.9 0.104 
RCC or bank 
  
33765.85 0.21 28171.05 0.258 
Near city dummy     285.0204 0.984 63113.71 0.232 
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(Continued) Tobit (1) Tobit (2) Tobit (3) 
Polychotomous Max 
WTB Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t 
bigong 
    
-5545.159 0.92 
chenmayuan 
    
-4569.621 0.96 
datong 
    
38278.62 0.497 
han 
    
26273.11 0.638 
huangbao 
    
43003.08 0.245 
huangbu 
    
10618.02 0.85 
laoshang 
    
-36039.17 0.43 
laoxia 
    
-53994.85* 0.056 
liaodi 
    
-4248.712 0.946 
liaoshang 
    
12782.94 0.836 
maying 
    
-39559.65 0.558 
mengjiazhai 
    
-111728.3*** 0.001 
sihu 
    
53558.46 0.329 
taibai 
    
36256.86 0.523 
tangjia 
    
-30859.04 0.241 
xiaozhai 
    
144295.9** 0.014 
xidazhai 
    
-76415.64 0.162 
xieshang 
    
-100673.6** 0.012 
xixiaozhai 
    
-74071.54*** 0.009 
yindou 
    
-2459.849 0.969 
zanfan 
    
19408.1 0.819 
zhaixi 
    
-91640.75*** 0.005 
Constant 98518.36** 0.015 77354.64* 0.077 68291.54 0.231 
Observations 219 
 
189 
 
189 
 Log likelihood -2604.4296   -2239.4288   -2215.3056     
Expected LUR Value 56889.15    55830.37   58881.91   
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 2.12: Tobit regression results: polychotomous choice minimum WTS 
 
 
Tobit (1) Tobit (2) Tobit (3) 
Polychotomous Min 
WTS Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t 
Sex (female = 1) 21003.86* 0.08 25305.2** 0.05 24838.26* 0.065 
Education 3515.046 0.327 1715.039 0.658 2891.647 0.444 
Years of farming -194.0568 0.69 189.6762 0.731 330.2639 0.545 
Farm size (mu) 6003.045** 0.016 6768.036** 0.017 2559.477 0.392 
Farm rent dummy -11997.05 0.375 -9178.823 0.538 -7336.322 0.625 
Corn 4648.95 0.806 10052.77 0.606 -18856.9 0.397 
Wheat -12646.1 0.445 -18187.48 0.32 -27426.44 0.19 
Tomato 278.3883 0.993 -153.364 0.996 26606.64 0.426 
Kiwi -32102.9 0.663 -80315.23 0.268 -39606.33 0.588 
Household income -0.2623357 0.305 -0.2776085 0.292 -0.3221649 0.212 
Percent income farming -38642.5* 0.092 -47524.02* 0.052 -47668.43* 0.058 
Asset value 0.00495 0.804 0.0032725 0.876 0.0158354 0.458 
Informal borrow -19861.34 0.155 -20841.16 0.182 -20719.37 0.189 
Formal borrow -16366.33 0.336 -21866.89 0.21 -19400.04 0.277 
Saving -11828.3** 0.043 -16814.35** 0.015 -13368.55* 0.057 
Risk Rationing 50002.75** 0.042 54413.41** 0.033 27967.26 0.299 
Quantity Rationing 762.4771 0.962 -17679.76 0.319 -8136.323 0.646 
Risk aversion score -135.838 0.703 378.8171 0.344 440.8792 0.322 
Prudence score 11.43919 0.974 167.5496 0.683 227.8748 0.586 
Business Climate 
  
10902.34 0.223 13726.25 0.131 
Migrant farm labor 
  
22860.02 0.499 21415.84 0.514 
Ever started business 
  
10376 0.409 6595.018 0.618 
Plan to start business 
  
671.8331 0.961 247.2213 0.986 
Computer 
  
-40116.67 0.216 -41290.07 0.2 
Internet 
  
76812.23** 0.026 85797.81** 0.012 
Village leader 
  
-47686.86 0.115 -59943.27** 0.048 
Village committee 
  
22650.71 0.433 18182.06 0.527 
State government 
  
33565.24 0.221 20797.5 0.457 
County government 
  
-66726.98*** 0.007 -63602.89*** 0.01 
State enterprise 
  
22736.81 0.27 26541.84 0.2 
RCC or bank 
  
52866.16 0.119 42665.54 0.2 
Near city dummy     3113.88 0.832 57612.47 0.414 
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(Continued) Tobit (1) Tobit (2) Tobit (3) 
Polychotomous Min 
WTS Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t 
bigong 
    
33530.57 0.647 
chenmayuan 
    
54197.69 0.66 
datong 
    
82067.37 0.276 
han 
    
95162.05 0.194 
huangbao 
    
14694.36 0.706 
huangbu 
    
50221.81 0.51 
laoshang 
    
25498.21 0.494 
laoxia 
    
-5989.234 0.831 
liaodi 
    
63420.46 0.395 
liaoshang 
    
-27874.74 0.73 
maying 
    
-66625.67 0.474 
mengjiazhai 
    
-58203.02 0.154 
pingxi 
    
19414.88 0.837 
sihu 
    
42635.39 0.555 
taibai 
    
34127.15 0.643 
tangjia 
    
-43948.36 0.144 
xiaozhai 
    
-42420.42 0.575 
xidazhai 
    
53830.08 0.314 
xieshang 
    
-89679.4** 0.033 
xixiaozhai 
    
-77395.08** 0.022 
yindou 
    
15946.88 0.838 
zanfan 
    
97070.95 0.341 
zhaixi 
    
-1869.635 0.954 
Constant 117781.8*** 0.006 79308.02 0.101 45208.23 0.541 
Observations 355 
 
300 
 
300 
 Log likelihood -4015.0717   -3361.8363    -3345.0615    
Expected LUR Value 99041.91   99414.4   96871.68   
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Summary of expected land use rights value by models are reported in Table 2.13.  
Compared to the equilibrium land use rights value of 39,156.13 RMB in a power function, we 
find the expected maximum WTB and minimum WTS from self-declare questions are 23,551.34 
RMB and 68,642.95 RMB respectively. With the existence of land use rights market, the 
expected value of land use rights would probably be in between the value of 23,551.34 RMB and 
68,642.95 RMB. However, the expected maximum WTB and minimum WTS from 
polychotomous choice format are found to be 58,881.91 RMB and 96,871.68 RMB respectively. 
These two values are greater than the equilibrium land use rights value of 39,156.13 RMB 
estimated in a power function. The expected value of land use rights from polychotomous choice 
would be in between the value of 58,881.91 RMB and 96,871.68 RMB. The expected value of 
land use rights derived from self-declare questions is lower than the expected value derived from 
polychotomous choice questions because of the format of the questions. This is consistent to the 
mean of WTB and WTS reported in Table 2.7, Summary statistics for the CVM. Compared 
between self-declare questions and polychotomous questions, respondents seem to reveal their 
WTB and WTS with certainty relatively small in self-declare questions. The values of WTB and 
WTS from zero to any positive amount are allowed in self-declare questions. The polychotomous 
choice or multiple bounded discrete choice questions on the other hand are bounded between 
20,000 RMB and 300,000 RMB. As a result, we worry about the potential for the polychotomous 
choice technique to result in overestimates of mean WTB and WTS. 
  
 57 
 
Table 2.13: Summary of expected land use rights value by models 
Model 
Expected LUR value 
(RMB) 
Power function 39,156.13 
Self-declare Max WTB 23,551.34 
Self-declare Min WTS 68,642.95 
Polychotomous choice Max WTB 58,881.91 
Polychotomous choice Min WTS 96,871.68 
 
 
2.10 Propensity to Buy or Sell Land Use Rights 
In this section, we want to examine the characteristics as well as factors associated with 
potential buyers and sellers of land use rights. We first need to identify who are potential buyers 
and sellers of land use rights. To do so, we use data from the survey response in a multiple 
bounded question (polychotomous choice format) presented in Table 2.3. With the 15 scenarios, 
each individual farmer responded the questionnaire differently. Figure 2.3 shows the diagram of 
WTB and WTS for land use rights of selected farmers when land use rights value decreases from 
300,000 RMB to 20,000 RMB. The Y-axis is the land use rights value and the X-axis is the 
WTB and WTS of land use rights where number 1 to 5 on the X-axis represents the response 
“definitely buy”, “might buy”, “neither buy nor sell”, “might sell” and “definitely sell” 
respectively. Based on the data and the diagram, some farmers, for instance, the 2
nd
 farmer 
would neither buy or nor sell land use rights for every land use rights value, while the 15
th
 farmer 
would definitely sell land use rights for every value. Some farmers would definitely sell at the 
high value then switch to buy at the lower value. The switching point of land use rights value 
from selling to buying is different across all respondents.  
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Figure 2.3: the diagram of willingness to buy and sell land use rights of selected farmers 
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Table 2.14 reports frequencies of respondents identifying their WTB and WTS at the 
starting land use rights value at 300,000 RMB and ending value at 20,000 RMB in the multiple 
bounded question format of 15 scenarios. The majority of farmers respond that they would 
definitely sell land use rights at 300,000 RMB, and when the land use right value drops to 20,000 
RMB, they would neither buy nor sell (186 farmers). There are 147 farmers who would neither 
buy nor sell land use rights at both high and low values. In the analysis, we exclude 15 
economically irrational farmers presented in the lower diagonal of Table 2.14 as they are more 
willing to buy at higher price and more willing to sell and lower price. The farmers‟ response in 
a questionnaire of 15 scenarios asking willingness to buy and sell land use rights is used to 
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identify each farmer whether he is a potential net seller or buyer of land use rights. The 
identification of a potential buyer and seller is reported in Table 2.15. 
 
Table 2.14: Frequencies of respondents indentifying WTB and WTS at 300,000 RMB and 
20,000 RMB 
  
def buy 
might 
buy neither might sell def sell 
 
 
  A B C D E 
start 
300,000 
def buy A 9 4 36 18 104 
 might 
buy B 3 3 31 27 49 
 nither C 4 3 147 37 186 
 might sell D 0 0 2 6 14 
 def sell E 0 0 3 0 34 
 
 
end 
      
 
20,000 
       
Table 2.15: Identification of a potential buyer and seller
5
  
start-end 
 
Frequencies 
A-A Buyer 9 
B-A Buyer 4 
B-B Buyer 3 
C-A Buyer 36 
C-B Buyer 31 
C-C Neither 147 
D-A*   Seller  18 
D-B*   Seller  27 
D-C Seller 37 
D-D Seller 6 
E-A*   Seller  104 
E-B*   Seller  49 
E-C Seller 186 
E-D Seller 14 
E-E Seller 34 
 
                                                 
5
 We apply econometric analysis using OLS regression to identify potential sellers and buyers. See the Appendix. 
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2.11 Determinants of Land Use Rights Buyer and Seller 
Farmers are influenced by different factors when making decisions to buy or sell land use 
rights. In this section, factors and individual characteristics associated with a potential seller and 
buyer of land use rights are examined. The outcome variable is the choice of farmers whether 
they would be a buyer or seller of land use rights described in the identification of a potential 
buyer and seller from a previous section. We use a seller dummy as a dependent variable which 
takes value = 1 if a respondent is a potential net seller, and 0 if a respondent is a potential net 
buyer. In a situation such as this, in which the outcome variable is dichotomous (buyer or seller), 
classic regression which attempts to explain the level of a continuous outcome variable in terms 
of a set of explanatory variables is not the most appropriate econometric method. However, by 
using a qualitative response model, such as the logit model, we can predict the probability that an 
option will be chosen. In practice, this requires that the explanatory variables adequately reflect 
the most important determining factors in the transaction of land use rights. Because of the 
causality between buyer individual and WTB; seller individual and WTS, we apply the same set 
of determinants of farmland value in the contingent valuation method as explanatory variables of 
land use rights buyer and seller model. 
 
The Logit Model 
Assume that a farmer chooses the most attractive alternative from the two options (buy or 
sell), the observations of the choices reveal the farmers‟ preferences. If we observe that a farmer 
i chooses to be a seller of land use rights, this implies that: Ui1 > Ui0, where Ui1 and Ui0 are the 
utilities that farmer i associates with a seller and buyer of land use rights, respectively. The utility 
Uij that the alternative j (j = 1: potential seller; j = 0: potential buyer) gives individual i, is 
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composed of two parts: a systematic term, which depends on an attributes vector X (demographic 
factors, farm attribute, production, profitability, debt, credit, liquidity, risk perception, etc.), and 
another random term    : 
                                                                                                                                (2.14) 
Utility Uij is not observable but we observe the decision Yi, which is worth 1 if individual 
i chooses to sell land use rights and 0 if chooses to buy land use rights. If a rational individual 
chooses the alternative that gives him the greatest utility, then we would have: 
Probability         Probability           
Probability         Probability           
In this case, the probability that farmer i chooses alternative 1 is
6
: 
                                                                                         
   
  
     
  
                                        (2.15) 
This is the reduced form for the binomial logit model, where the   
  row vector of 
explanatory variables for the individual i contains the independent or explanatory variables 
considered in a section of contingent valuation method. We assume that     follow a distribution 
of logistic probability. 
The logit model results 
The results of the estimation by maximum likelihood of the logit model used to analyze 
the influence of the explanatory variables on the probability of selling land use rights, are 
                                                 
6
 See McFadden (1974) 
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included in Table 2.16. With the attempt to avoid the problem of multicolinearity, in Logit (1) 
we introduce major explanatory variables, while in Logit (2) and (3) other factors and villages 
fixed effects are included, respectively. The F-test indicates that the variables excluded in Logit 
(1) and (2) are statistically significant and different from zero, therefore, the Logit (3) model is 
the main consideration of the study. 
  Factors that are strongly associated with land use rights seller and buyer are tomato, asset 
value, formal borrowing and near city variables. The estimated coefficient associated with the 
explanatory variable “tomato” is negative and statistically significant. We can affirm that tomato 
farmers are less likely to be sellers of land use rights because growing tomato can make high 
profit to them. Secondly, the financial and productive wealth of the individual, approximated by 
the asset value plays an important role in the land use rights transaction. The coefficient of asset 
value is positive and statistically significant. Therefore, the greater assets farmers possess would 
increase the probability of selling land use rights. This could imply a decreasing in marginal 
utility of holding assets. Farmers holding more assets would have less incentive to buy more land 
but would rather sell land use rights and receive money instead. Furthermore, formal borrowing 
and geographical location are found to be inversely correlated with the probability of being land 
use rights seller. Farmers who can access a formal credit are less likely to be sellers of land use 
rights. Since they are able to obtain formal loans, it is not necessary for them to sell land use 
rights in order to receive money. In addition, the probability of being land use rights sellers is 
reduced for farmers living near the city.  Finally, the variables related to farm attribute, credit 
rationing, attitude toward risk, entrepreneurship and politics are found to be statistically 
insignificant on the probability of being sellers of buyers of land use rights. 
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Table 2.16: The logit model results 
 
 
Logit (1) Logit (2) Logit (3) 
Seller dummy Coefficient P>z Coefficient P>z Coefficient P>z 
Sex (female = 1) -0.0903995 0.728 -0.0895983 0.76 -0.4705056 0.169 
Education 0.0593139 0.465 0.0697893 0.47 0.071309 0.516 
Years of farming -0.0042962 0.72 -0.0110326 0.454 -0.015671 0.34 
Farm size (mu) -0.0315166 0.507 -0.0418683 0.473 -0.067952 0.277 
Farm rent dummy 0.0064532 0.982 0.0880364 0.794 0.1849891 0.636 
Corn -0.7555519* 0.087 -0.511041 0.302 0.2838759 0.673 
Wheat -0.8938567** 0.018 -0.496868 0.298 0.0046294 0.994 
Tomato -1.549513** 0.033 -1.782738** 0.03 -1.882351* 0.059 
Kiwi -0.2148573 0.889 0.2111402 0.893 -0.5406633 0.73 
Household income 1.51E-06 0.776 4.08E-06 0.455 5.02E-06 0.387 
Percent income farming -0.1415371 0.789 0.080807 0.893 0.4042003 0.544 
Asset value 0.000000946** 0.037 0.00000104** 0.036 0.000000949* 0.064 
Informal borrow 0.1368446 0.647 0.0272987 0.936 0.059413 0.88 
Formal borrow -0.4123103 0.27 -0.4722647 0.247 -0.8724206* 0.09 
Saving -0.0706464 0.579 -0.1070951 0.472 -0.2034927 0.261 
Risk Rationing 0.2396109 0.629 0.0765691 0.883 -0.4040942 0.546 
Quantity Rationing -0.1414264 0.697 0.1376389 0.741 0.4626607 0.316 
Risk aversion score -0.0052673 0.503 -0.0056837 0.539 -0.010594 0.382 
Prudence score 0.0040715 0.6 0.0060608 0.524 0.0135544 0.245 
Business Climate 
  
-0.4285398* 0.051 -0.3403938 0.139 
Migrant farm labor 
  
-0.7551483 0.372 -0.3995058 0.666 
Start business 
  
-0.0967422 0.742 0.1254808 0.731 
Plan to start business 
  
0.0171945 0.957 0.2328078 0.528 
Computer 
  
0.2852951 0.679 0.7473304 0.285 
Internet 
  
-0.4614108 0.545 -0.5273312 0.512 
Village leader 
  
0.069755 0.912 0.1743132 0.82 
Village committee 
  
-0.3698162 0.548 -0.3067351 0.666 
State government 
  
-0.6282865 0.338 0.0018438 0.998 
County government 
  
0.8786926 0.134 0.754998 0.247 
State enterprise 
  
0.6114386 0.149 0.4331282 0.44 
RCC or bank 
  
-1.515237* 0.052 -0.8600447 0.356 
Near city dummy     0.4175188 0.244 -17.7052*** 0 
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(Continued) Logit (1) Logit (2) Logit (3) 
Seller dummy Coefficient P>z Coefficient P>z Coefficient P>z 
Bigong 
    
-17.09501*** 0 
Datong 
    
-18.12858*** 0 
Han 
    
-19.31048*** 0 
Laoshang 
    
-1.873638 0.101 
Laoxia 
    
-0.7887307 0.303 
Liaodi 
    
-17.4012*** 0 
Mengjiazhai 
    
1.533198 0.202 
Sihu 
    
-18.55698*** 0 
Taibai 
    
-17.60876*** 0 
Tangjia 
    
1.134917 0.12 
Xiaozhai 
    
-18.46745*** 0 
Xidazhai 
    
1.331552 0.511 
Xieshang 
    
0.9313091 0.432 
Xixiaozhai 
    
-0.5123116 0.56 
Yindou 
    
-18.05653*** 0 
Zanfan 
    
-17.50761*** 0 
Zhaixi 
    
1.106866 0.346 
Constant 0.7052518 0.446 0.5555178 0.621 18.4181 . 
Observations 311   268   247   
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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2.12 Summary 
 Modern economics suggest that tenure security and land ownership would encourage 
agricultural investment and enhance rural economic growth. In the past few decades, Chinese 
farmers have failed to capitalize on the economic gains because rural land reform has not kept 
pace with urban land reform. China allows urban residents to trade or sell their land use contracts 
freely. That right has allowed people to profit from city property in ways that farmers have not 
legally been able to do. However, in 2008, The Chinese government has considered the policy 
and possibility of land use rights transfer and transactability as farmers are allowed to buy and 
sell land use rights for the first time. This could draw hundreds of millions of farmers more 
firmly into the market economy. Therefore, it is interesting to see what would happen if the 
Chinese government made it legal for farmers to buy or sell land use rights. 
The results from the study suggest that, at the land use rights market equilibrium, the 
estimated equilibrium price of land use rights is 39,156.1335 RMB and the equilibrium 
percentage of farmers who will participate in the market is 16.43%. This is in fact a significant 
portion of the population participating in the market which numbers over 131 million farmers 
representing 800 million farmers employed in an agricultural sector in China. In contrast, the 
liberalization of land use rights in Vietnam in the early 1990s resulted in only about 3% of land 
use rights being transacted. The price elasticity of demand is equal to -0.952 and the price 
elasticity of supply is 0.8623. the inelasticity of demand and supply would imply changes in land 
use rights value have a relatively small effect on the changes in percentage of farmers willing to 
buy and sell land use rights. 
We apply the contingent valuation method to estimate the value of land use rights by 
incorporating several determinants of land value. The expected maximum WTB and minimum 
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WTS from self-declare questions are 23,551.34 RMB and 68,642.95 RMB respectively. With the 
existence of land use rights market, the expected value of land use rights would probably be in 
between the value of 23,551.34 RMB and 68,642.95 RMB. However, the expected maximum 
WTB and minimum WTS from polychotomous choice format are found to be 58,881.91 RMB 
and 96,871.68 RMB respectively. We apply OLS regression using data from self-declare 
questions but apply Tobit regression using data from polychotomous choice questions.  The main 
issue is “which type of questions and model specification is better?”.  The self-declare question 
might be better in the sense that we can directly obtain the true value of willingness to buy and 
sell of land use rights. The estimated market equilibrium land use rights value derived from the 
power function is also in the range of WTB and WTS values estimated from OLS regression. In 
contrast, the expected value of land use rights estimated from tobit model of polychotomous 
choice is much higher. Because of the uniqueness of our multiple bounded questions, we apply a 
tobit model with censored data at the upper bound (300,000 RMB) and lower bound (20,000 
RMB) in the polychotomous choice questions format. However, the polychotomous choice 
format is better than self-declare questions in term of the flexibility in revealing WTB and WTS. 
Some respondents might be unwilling to precisely reveal their WTB and WTS value, so the 
polychotomous choice questions format is another option in that a respondent can answer in 
qualitative responses from “definitely buy” to “definitely sell” at a given value. In addition, the 
polychotomous choice questions format also give the important information about the elasticity 
of demand and supply of land use rights. 
The OLS results from self-declare questions indicate that tomato farmers, risk rationed 
and quantity rationed individuals, farmers who have computer at home, have family members 
work for village committee and farmers live near the city are more likely to place high maximum 
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WTB value of land use rights which cause the increase in value of land use rights in the market. 
Moreover, several factors have significant impact on the minimum WTS. Household income, 
percentage of income from farming and asset value are positively related to WTS of land use 
rights. Farmers who can generate high income from farming would sell land use rights at a high 
price because their marginal productivity of land is relatively high. In addition, farmers who have 
ever stated business have high minimum WTS and would be more likely to remain the 
agriculture. However, farmers who can access to a formal credit or who reside near the city have 
a low minimum WTS. Farmers whose land located near the city want to sell land use rights 
because they have more opportunity to work in the city. 
The tobit model results using data from polychotomous choice questions suggest that 
corn, wheat farmers, having computer at home and good business climate have reverse effect on 
maximum WTB and would decrease value of land use rights. However, farmers having more 
saving, having internet access at home or having family members working for state enterprise 
place relatively greater maximum WTB value of land use rights. The minimum WTS for land 
use rights depends on several factors. Female respondents and farmers having internet access 
place relatively greater maximum WTB value of land use rights. In contrast, percentage of 
income from farming and saving are found to be negatively correlated with WTS. In addition, 
having family members work as a village leader or work in a county government would cause a 
decrease in minimum WTS.  
Factors associated with potential buyers and sellers are also examined in the last section. 
The results show that tomato farmers are less likely to be sellers of land use rights because 
growing tomato can make high profit to them. Furthermore, farmers who can access a formal 
credit and who live near the city are less likely to be sellers of land use rights. On the contrary, 
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the greater assets farmers hold would increase the probability of selling land use rights. The 
probability of buying and selling land use rights also varies between village regions. 
The study shows preliminary representation of the land use rights market structure if the 
transaction of land use rights is implemented.  Clearly, several factors significantly affect WTB 
and WTS. The characteristics of potential buyers and sellers differ depending on the production, 
income, geographical location, etc. As Deininger et al. (2006) suggest, more detailed 
investigation of the factors affecting the implementation of legal and institutional change aiming 
to make property rights more secure could provide important insights for policy makers 
The results have important policy implications. If the goal is to enhance rural 
development through the land use rights market which would benefit both the agricultural sector 
and farmer wealth, then the government should encourage farmers to buy land use rights, 
increase farm invest and expand the production. Results also suggest that farmers who grow high 
profit crops are more likely to buy land use rights and stay in farm. In addition, risk rationed and 
quantity rationed individuals are more likely to buy land use rights at high price. Farmland has 
served as collateral for farm mortgages, reducing the effect of capital costs for both expansion 
and operating credit. Therefore, it is important to enhance the certainty and security of land use 
rights contract. Also, the consideration whether land contracts should be extended to 70 years 
from 30 years should be seriously addressed as it would give farmers more security and 
presumably increase the value of their land use rights. In general, farmland is crucial to the 
economic stability in the agricultural sector as it is a significant factor of production and a 
traditional source of wealth to farmers. Farmland values have served as a combination of both a 
retirement portfolio and an estate for bequest to future generations of farmers. Changes in 
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farmland values overall are strongly associated with changes in returns to farmland, Salois et al. 
(2010). 
However, there is a debate that the policy allowing farmers to transact their land use 
rights might create a few landlords and many landless farmers who will have no means for a 
living. Farmlands might be used for non-farming purposes which later may threaten the country's 
food safety. However, the Chinese government has insisted that the country must remain self-
sufficient in the production of foods, and is highly unlikely to allow farmers to sell land use 
rights for nonagricultural development. Chau et al. (2011) observe that socially excessive land 
conversion from agriculture to construction can occur in cycle with aggressive land development 
efforts in rural areas, through a land administration policy that explicitly links allowable land 
conversion quotas with land development efforts. Nevertheless, China planned to carry out "the 
most stringent farmland protection system" and urge local authorities to firmly safeguard the 1.8 
billion mu (120 million hectares) minimum farmland set line and also called on local 
governments to stick to "the most stringent land conservation system" to strictly control the total 
scale of the land used for urban development (Chinareview.cn 2008). 
Lastly, urbanization policy and influx of rural migration must be seriously considered. 
Many traditionalists strongly support collective land ownership and argue that China‟s economy 
is still not robust enough to absorb hundreds of millions of full time rural workers. They also 
support the system of allocating small plots of land to all rural households as guaranteeing 
farmers a subsistence income. However, the results show that over 131 million farmers 
representing 800 million farmers will participate in land use rights market; then approximately 
65.5 million farmers would leave agriculture. Relatively rich farmers tend to sell land use rights 
at low price and would be more likely to sell their land use rights implying that they want to exit 
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farming. In addition, the rapid economic growth in China would lead to an increase in 
employment opportunities and thus, farmers are encouraged to leave agriculture and move to 
cities as migrant workers. Consequently, policies directed towards promoting off-farm income 
and employment, and thereby stimulating urban growth, are more appropriate.  
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2.13 Appendix 
Identification of a potential buyer and seller 
The OLS regression is applied to identify a potential net seller or buyer of land use rights 
for each farmer. The dependent variable is a self-declare seller dummy taking value = 1 if 
respondents reveal the value of minimum WTS, value = 0 if respondents reveal the value of 
maximum WTB, otherwise it is a missing value. Independent variables AA to EE, except the 
lower diagonal in Table 2.14, are dummy variables of farmers who respond WTB and WTS at 
the starting value of 300,000 RMB and ending value of 20,000 RMB in a questionnaire of 15 
scenarios. Variables DA, DB, EA and EB are of interest because these variables are difficult to 
identify whether respondents are a net seller of buyer as they would sell and a higher value and 
buy at a lower value, while other variables are trivial. The control variables are self-declare WTB 
or WTS value, farm size and percentage of income from farming. The OLS results to identify a 
potential buyer and seller are reported in Table 2.17. According to the results, coefficients of 
DA, DB, EA and EB are positively significant implying that they are potentially net sellers.  
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Table 2.17: Potential net seller and net buyer OLS results  
 
Self-declare seller dummy Coefficient P>t 
AA -0.0172487 0.917 
BA -0.2416073 0.286 
BB 0.0192932 0.951 
CA 0.0559645 0.577 
CB 0.1589074 0.132 
CC 0.2439206*** 0.004 
DA 0.2062688* 0.1 
DB 0.3100309*** 0.004 
DC 0.5276356*** 0 
DD 0.7868582*** 0 
EA 0.3713547*** 0 
EB 0.4648264*** 0 
EC 0.6022312*** 0 
ED 0.8709643*** 0 
EE 0.5473235*** 0 
Self-declare WTB or WTS value 0.00000186*** 0 
Farm size (mu) 0.004122 0.554 
Percentage income farm -0.1178192 0.124 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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CHAPTER 3 
RISK RATIONING IN CHINA RURAL CREDIT MARKETS  
3.1 Introduction 
The presence of information asymmetry creates the quantity rationing problem in credit 
markets. Lenders do not know as much about a borrowers‟ likelihood of repayment as the actual 
borrowers do. 
 
A tradeoff between interest rate and collateral is therefore required by lenders to 
offset default risk. A collateral loan is often offered at a lower interest rate than an unsecured 
loan, because there is a guarantee of repayment should the borrower default on the loan. 
Nevertheless, previous literature has shown the existence of risk rationing and its significance as 
the borrower voluntarily withdraws from the credit market even he has the collateral wealth 
needed to qualify for a loan contract.  
Boucher et al. (2009) use survey data from Peru to measure the incidence and impact of 
credit constraints in the formal credit sector. They find risk rationed households accounts for a 
significant fraction of the sample. They also provide examples of responses associated with risk 
rationing. Of these, the most common response in each of the surveys they conducted was “I 
don‟t want to risk my land”. Guirkinger et al. (2008) develop a model and show that collateral 
requirements imposed by lenders in response to asymmetric information can cause not only 
quantity rationing but also transaction cost rationing and risk rationing. 
Recent literature by  Boucher et al. (2008) (BCG) presents theory of risk rationing and 
identify the necessary and sufficient condition of risk rationing incidence. They also provide 
evidence of risk rationing in Peru, Honduras and Nicaragua. We find their theoretical paper of 
risk rationing is intriguing. Turvey et al. (2009) argue that the incidence of credit rationing is 
blurred when risk is introduced. They suggest that utility maximizing farmers will reduce their 
demand for credit as risks increase or farmers become more risk averse. Credit choices are as 
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much determined by endogenous risk aversion and production and market uncertainties as well 
as external influences. 
In fact, in a 2009 survey of  Chinese farmers in Gansu and Shaanxi provinces Turvey et 
al. (2011) asked a small number of questions related to the hypothetical possibility of the 
mortgagability of land use rights as a form of collateral. One of the arguments raised in favor of 
the transferability of land use rights was that the rights could be used as collateral against a loan. 
This argument was predicated on the assumption that farm households were to a large extent 
credit rationed. However, it was found that a large number of farm households would not use 
land use rights as loan collateral. Approximately 45.8% either disagreed or strongly disagreed 
with using the land use rights as collateral, compared to only 35.4%  who moderately agreed or 
strongly agreed to use land use rights as collateral. Because the questions specifically referred to 
land use rights as collateral, the results strongly hinted of the possibility that risk rationing was 
wide spread in rural China, and if so this would dampen the overall impacts of credit reforms 
currently under way in China. Politically, evidence of risk rationing in rural credit market would 
suggest that the effectiveness of land titling policy encouraging farmers to pledge their rights as 
collateral security may be overestimated.  
The purpose in preparing this study is to provide a specific test of BCG framework on 
risk rationing and examine the attributes of risk rationed, quantity rationed, and price rationed 
farmers. As a commentary our intention is not at all to criticize this model. Indeed, the reasoning 
is quite the opposite in that we find risk rationing as a topic of inquiry to be critically important 
in understanding borrower behavior and credit decisions, and as we indicated above we find the 
models presented in BCG to be fascinating from the points of view of academic completeness 
and public policy guidance.  
 78 
 
Turvey et al. (2011) 2009 survey was not detailed enough to state anything stronger than 
a „suggestion‟ of risk rationing, nor was it constructed to specifically isolate risk rationing under 
the specific conjectures and hypotheses raised by BCG. In this study we report survey results 
from a follow-up survey of 730 farm households conducted in Shaanxi in November 2010 and 
designed specifically to test the conjectures and hypotheses of BCG. Our approach uses the 
direct elicitation methodology (DEM) where a set of questions directly elicits the household‟s 
status as either credit constrained versus unconstrained, and is similar to an approach 
recommended in  Boucher et al. (2009).  
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, we briefly review the risk 
rationing definition. In Section 3.3 and 3.4, we describe a model and credit rationing status and 
sample survey questions to identify credit constraint status. Section 3.5 describes the survey and 
data that are used in the analysis. The descriptive statistics, summary of household characteristics 
and frequencies by credit constraint status are presented. Next, several testable hypotheses are 
derived. In Section 3.7, we introduce the model and determinants of credit constraint Status. The 
empirical results are presented and discussed in the following section. Section 3.9 concludes and 
discusses the policy implications of the findings. 
 
3.2 Risk Rationing Definition  
The study by BCG presents theory and implication of risk rationing. They define risk 
rationing as follow; “Risk rationing occurs when insurance markets are absent, and lenders, 
constrained by asymmetric information, shift so much contractual risk to the borrower that the 
borrower voluntarily withdraws from the credit market even when he has the collateral 
wealth needed to qualify for a loan contract”.   
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According to the risk rationing description, four important conditions specified in bold 
are needed to be considered. First, risk rationing occurs when insurance markets are absent. Risk 
plays an important role in human livelihood, particularly for farmers who typically exposed to 
the price shocks, yield and weather risk. With these uncertainties, farmers, particularly risk 
averse farmers, attempt to minimize their exposure to risk by participating in insurance market. 
Nevertheless, it is unclear whether existing insurance markets, in spite of their imperfections, are 
sufficient to ensure that the risk rationing is negligible and can be ignored. The presence of 
insurance markets in rural China thus leads to prediction regarding the relationship between 
insurance market and risk rationed farm households. Second, lenders constrained by asymmetric 
information. Asymmetric information – adverse selection and moral hazard – among lenders 
results in a less efficient allocation of resources (Sharpe 1990). In the presence of asymmetric 
information, lenders increase interest rate or require borrowers to pledge collateral in order to 
decrease a default risk as they cannot observe the different types of borrowers. The increase in 
interest rate and collateral requirement may lead to the third condition; the borrower voluntarily 
withdraws from the credit market. Fourth, the borrower has the collateral wealth needed to 
qualify for a loan contract. Borrowers that pledge collateral should be perceived as less risky. However, 
by combining the third and forth conditions, the risk rationed borrowers have enough collateral but are 
not willing to pledge collateral and choose not to accept the offered contract. This is related to risk 
perception of borrowers associated with a loan contract.  
From definition, they assume these four conditions are important for risk rationing to 
occur. Testing these conditions is one of the purposes of this study. We are interested to see 
whether the insurance markets, asymmetric information, risk and collateral are essentially related 
to risk rationing in economic context. 
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3.3 Model 
 
The model structure is based on BCG
7
. A farmer chooses activity choice between a safe, 
subsistence reservation activity and a risky commercial activity where the latter must be financed 
by an optimally designed credit contract offered by a competitive sector of lenders.  
Agent‟s endowments are consist of financial wealth, , and land,  . Financial wealth is 
liquid and can be used as collateral to secure production loans. Land can also be used as 
collateral and sold at price   . 
Agents allocate their land between two activities; reservation or subsistence activity 
which is safe and commercial activity which is risky but gives higher return. 
A reservation activity does not require capital and yields a certain return   per unit land. A risky 
commercial activity requires a fixed investment   per unit land and yields an uncertain return 
with gross revenues    per unit land if good state is realized and gross revenues    per unit land 
if bad state is realized. 
Assume an agent has additively separable utility function  
                                                                                                                                   (3.1) 
where    is consumable wealth in state j and e is the effort exerted in production which can be 
either high (e = H) or low (e = L). The disutility of effort,     , is increasing in effort so that 
           Let    be the probability of the state of nature under effort e, so that        
Assume     so that an agent must borrow to utilize the commercial activity. 
The optimal contract maximizes the agent‟s expected utility subject to the principal‟s 
(lender‟s) participation constraint and the agent‟s incentive compatibility constraint (ICC). We 
                                                 
7
 The entirety of section 3 is developed and paraphrased from the theoretical development originating in BCG. 
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solve for optimal loan contract         where    and    are the borrower‟s payoff per unit area 
financed under the good and bad states of nature. 
 
                                                                                                                      (3.2)          
             
                                                                          
                                                           (3.3)                     
                                                  
                     
                                                                                                     (3.4) ICC 
                   
                                                                      
 
 
                                                             (3.5) 
 
Quantity rationing occurs when  
(a) the agent would be offered and demand a credit contract in the symmetric information 
world; but,  
(b) the agent lacks sufficient wealth to collateralize the contract (i.e.,      
    
      ). 
 Risk rationing occurs when 
(a) the agent would be offered and demand a credit contract in the symmetric information 
world;  
(b) the agent is offered a financially feasible contract in the asymmetric information world 
(i.e.,          
      ) but, 
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(c) the agent chooses not to accept the offered contract, preferring the reservation subsistence 
activity. 
 
3.4 Credit Rationing Status 
The survey asked questions that made it possible to infer respondents‟ credit rationing 
status based partly on Boucher et al. (2009) strategy to directly elicit credit constraint. Constraint 
categories can be defined as follows.  
1) Price rationed or unconstrained farmer is the one who may be either non-borrower or 
borrower and was happy with the amount he received. A price rationed farmer is not 
affected by asymmetric information in credit markets as he does not face a binding 
credit limit.  
2) Quantity rationed or supply-side-constrained farmer may be either an applicant who 
was rejected a loan or a non-applicant who knew that he would be rejected. A 
quantity rationed farmer faces a binding credit limit, therefore; the limiting constraint 
comes from the supply side. A quantity rationed farmer is expected to have excess 
demand.   
3) Risk rationed or demand-side-constrained farmer does not face a binding limit and 
therefore does not have excess demand for credit. The limiting constraint comes from 
the demand side. The demand is lower because of the risk-sharing rules associated 
with the loan contract.  
We apply DEM to gather information on the credit market perceptions of both borrowers 
and non-borrowers. Figure 3.1 shows sample survey questions to identify credit constraint status. 
The survey questions are structured as follows. We divide Chinese farmers into two groups. 
 83 
 
Farmers in the first group do not have to apply for a loan but instead RCC or bank evaluate their 
creditworthiness and offer them a loan. Farmers in the second group must formally request a loan 
from their local RCC or Bank. In the first group, since RCC or bank offer a loan without them 
requesting a loan, then farmers are not quantity rationed. We asked the first group “How much of 
loan did RCC or Bank offer to lend you?” and “How much of loan did you actually use?”. Risk 
rationed farmers are individuals who responded that the amount of loan they use is less than the 
amount RCC or bank offer because they are afraid of losing collateral, otherwise; they are price 
rationed. In the second group of farmers who must request a loan, we further asked whether they 
applied for a loan from RCC or bank within the past 2 years. It is very challenging to classify the 
constraint status of individuals who do not participate in the credit market. They might not have 
applied for a loan because of three reasons; first, they had enough money and no need to borrow 
(price rationed); second, they knew that they would be rejected (quantity rationed); or third, they 
were afraid to lose collateral (risk rationed). On the other hand, among the loan applicants, 
farmers who applied for a loan but either they were rejected or RCC offered the amount of loan 
less than the amount they requested are quantity rationed. Price rationed farmers are either who 
accepted the approved loan or who applied but did not accept the approved loan because of 
reasons other than risk associated with a loan contract. Risk rationed farmers did not accept the 
approved loan because they are afraid of losing collateral. Three types of credit rationed farmers 
namely risk rationed, quantity rationed and price rationed farmers have been identified and used 
as dependent variables. 
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Figure 3.1: Sample survey questions to identify credit constraint status  
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Local RCC or Bank 
evaluates my 
creditworthiness and offers 
me a loan without me 
requesting a loan. 
I must formally request a 
loan from my local RCC or 
Bank. 
1. On the most recent loan 
OFFER, approximately how 
much (RMB) in loan did RCC or 
Bank OFFER to lend you? 
2. How much of loan (RMB) did 
you ACTUALLY use? 
 
 
4. Have you applied for a 
loan from RCC or bank 
within the past 2 years? 
5.On the most recent 
loan request, 
approximately how 
much (RMB) in loan 
did you request? 
6. How much (RMB) 
did RCC or banks offer 
to you? 
 
 
 
7.(If answer to Q6 is 
greater than zero) Did
you accept the offered 
loan? 
8. Why? Because 
you are afraid of 
losing collateral? 
 
3. Why? Because 
you are afraid of 
losing collateral? 
9. Why? Because 
you are afraid of 
losing collateral? 
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3.5 Survey and Data 
The farm household survey was conducted in Shaanxi province, Yangling district in 
November 2010. Seven hundred thirty households were surveyed. Each household was 
interviewed by graduate students from Northwest Agriculture and Forestry University. The 
survey itself dealt exclusively with farm credit, risk perception and management, transaction of 
land use rights, and entrepreneurship.  
The characteristics of these communities are as follows. On average there are about 5 
people living in each household. The average education level of respondents is between 
attending middle school and completing middle school. The average number of years farming is 
28 years, and the average farm size is 5mu (about 5/6th of an acre). Household income average is 
23,796 RMB/year with approximately 39% of household income coming from farm activities. 
The average profit per year earned from cropped land is 953 RMB/mu. The average asset per 
household is 318,904 RMB. There are 203 farmers indicating the amount of their debt and the 
average debt per household is 29,330 RMB. Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics on some 
variables. 
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
            
Sex (Female =1) 730 0.5452055 0.4982937 0 1 
Age 730 48.72 11.361 18 78 
Education 730 4.371233 1.836378 0 8 
Household member 730 4.88 1.512 2 18 
Years of Farming 726 27.66529 13.54714 0 65 
Farm Size (mu) 728 4.930192 2.818299 0 40 
Household Income (RMB) 721 23,796.44 23,048.36 0 248,000 
Percentage farm Income 720 0.3929722 0.2932866 0 1 
Asset Value (RMB) 703 318,904.4 1,897,610 0 50,000,000 
Farm Profit (RMB) 710 952.7394 1,915.054 0 25,000 
Amount of Debt (RMB) 203 29,329.6014 58,190.011 0.01 600,000 
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In order to identify risk ration farmers from the survey response, we apply DEM and 
separate Chinese farmers into two groups (see figure 3.1). The first is a group of 52 farmers who 
did not request a loan but a local RCC or bank evaluates their creditworthiness and offers them a 
loan. Among farmers who borrowed less than the amount that the lender was willing to provide, 27.3% 
indicated that they did not use the total amount of credit made available to them because they are 
afraid of losing collateral. In the second group, 672 farmers must formally request a loan from 
their local RCC or bank. There are 121 farmers who have applied for a loan within the past two 
years and no risk rationed farmer is found in this loan applicant group. Among farmers who have 
not applied for a loan, approximately 7.5% of these farmers are risk rationed. They responded 
that they have not applied from RCC or bank in the last two years because they are afraid of 
losing collateral. Among all 730 respondents, the total proportion of risk rationed farmers is 
approximately 6.2%. Considering this percentage of risk rationing from our result, when we 
generalize this percentage to 350 million farm households in China, there are approximately 21.7 
million farm households who are risk rationed. 
To compare characteristics among credit rationed farmers, quantity rationed and price 
rationed farmers were also identified. Approximately 14% of all respondents are quantity 
rationed who indicated that they must formally request a loan from RCC or bank and have 
applied for a loan within the past two years but RCC or bank either did not offer them any loan 
or offered less than the amount requested. Quantity rationed farmers are also farmers who have 
not applied for a loan because they knew they would be rejected. We include farmers who 
responded they did not applied for a loan because they are not a credit worthy or they cannot get a 
guarantee in a quantity rationed group because they would know that RCC or bank will reject their loan 
application. The rest are price rationed farmers with a proportion of 79.9% who indicate; first, 
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they actually used a loan that RCC or bank offered to them without requesting a loan; second, 
they have applied for a loan and accepted the offered loan; or third, they are non-borrower and 
no need to borrow. 
Table 3.2 provides a summary of household characteristics and frequencies by credit 
constraint status. Among 730 respondents, the majority of farmers are price rationed. 
Approximately 14% and 6.2% of all respondents are quantity rationed and risk rationed farmers 
respectively. The table compares the means and medians of several key variables for 3 types of 
credit rationed farmers. Risk rationed farmers tend to be a bit younger and substantially more 
educated than quantity and price rationed farmers. The household income, asset value and farm 
profit of quantity rationed farmers are less than that of risk rationed and price rationed farmers. 
As expected, poor farmers are more likely to be quantity rationed as it is difficult to get a loan 
approval by RCC or bank. Risk rationed farmers have the highest median of household income, 
asset value and farm profit but the lowest amount of debt.  
Table 3.2: Summary of household characteristics and frequencies by credit constraint status 
 
Non-price Rationed 
  
  Risk Rationed Quantity Rationed Price Rationed Total 
  mean median mean median mean median mean median 
Sex (Female =1) 0.67 1.00 0.54 1.00 0.54 1.00 0.55 1.00 
Age 44.87 47.00 48.70 50.00 49.02 50.00 48.72 50.00 
Education 4.67 5.00 4.17 5.00 4.38 5.00 4.37 5.00 
Years of Farming 25.87 27.00 29.54 30.00 27.48 30.00 27.67 30.00 
Farm Size (mu) 5.00 5.00 5.18 5.00 4.88 5.00 4.93 5.00 
Household Income (RMB) 26,337.18 22,000.00 21,301.18 16,000.00 24,040.67 20,000.00 23,796.44 20,000.00 
Percentage farm Income 0.41 0.30 0.42 0.36 0.39 0.31 0.39 0.32 
Asset Value (RMB) 210,166.67 200,000.00 208,234.69 145,000.00 346,280.28 150,000.00 318,904.41 150,000.00 
Farm Profit (RMB) 1,296.67 700.00 564.55 500.00 994.81 500.00 952.74 500.00 
Amount of Debt (RMB) 21,500.00 7,500.00 29,009.19 10,000.00 29,837.78 20,000.00 29,329.60 18,000.00 
Observations 45 102 583 730 
Percentage of sample 6.2 14 79.9 100 
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3.6Testable Hypotheses  
 BCG has identified conditions under which risk and quantity rationing will exist. Based 
on their theory and implication, a number of testable hypotheses that describe the most important 
factors explaining the existence of risk and quantity rationing were formulated as follows.   
1) Wealth-biased quantity rationing
8
 
 Quantity rationing is decreasing in financial wealth and productive wealth. Financial 
wealth is liquid and can be committed as collateral to secure production loans. Productive wealth 
is land which can also be used as collateral. BCG show that quantity rationing is unambiguously 
biased against the poor. An increase in financial wealth tends to relax quantity rationing, an 
increase in an agent‟s land endowment, whether it is titled or untitled, will also relax quantity 
rationing. 
2) Risk rationing and financial wealth 
 2.1) The financial wealthy is risk rationed.  
Thiele et al. (1999) and BCG demonstrate that the occurrence of risk rationing may 
depend on the type of wealth considered. They obtain the results that the financial wealthy will 
be risk rationed
9
. 
2.2) Risk aversion and Prudence are significantly associated with risk rationing. 
Under proposition 2 in BCG
10
, risk rationing can be biased either for or against the 
                                                 
8
 See Boucher, S., M. Carter, et al. (2008) Proposition 1, page 414 
9
 Boucher, S., M. Carter, et al. (2008) argue that whether it is the financially poor or the financially rich that are risk 
rationed depends on the relative strength of the two opposing effects namely risk-aversion effect and incentive-
dilution effect. Risk-aversion effect states that those agents who are more sensitive to risk would be more likely to 
be risk rationed. Assume decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), we might expect that the relatively poor agents 
are risk rationed. Incentive-dilution effect states that financially wealthier agents are less sensitive to a given 
contractual risk and must then face riskier contracts than poorer agents in order to maintain incentive compatibility. 
Therefore, the relatively rich agents are risk rationed. 
10
 See Boucher, S., M. Carter, et al. (2008) Proposition 2, page 416 
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financially wealthy. Therefore it is not clear whether the rich or the poor agents are risk rationed. 
BCG propose that 1) If P > 3A, then an agent with financial wealthy (rich) will prefer 
commercial activity and poor will prefer subsistence activity and be risk rationed and 2) If P < 
3A, poor will prefer commercial activity and rich will prefer subsistence activity and be risk 
rationed, where P and A denote the prudence and coefficient of absolute risk aversion 
respectively. We want to test hypothesis that risk aversion and prudence are significantly 
correlated with risk rationing. 
3) Risk rationing and productive wealth 
The relatively land-poor is risk rationed. The authors argue that exploiting the land with 
the risky activity yields a higher return. As farm size increases, moving back to the safe activity 
becomes increasingly costly. The land-wealthy will choose to participate in the credit market and 
fully exploit their productive asset (land). Therefore, relative land-rich is less like to be risk 
rationed. 
4) Risk rationing and insurance market, asymmetric information and elasticity of demand for 
credit 
Risk rationing occurs when insurance markets are absent; the agent would be offered and 
demand a credit contract in the symmetric information world; the agent is offered a financially 
feasible contract in the asymmetric information world but, the agent chooses not to accept the 
offered contract, preferring the reservation subsistence activity (Boucher et al. 2008). According 
to the definition, we hypothesize that insurance market is not associated with risk rationing; 
asymmetric information is related to risk rationing.  
Several recent studies examine the credit demand using data from several developing 
countries, see Dehejia et al. (2011) and Karlan et al. (2008). Dehejia et al. (2011) estimate the 
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demand for credit in Bangladesh and find that borrowers are highly sensitive to interest rate 
changes
11
. Turvey et al. (2011) estimate individual household credit demand elasticities based on 
897 farm households surveyed in Shaanxi and Gansu provinces in China and find that as interest 
rates fell the demand for credit increased in elasticity. However, they do not find any statistical 
indication of a relationship between suggested acceptance of risk and the demand elasticity. We 
want to further explore the sensitivity to interest rate by credit constraint status. Risk rationed 
farmers choose not to accept the offered loan because of the risk associated with the offered 
contract. This can imply that changes in interest rate should not lead to changes in quantity 
demand for credit of risk rationed farmers. Therefore, we hypothesize that risk rationed farmers 
are not sensitive to interest rate and have perfectly inelastic demand for credit. 
 
3.7 The Model and Determinants of Credit Constraint Status 
The analysis applies the linear probability model and the logit model using a robust 
estimator to test the hypotheses. Each model, we present three regressions that differ in the 
dependent variable. The dependent variables include risk rationing, quantity rationing and price 
rationing identified based on credit rationing status. 
 
Independent variables 
We define the independent variables into several categories, each designed to capture the 
effects on credit rationing. The demographic variables in a model consist of sex, education and 
year of farming, 
Measures for wealth. In literature, both financial wealth and productive wealth are 
                                                 
11
 They also find that less wealthy households are more sensitive to the loan price comparing to the wealthier 
household. 
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significantly associated with credit rationing. Specific variables include farm size, household 
income, percentage of farm income, asset value and saving. Farm size is a proxy of productive 
wealth and the rest are proxies of financial wealth. 
Measuring for risk aversion and prudence. We asked a series of questions about risk 
taking, risk mitigating and precautionary saving behavior that would reflect such attributes and 
used data to compute a risk aversion score and prudence score. Risk aversion score is calculated 
based on farmers‟ willingness to take risk, risk management options use and perceptions. In the 
survey form farmers were asked to identify their willingness to accept greater production risks in 
order to increase the chance of higher profits, to take risks with new technologies, and to take 
risks with new management practices before seeing good results in other farms. In addition, 
farmers indicated how important of risk management in their farm. Risk management options 
that we asked include farm diversification, geographic diversification, irrigation, marketing 
diversification, forward contract, participation in government programs, maintaining financial 
reserves and investing off-farm for other sources of income. Prudence score is calculated based 
on the purposes of their precautionary savings. Farmers specified their level of agreement or 
disagreement on a five-level Likert scale for a series of statements; I save in case my automobile 
break down; I save for unexpected medical emergency; I save to protect job loss; and I save for 
unanticipated crop loss. The higher the score would indicate that the respondent is more risk 
averse and prudence.
12
 
Measure of insurance market participation is represented by insurance variable. Farmers 
indicated whether they regularly purchase insurance for any of the following items: life 
insurance, fire insurance for home and, automobile insurance, health/medical insurance, farmer‟s 
                                                 
12
 We also conducted a simple field experiment to estimate the partial risk aversion coefficient of the farmers based 
on Binswanger (1981) which is used as a proxy of risk aversion. 
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minimum living standard security, rural old-age insurance, crop insurance, and livestock 
insurance. The higher value of insurance variable would imply the more participation in 
insurance markets. 
 To capture asymmetric information aspect, we include two binary variables; credit 
worthy and group guarantee variables. In the presence of asymmetric information, creditworthy 
borrowers may be denied credit because they are unable to meet such collateral requirements or 
pay such high interest rates. Loan may be disapproved if borrowers are not a member of group 
guarantee in which every member of a group ensure the repayment of all members. Credit 
worthy variable takes value 1 if a respondent indicated he is currently considered a „Credit 
Worthy‟ borrower by local RCC, or 0 otherwise.  Group guarantee variable takes value 1 if a 
respondent indicated he is a member of a Group Guarantee, or 0 otherwise.   
Elasticity of demand for credit. We estimate the sensitivity of the quantity demanded for 
credit to changes in the interest rate.  Using 7% interest rate as a benchmark, farmers were asked 
to rank on a five-point ordinal scale (from Definitely Borrow a lot more to Definitely not borrow 
anymore) when interest rate decreases from 7% to 6%, 5%, 4%, and 3% (called lower interest 
rate) and increases from 7% to 8%, 9%, 10%, and 11% (called higher interest rate), assuming 
that respondents can borrow as much as they need. We create 10 binary variables to indicate 
characteristics of each respondent whether his credit demand is perfectly inelastic; highly 
inelastic, medium elastic, moderate elastic and highly elastic for lower and higher interest rate. 
Numerical criteria to specify each of elasticity of demand for credit variable are presented in the 
Appendix.   
Furthermore, we include binary variables for whether the respondent held informal credit 
(friends and family); and/or formal credit (RCC or bank) to capture effects between formal and 
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informal credit. In addition, farmers identified the willingness to borrow if they can use their 
land use rights as collateral for a loan on a five-point scale (from definitely borrow more to not 
borrow any more).  The higher the value of the land use rights as collateral variable, the less 
likely farmers will borrow. Finally, we include a dummy variable to account for farmers‟ 
entrepreneurial activity. The variable “Ever started business” takes value 1 if respondents have 
ever started a new business and 0 otherwise. Whereas, the variable “Plan to start business” takes 
value 1 if respondents are planning to start a new business and 0 otherwise.  
 
3.8 Empirical Results 
In this section the results of the hypotheses testing are reported. Table 3.3 and 3.4 present 
results from a linear probability model and logit model respectively. The theory suggests that 
there will be a negative relationship between quantity rationing and wealth. We find that this 
holds true. In both models, it is found that there is a negative and significant relationship between 
quantity rationed farmers and asset value. In addition, asset value is also negatively associated 
with quantity rationing but positively associated with price rationing. As expected, relatively 
financial poor is more likely to be quantity rationed because from lenders‟ perception, the 
likelihood of repayment of the poor may be small. However, this does not appear to be the case 
for the productive wealth, which has an insignificant coefficient for the farm size variable on 
both quantity and risk rationing. We also tested the hypothesis that the financial wealthy is risk 
rationed and this does not hold true in both models. The result is not consistent with what Thiele 
and Wambach (1999); and BCG found, specifically it is the financially wealthy who will be risk 
rationed.  
We find risk aversion and prudence are strongly correlated with risk rationing and 
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quantity rationing.  There is a positive and significant relationship between risk aversion score 
and risk rationed farmers, given prudence score = 0. This also holds true for prudence score and 
risk rationed farmers, given risk aversion score = 0. As anticipated, relatively high risk averse 
and prudent farmers tend to be risk rationed. This is consistent with Boucher et al. (2009) that 
expect risk rationing should be more likely among households that are more risk averse. The 
coefficient on interaction term between risk aversion and prudence is negative and significant 
indicating that risk aversion and prudence attribute work in an opposite direction for risk rationed 
farmers. On the other hand, the unique effect of risk aversion and prudence on quantity rationed 
farmers are negative when prudence score = 0 and risk aversion score = 0 respectively. The 
coefficient on interaction term between risk aversion and prudence is positive and significant 
showing that risk aversion and prudence attribute of quantity rationed farmers are 
complementary. 
In addition, the likelihood of being risk rationed increases significantly with participation 
in insurance markets as presented in both linear probability model and logit model. Risk averse 
households tend to have a higher willingness to pay for insurance and participate in insurance 
markets and are more likely to be risk rationed. This is to confirm that risk rationing may exist 
with the presence of insurance markets. The evidence contradicts with the risk rationing 
characterization given by BCG stating that risk rationing occurs when insurance markets are 
absent. In contrast, the likelihood of being quantity rationed significantly decreases with the 
increase in insurance markets participation. Quantity rationed individuals are less likely to 
participate in insurance markets.   
Being considered as a credit worthy and being a member of group guarantee appear to 
have no impact on risk rationing. However, credit worthy is significantly decreasing with 
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quantity rationing as anticipated. Creditworthiness has to do with the ability of a borrower to pay 
current debt in a timely manner. Lenders would be more willing to provide loan to credit worthy 
individuals, therefore; credit worthy individuals are less likely to be quantity rationed. In linear 
probability model, coefficients of credit worthy and group guarantee are significant and positive 
on price rationed farmers. This could simply be that farmers who are credit worthy or are 
member of group guarantee are more likely to be price rationed, which can be either borrowers 
who were happy with the amount they received or non-borrowers.    
Dummy variables of respondents‟ elasticity of credit demand at lower and higher interest 
rate are included in the model and are compared with perfectly inelastic credit demand. In linear 
probability model, the elasticity of demand for credit does not appear to be significant on risk 
rationing. In other words, we cannot distinguish risk rationed farmers by their sensitivity to 
changes in interest rate. This seems to be consistent with the hypothesis as the interest rate 
variation should not affect the credit demand of risk rationed individual but the risk perception 
which is innate characteristics. Considering other type of credit rationed farmers, results show 
that quantity rationed individuals are less sensitive to high interest rate than others. But price 
rationed individuals are more sensitive to high interest rate and less sensitive to low interest rate. 
This illustrates the excess demand for credit of quantity rationed farmers as interest rate increases 
or decreases relative to price rationed farmers. The results in logit model are consistent with 
those in linear probability model except that now risk rationed farmers are more sensitive to low 
interest rate. Table 3.5 and 3.6 also present results from the crosstabulation between inelasticity 
of credit demand and borrower type and confirm that risk rationed farmers are more sensitive to 
low interest rate. The higher the measure of inelasticity would indicate the less willingness to 
borrow when interest rate varies. At any given interest rates, a large proportion of risk rationed 
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farmers has highly inelastic demand. However, when interest rate is low enough, some risk 
rationed farmers have high elastic demand and are willing to borrow.  
There appears to be a strongly negative relationship between formal borrowing and risk 
rationing. Risk rationed individuals are less likely to participate in formal markets because they 
are discouraged in their participation and borrowing decisions by the risk of losing collateral 
associated with getting formal credit. The results suggest that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between informal borrowing and quantity rationed farmers. This does not appear to 
be the case for the price rationed farmers, which has a negative and significant coefficient for 
informal borrowing variable. The constraint to access in formal credit markets of quantity 
rationed farmers causes the increasing participation in informal credit markets relative to price 
rationed farmers.   
To capture the willingness to borrow when farmers can use their land as collateral, we 
find the coefficients of land use rights as collateral variable on risk rationing and price rationing 
are not different from zero. However, the variable is significant and negatively associated with 
quantity rationing. This could imply that quantity rationed farmers tend to borrow more when 
they can use land as collateral for a loan. In addition, we find female is more likely to be risk 
rationed but male is more likely to be price rationed. This is consistent with most studies 
indicating that women are found to be more averse to risk than men. Finally, there is no strong 
relationship between entrepreneurship variables and all 3 credit rationed types in the linear 
probability model. However, in the logit model, the coefficient of plan to start business variable 
is negative and significant on price rationed farmers. Farmers who plan to start business are not 
likely to be price rationed.  
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Table 3.3: Linear probability Model 
  Risk Rationed Quantity Rationed Price Rationed 
  (1) P>t (2) P>t (3) P>t 
Sex (Female =1) 0.0390119* 0.061 0.0177828 0.528 -0.0567947* 0.097 
Education 0.0074557 0.212 -0.0040498 0.637 -0.0034059 0.739 
Years of Farming 0.0002039 0.804 0.0014853 0.191 -0.0016892 0.224 
Farm Size (mu) -0.0010763 0.743 0.0029848 0.594 -0.0019085 0.764 
Household Income (RMB) -8.31E-08 0.781 4.98E-07 0.573 -4.15E-07 0.649 
Percent Farm Income 0.0374555 0.354 -0.0249433 0.652 -0.0125123 0.848 
Asset Value (RMB) -1.16E-09 0.274 -0.00000000392* 0.093 0.00000000508* 0.079 
Saving 0.0015636 0.884 -0.0235085 0.152 0.0219448 0.253 
Informal Borrowing -0.0129207 0.54 0.1373711*** 0 -0.1244504*** 0.003 
Formal Borrowing -0.0638383*** 0.003 -0.0220723 0.635 0.0859106* 0.088 
Insurance 0.0269298* 0.062 -0.0292646* 0.057 0.0023348 0.908 
Highly Inelastic_lower_i -0.0243217 0.356 -0.0164642 0.627 0.0407859 0.329 
Medium Elastic_lower_i 0.0182933 0.632 0.0300997 0.47 -0.048393 0.365 
Moderate Elastic_lower_i -0.0173542 0.722 0.0582786 0.426 -0.0409244 0.634 
Highly Elastic_lower_i 0.1625621 0.164 0.2178793 0.123 -0.3804414*** 0.01 
Highly Inelastic_higher_i -0.0303448 0.366 0.0115993 0.814 0.0187455 0.74 
Medium Elastic_higher_i -0.0124085 0.778 0.1249938 0.112 -0.1125852 0.189 
Moderate Elastic_higher_i -0.047337 0.271 -0.0814908 0.477 0.1288278 0.325 
Highly Elastic_higher_i -0.0604622 0.512 -0.3241685** 0.013 0.3846307** 0.017 
Land Use Rights as 
Collateral 0.0014965 0.854 -0.0180144 0.117 0.0165179 0.224 
Credit Worthy -0.0035254 0.875 -0.1011384** 0.014 0.1046638** 0.021 
Group Guarantee -0.030602 0.297 -0.0658012 0.167 0.0964032* 0.075 
Ever started business -0.023436 0.244 0.0007093 0.982 0.0227267 0.527 
Plan to start business 0.0113026 0.612 0.0528498 0.125 -0.0641524 0.105 
Risk Aversion Score 0.0039919*** 0.01 -0.0048225* 0.094 0.0008307 0.793 
Prudence Score 0.004964** 0.029 -0.0080622*** 0.008 0.0030982 0.406 
Risk Aversion* Prudence  -0.0000621* 0.086 0.0001273** 0.017 -0.0000652 0.303 
Constant -0.322263** 0.012 0.5936249*** 0.002 0.7286381*** 0.002 
Observations 575   575   575   
Note: The dependent variable for each column is listed in the column heading. 
  ***Significant at the 1 percent level, ** 5 percent level, *10 percent level 
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Table 3.4: Logit Model 
  Risk Rationed Quantity Rationed Price Rationed 
  (1) P>z (2) P>z (3) P>z 
Sex (Female =1) 0.9181063** 0.033 0.176303 0.519 -0.3649071 0.119 
Education 0.1448204 0.227 -0.0395641 0.609 -0.01988 0.765 
Years of Farming 0.0056551 0.732 0.0147827 0.245 -0.0119582 0.245 
Farm Size (mu) -0.0130984 0.806 0.0663359 0.294 -0.0299784 0.507 
Household Income (RMB) -9.80E-07 0.875 9.72E-06 0.193 -6.59E-06 0.279 
Percent Farm Income 0.5108259 0.473 -0.1834107 0.725 -0.0671081 0.875 
Asset Value (RMB) -6.08E-07 0.27 -0.0000014* 0.053 0.00000119** 0.017 
Saving 0.1213536 0.563 -0.2179932 0.266 0.1416357 0.315 
Informal Borrowing -0.3936165 0.382 1.195029*** 0 -0.8351765*** 0.001 
Formal Borrowing -2.262973** 0.022 -0.1483446 0.714 0.5374682 0.15 
Insurance 0.4928389** 0.015 -0.2561515 0.122 -0.0100312 0.942 
Highly Inelastic_lower_i -0.4146077 0.41 -0.2017156 0.603 0.3639452 0.245 
Medium Elastic_lower_i 0.3252105 0.544 0.1610179 0.712 -0.2012367 0.562 
Moderate Elastic_lower_i -0.1713025 0.875 0.2595976 0.664 -0.03266 0.951 
Highly Elastic_lower_i 2.155675** 0.029 1.608991** 0.033 -2.050931** 0.011 
Highly Inelastic_higher_i -0.8140792 0.251 0.2018447 0.638 0.0485604 0.897 
Medium Elastic_higher_i -0.2118449 0.794 1.044138** 0.048 -0.746228 0.114 
Moderate Elastic_higher_i dropped 0.988 -0.8306577 0.488 1.064743 0.425 
Highly Elastic_higher_i dropped 0.991 dropped 
 
dropped 
 Land Use Rights as 
Collateral 0.0024396 0.643 -0.2080838** 0.041 0.1305125 0.131 
Credit Worthy 0.0059218 0.418 -0.6456189** 0.033 0.5273625** 0.049 
Group Guarantee -0.3217286 0.9 -0.732953 0.307 0.8488686 0.125 
Ever started business -0.3429987 0.001 0.054649 0.858 0.1584072 0.532 
Plan to start business -0.0575772 0.001 0.4649128 0.126 -0.4644905* 0.074 
Risk Aversion Score 0.1421943*** 0.002 -0.0468407** 0.047 0.0060762 0.775 
Prudence Score 0.1534811*** 0 -0.1051185*** 0.002 0.027058 0.333 
Risk Aversion* Prudence  -0.0021159*** 
 
0.0015423*** 0.003 -0.000489 0.268 
Constant -14.83479*** 
 
2.30034 0.152 0.8963496 0.559 
Observations 563   572   572   
Note: The dependent variable for each column is listed in the column heading. 
  ***Significant at the 1 percent level, ** 5 percent level, *10 percent level 
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Table 3.5: Measure of inelasticity at lower interest rates * Borrower Type Crosstabulation 
  
Borrower Type 
Total 
Risk 
Rationed 
Quantity 
Rationed 
Price 
Rationed 
Measure of 
inelasticity at lower 
interest rates 
1 4.40% 4.90% 2.10% 2.70% 
2 4.40% 18.60% 8.30% 9.50% 
3 33.30% 29.40% 23.60% 25.00% 
4 17.80% 19.60% 28.60% 26.70% 
5 40.00% 27.50% 37.40% 36.20% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 
 
 
Table 3.6: Measure of inelasticity at higher interest rates * Borrower Type Crosstabulation 
 
  
Borrower Type 
Total 
Risk 
Rationed 
Quantity 
Rationed 
Price 
Rationed 
Measure of 
inelasticity at higher 
interest rates 
1 
  
1.00% 0.50% 0.60% 
2   1.00% 1.60% 1.40% 
3 6.70% 16.70% 5.90% 7.50% 
4 8.90% 20.60% 15.80% 16.10% 
5 84.40% 60.80% 76.20% 74.50% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 
 
3.9 Conclusion  
The purpose of this study is to provide a specific test of risk rationing theory proposed by 
BCG. The farm household survey was conducted in Shaanxi province in November 2010 and 
730 households were surveyed. Survey questions applied the direct elicitation methodology 
(DEM) and were designed so that each credit rationing status could easily be extracted.  
Among all 730 respondents, the total proportion of risk rationed, quantity rationed and 
price rationed farmers are approximately 6.2%, 14% and 79.9% respectively. The results verify 
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the existence of risk rationing in China rural credit markets. There is a strong support to the 
theory that the financial poor is more likely to be quantity rationed. However, the result does not 
significantly support that the financial wealthy is more likely to be risk rationed. In addition, the 
productive wealth appears to have to no impact on all types of credit constraint status. We find 
that risk averse and prudent individuals are more likely to be risk rationed. This is likely due to 
innate risk judgments made by individuals. Our study is among the first that we are aware that 
has been able to provide evidence that in fact risk rationing behavior can take place in the 
presence of insurance markets. The evidence is not consistent with BCG suggesting that risk 
rationing occurs when insurance markets are absent. Combining the results, risk averse 
households tend to have a higher willingness to pay for insurance and participate in insurance 
markets and are more likely to be risk rationed. 
Elasticity of demand for credit has a strong implication in credit markets. Results 
exemplify the excess demand for credit of quantity rationed farmers as quantity rationed 
individuals are less sensitive to high interest rate than others, but price rationed individuals are 
more sensitive to high interest rate and less sensitive to low interest rate. We also find that a 
large proportion of risk rationed farmers has perfectly inelastic of demand for credit but in fact, 
when interest rate is low enough, risk rationed individuals are more likely to borrow.   
What have we learned from incidence of risk rationing is that efforts to enhance the working of 
rural credit markets and credit access in order to increase agricultural investment and alleviate 
poverty must also deal with risk. BCG argue that failure to account for risk rationed agents, who 
have profitable projects but are discouraged from implementing them because of the riskiness of 
the available loan contracts, may lead to a distortion of the rural financial system. The finding of 
the significance of risk rationing has practical policy implications. The interest rate subsidy and 
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pricing strategies designed to increase credit access might be ineffective because of the 
inelasticity demand for credit of risk rationed individuals. In addition, a policy to increase land 
use rights and security would be successful if collateral played a key role in borrowing 
agreements
13
. However, if credit were constrained because of risk perception, then this policy 
would be unlikely to reduce credit constraint. Land use rights in China will be only partially 
effective as it does not increase farmers‟ willingness to offer up the collateral needed to obtain 
loans. As a result, policies that decrease the risk associated with loan contract to rural households 
would be more appropriate in the presence of risk rationing. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
13
 Stiglitz and Weiss (1992) argued that collateral and other non-price rationing devices would not eliminate the 
possibility of credit rationing. 
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3.10 Appendix 
Elasticity of demand for credit variables 
 We create 10 binary variables to indicate characteristics of each respondent whether his 
credit demand is perfectly inelastic; highly inelastic, medium elastic, moderate elastic and highly 
elastic for lower and higher interest rate by using criteria as follows.  
First, we ask a question “How much do you currently owe to RCC or Banks?”. 
Depending on the amount of debt, each respondent then indicate the 5-level of willingness to 
borrow when interest rate varies in a) or b). At any given rates, a respondent indicating he would 
definitely not borrow anymore/less will have perfectly inelastic demand for credit. The elasticity 
increases as he would be willing to borrow more. 
   Q. How much do you currently owe to RCC or Banks?   ________ RMB 
If > 0 go to a), if = 0 go to b) 
 
 a) Suppose that the current RCC rate of interest is 7% per year. Assume that you can 
borrow as much as you need at this interest rate so that all of you credit needs are 
satisfied, if interest rates changed from 7% to the following rate, you would 
 
New 
Interest 
rate % 
Definitely 
Borrow a lot 
more 
Definitely 
Borrow 
some more 
Maybe 
borrow a lot 
more 
Maybe 
borrow some 
more 
Definitely 
not borrow 
anymore 
6 
     5 
     4 
     3 
      
New 
Interest 
rate % 
Definitely 
Borrow a lot 
less 
Definitely 
Borrow 
some less 
Maybe 
borrow a lot 
less 
Maybe 
borrow some 
less 
Definitely 
not borrow 
any less 
8 
     9 
     10 
     11 
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b) You indicated that you have no debt to RCC or banks. Suppose you can have all your 
loan needs met at the following rate. What would your borrowing activity be given the 
following annual interest rate?  
 
New 
Interest 
rate % 
Definitely 
Borrow a lot  
Definitely 
Borrow 
some  
Maybe 
borrow a lot  
Maybe 
borrow some 
Definitely 
not borrow 
any 
3 
     4 
     5 
     6 
     7 
     8 
     9 
     10 
     11 
      
 
Second, we recode responses in Table a) and b) as a score. Definitely Borrow a lot 
more/less, Definitely Borrow some more/less, Maybe borrow a lot more/less, Maybe borrow 
some more/less and Definitely not borrow anymore/less take value 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively. 
Third, numerical criteria are assigned as follow.  
Table a) at lower interest rate (6%, 5%, 4%, 3%), maximum score = 20, minimum score = 4 
Score Elasticity of demand for credit variables 
20 Perfectly Inelastic_lower_i = 1, otherwise = 0 
16-19 Highly Inelastic_lower_i = 1, otherwise = 0 
9-15 Medium Elastic_lower_i = 1, otherwise = 0 
5-8 Moderate Elastic_lower_i = 1, otherwise = 0 
4 Highly Elastic_lower_i = 1, otherwise = 0 
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Table a) at higher interest rate (8%, 9%, 10%, 11%), maximum score = 20, minimum score = 4 
Score Elasticity of demand for credit variables 
20 Perfectly Inelastic_higher_i = 1, otherwise = 0 
16-19 Highly Inelastic_ higher_i = 1, otherwise = 0 
9-15 Medium Elastic_ higher_i = 1, otherwise = 0 
5-8 Moderate Elastic_ higher_i = 1, otherwise = 0 
4 Highly Elastic_ higher_i = 1, otherwise = 0 
 
 
Table b) at lower interest rate (3%, 4%, 5%, 6%, 7%), maximum score = 25, minimum score = 5 
Score Elasticity of demand for credit variables 
25 Perfectly Inelastic_lower_i = 1, otherwise = 0 
20-24 Highly Inelastic_lower_i = 1, otherwise = 0 
11-19 Medium Elastic_lower_i = 1, otherwise = 0 
6-10 Moderate Elastic_lower_i = 1, otherwise = 0 
5 Highly Elastic_lower_i = 1, otherwise = 0 
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Table b) at higher interest rate(7%, 8%, 9%, 10%, 11%), maximum score = 25, minimum score = 5 
Score Elasticity of demand for credit variables 
25 Perfectly Inelastic_higher_i = 1, otherwise = 0 
20-24 Highly Inelastic_ higher_i = 1, otherwise = 0 
11-19 Medium Elastic_ higher_i = 1, otherwise = 0 
6-10 Moderate Elastic_ higher_i = 1, otherwise = 0 
5 Highly Elastic_ higher_i = 1, otherwise = 0 
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CHAPTER 4 
LIVELIHOOD DISRUPTION AND VENTURE CREATION: 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AS TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 
A COMPARISON BETWEEN SHAANXI FARMERS AND KENTUCKY FARMERS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Starting a new business venture can involve a substantial change in work activities as 
well as substantial uncertainty and risk about the potential rewards and costs. Similarly a 
manager making a decision about whether or not to adopt a new and unfamiliar technology also 
faces substantial uncertainty regarding the potential costs and rewards, or how the new 
technology will affect the use of other inputs in the production process. By comparing the 
similarities in the act of venture creation and the adoption of a new technology, this study seeks 
to introduce the entrepreneurship model, examine factors influencing entrepreneurial adoption 
decision and estimate the effect of internal family events on the decision to start a new business. 
Drucker (1985) defines an entrepreneur as a person who looks out for any changes, 
responds to it and exploits the opportunity generated by the change. It may mean provision of a 
new business, new product or a new service. Entrepreneurship ranges from individual projects to 
major activities creating many job opportunities and may involve the entrepreneur either on a 
full-time or part-time basis. The potential entrepreneur succeeds if the venture makes a 
sustainable profit (in terms of money and enjoyment) relative to other employment or business 
opportunities forgone. In this sense, we can think of the potential entrepreneur as involved in the 
joint production of profit and enjoyment. The entrepreneur may produce profit and enjoyment 
through some current mix of production technology, or through an entrepreneurial technology. In 
this way, the considerations of venture creation can be directly compared to the technology 
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adoption decision of a producer.  
Noting the similarities between venture creation and technology adoption is important for 
two primary reasons. First, a long and well developed literature exists to examine the adoption 
and diffusion of new technologies (see Geroski (2000) for a review). This literature involves 
substantial rigor and much of it is devoted to empirical application and testing of candidate 
theories. This is in stark contrast to the literature on entrepreneurship which may be 
characterized as comprising many eclectic theories that are difficult to test and often supported 
only anecdotally. Secondly, technology adoption is an entrepreneurial activity. Thus, it is 
important to recognize this literature as contributing to our understanding of how 
entrepreneurship decisions are made and how policy may spur such activities in a way that 
promotes growth.  
In demonstrating how the technology adoption literature may be applied to venture 
creation, we will employ two novel data sets consisting of a survey administered to Chinese 
farmers in Shaanxi province and tobacco farmers in Kentucky.  
First, the entrepreneurship survey has been carried out in Shaanxi province in November 
2011. The survey collected detailed information of the Chinese farmer on entrepreneurial 
decision and attitude toward the hypothetical implementation of land use rights transaction in 
China. It is interesting to see what would happen in term of the entrepreneurial decision if the 
Chinese government made it legal for farmers to buy or sell land use rights. The second survey 
collected detailed information on the socioeconomic background, entrepreneurial decision and 
attitude, livelihood disruption, ability levels and personality traits of the Kentucky farmer at the 
time of tobacco buyout. On October 22, 2004, President Bush signed the Fair and Equitable 
Tobacco Reform Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-357) which ended the tobacco quota program and 
 109 
 
established the Tobacco Transition Payment Program (TTPP), also called the "tobacco buyout". 
The TTPP helps tobacco quota holders and producers transition to the free market by providing 
annual transitional payments for 10 years to eligible tobacco quota holders and producers. 
Kentucky is one of the most tobacco-dependent states and Kentucky tobacco farmers are 
particularly vulnerable to changes in tobacco economy. Farmers faced a declining return to 
tobacco farming and, at the same time, received a large sum of money from the government 
(often a lump sum) potentially encouraging farmers to consider alternative livelihoods. By 
utilizing the survey data of 730 Shaanxi farmers and 701 Kentucky tobacco farmers, we can 
explore some of the determinants of entrepreneurial intention.  
The rest of this Chapter proceeds as follows. First, we briefly review the literature on 
technology adoption, including some discussion of the most prominent models. Second, we 
compare entrepreneurial attitudes between Shaanxi and Kentucky farmers. Next we propose our 
own conceptual model of entrepreneurship based on the technology adoption literature and 
several hypotheses are derived. The data and methodology are formulated in the following 
section. Finally, the empirical results are presented and discussed. 
 
4.2 Learning by Doing and Learning by Using  
Economists have studied the effect of entrepreneurial activities and economic activities, 
such as trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), on economic growth. It is believed that the 
outcome of technology adoption in those activities creates knowledge in human capital through 
learning and technology diffusion which increase productivity in the economy.  
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4.2.1 Leaning by Doing 
 
Arrow (1962) and Lucas (1988), both suggest that technical change is the by-product of 
knowledge and experience gained in the production of goods. They call this process “learning by 
doing”. The adoption of a new technology will lead to an initial change in productivity followed 
by some growth in productivity over time due to learning by doing.  
Arrow (1962) suggests an endogenous theory of the changes in knowledge which cause 
inter-temporal shifts in production function. The acquisition of knowledge is usually called 
“learning” which is the product of experience. Learning takes place either during production or 
problem solving. According to the classic learning experiments, learning associated with 
repetition is subject to sharply diminishing returns. Thus, the stimulus situations must themselves 
be steadily evolving rather than simply repeating, in order to have steadily increasing 
performance.  The role of experience in increasing productivity has been widely observed as the 
number of labor-hours expended in production is a decreasing function of the total number of 
output of the same type previously produced. Thus, there is a pronounced “learning curve” in 
production.   
Accordingly, Arrow formulated the hypothesis that technical change in general can be 
ascribed to experience, that it is the activity of production which gives rise to problems for which 
favorable responses are selected over time. In his model, cumulative gross investment 
(cumulative production of capital goods) is an economic variable representing an index of 
“experience”. Each new machine produced and put into use is capable of changing the 
environment in which production and learning takes place. To decide where the learning enters 
the production process, he assumed technical change is completely embodied in new capital 
 111 
 
goods. The amount of labor used in production and output capacity are functions of cumulative 
gross investment which affect an increase in total output and productivity.  
Epple et al. (1996) study transfer across shifts at manufacturing facilities over time by 
analyzing whether knowledge acquired through learning by doing is cumulative and persists 
through time or whether it depreciates. The results suggest that knowledge acquired during the 
period of one-shift operation carried forward to both shifts of the two-shift regime. In addition, 
during the two-shift regime, most learning occurred on the first shift, and most knowledge 
acquired on the day shift was transferred to the second shift. Irwin et al. (1994) suggest that 
learning by doing in the semiconductor industry is limited and evidence on spillovers is 
nonexistent. Tsang (2002) uses a survey of 73 Singapore and 89 Hong Kong firms with respect 
to their joint venture set up in China to study channels of knowledge acquisition and finds that 
firms improve their skills of knowledge acquisition through learning by doing. 
 
4.2.2 Learning by Using 
Another form of learning introduced by Rosenberg (1982) is “learning by using”  which 
is a function not of the experience involved in producing the product but of its utilization by the 
final user. Intuitively, producers have learned through use of consumers how to improve quality 
or lower maintenance and other operating costs. 
 Mukoyama (2006) employs a statistical model to formulate the idea of “learning by 
using” as a stochastic process. Capital goods (machine) producers learn from the experience of 
users which leads to improvement in machine quality over time. The improvement process 
approximately takes an exponential form, and produces an S-shape diffusion curve of machines 
when combine with the growth of demand due to improvement. It is found that when the initial 
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quality of the machine is low, the dispersion of machine quality tends to increase first, and to 
decline as the machines diffuse. 
Adler et al. (1991) distinguish between first-order learning and second-order learning. 
The concept of learning by doing is similar to the first-order learning which is learning based on 
repetition and on the associated incremental development of expertise which makes direct 
workers more effective in executing the tasks assigned to them. While, the concept of learning 
by using is similar to the second-order learning which is learning created by production 
experience and  by explicit managerial or engineering action to change the technology, the 
equipment, the processes or the human capital in ways that augment capabilities. They find that 
the learning effect can be as strong in very capital-intensive operations as in labor/materials-
intensive operations, which suggests the importance of learning in capital.  
MacLeod (1992) explores the role of capital-goods suppliers in the innovation and 
diffusion of technical change. She emphasizes the type of interaction between users and capital-
goods suppliers by studying the British mechanical engineering industry in 19th century and 
writes “... it was often only through the medium of their capital-goods suppliers that information 
about a new technology was passed back and forth among users (p.287)”.  
McWilliams et al. (1996) introduce learning by using into an adoption model to explain 
why larger and more educated firms adopt earlier. They integrate the concepts of adoption and 
diffusion by using Tobit analysis in the empirical estimation of time of adoption, which allows 
the diffusion of the technology to be derived from the time of adoption analysis. The study 
suggests that dynamic economies of scale arise in learning by using that speed up adoption.  
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4.3 Technology Adoption 
Technology adoption is the decision by a producer to begin using a different production 
process in the hopes of obtaining a larger profit. Once a technology is introduced to the market, 
few may have any specific knowledge of how to use the technology correctly, or the levels of 
production that can be expected given a set of inputs. For example, studies have recently 
examined the adoption of genetically modified cotton seed in China (see Wang et al. 2008; 
Huang et al. 2002). Huang et al. find that early adopters were highly successful in reducing input 
costs and increasing profits leading to rapid and widespread diffusion of the new technology. 
More prominent examples in the literature involve the adoption of irrigation technology 
(Koundouri et al. 2006), large scale farm equipment (Rees, Briggs and Oakey 1984), or 
information technology (Williams and Rao 1997). Technology adoption can be represented by 
Diffusion Model and Threshold Model. 
 
4.3.1 Diffusion Model 
Technological change is a multistage process consisting of innovation, adoption and 
diffusion (Schmookler 1966). Once, the innovation is introduced, the technology adoption 
process takes time to complete. This process was the focus a many sociologists and economists. 
The early literature noted that plotting the rate of technology diffusion (the percent of those 
adopting) over time results in an S-shaped curve (see figure 4.1 in the appendix) (Davies 1979; 
Griliches 1957; Klepper and Graddy 1990). With an S-shaped diffusion curve, there is a 
relatively low adoption rate but with a high rate of change in adoption during an initial period, a 
period of introduction of a technology. The takeoff period is followed by a saturation period 
where diffusion rates are slow, marginal rate of diffusion decreases and the diffusion rate reaches 
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a peak. In a final period, diffusion rate and marginal rate declines and the new innovation is 
replaced. Diffusion tends to be concentrated geographically around cities (Baptista 1998), 
potentially due to the greater visibility of early adopters. 
Diffusion is often modeled using the function (Sunding and Zilberman 2001): 
                                        1)( ]1[)(  btaeKtP             (4.1) 
where P(t) is the rate of diffusion at time t, and K is the equilibrium rate of diffusion, a reflects 
diffusion at the start of the estimation period, b is the growth rate of diffusion. Based on 
epidemiological models, this early model of technology adoption is simple in that it does not 
offer any explanation of why technology is adopted. Rather the model only dictates a pattern of 
adoption over time.  Early refinements were suggested by Quirmbach (1986) to make K a 
function of profit resulting from the new technology.  
Mansfield (1963) modifies the diffusion model, supposing that diffusion is primarily a 
function of information transfer. His logistic curve based model is written implicitly as 
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where  m(t) is the number of firms adopting at time t, n(t)  is the total universe of firms, b is the 
growth rate of diffusion, and  is an integration constant that positions the logistic curve on the 
time scale. Mansfield argues why the curve should be S-shaped. The profit from adopting new 
technology increases over time due to improvements in implementation of the technology, while 
the cost of adoption decreases, thus the rate of diffusion accelerates. Although, the Mansfield 
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model can explain the S-shaped curve, it disregards differences between firms by assuming that 
all firms are identical. In addition, while Mansfield‟s arguments involve dynamic aspects of 
technology adoption (such as lowering costs and increased profits through experience with the 
new technology), the model itself excludes these factors.   
 
4.3.2Threshold Model 
An alternative model is proposed by David (1969). His threshold model assumes that 
firms are heterogeneous, leading to different propensities to adopt a technology. Further, his 
model draws a distinction between adoption and the extent of adoption. He proposes two 
diffusion curves:  
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where, 1tY  is the share of farms adopting at time t, 
2
tY  is the share of total acres adopting the 
modern technology at time t, tt
c
t FL  /  is cutoff farm size upon which adoption occurs, where 
tF  is fixed cost and t  is the profit differential per acre, L is farm size, g(L) is density of farm 
size, 


0
)( dLLgN  is the total number of farms, 


0
)( dLLLgL  is the total acreage.   
The Threshold model potentially addresses learning-by-doing and learning-by-using. 
Learning-by-doing should cut the fixed costs of adopting a new technology            
through the accumulation of technology specific knowledge. Further, the profit differential 
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between old and new technologies will grow over time             because of learning-by-
using as farmers will get more yields and save cost with more experience in the use of new 
technology. The dynamics of diffusion associated with the threshold model will lead to an S-
shaped diffusion curve.  
 The threshold model applies in many cases where heterogeneity results from differences 
in farm size, land quality or human capital. David (1969) explains the adoption of grain 
harvesting machinery in the United States in the nineteenth century and argues that farm size is 
the main source of heterogeneity among farmers. He derives the minimum farm size required for 
adoption of various pieces of equipment. Just et al. (1983) argue that adoption of new technology 
requires fixed costs associated with new machinery and a fixed investment of time for learning, 
locating and developing markets, and training hired labor. These fixed costs are more likely to 
discourage adoption by small farms and thus play a crucial role in the relationship of farm size 
and adoption. They suggest that risk attitudes and the stochastic relationship of returns per 
hectare under the traditional and modern technologies play an important role in determining the 
role of farm size in technology adoption.  
 
4.4 Entrepreneurial Attitude 
Previous literatures study and compare the determinants of entrepreneurship using 
surveys of individuals from large developed countries and developing transition countries in 
order understand how these groups differ in terms of individual characteristics, personality traits, 
perceptions of the institutional, social, and economic environment that businesses face. These 
factors are found to be differently associated with entrepreneurs in different countries (Djankov 
et al. 2006b; Ardagna et al. 2009). Therefore, we try to examine and compare entrepreneurial 
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characteristics and attitude of Shaanxi and Kentucky farmers to better understand their 
entrepreneurial uniqueness, opinion and business environment among two regions.  
In each question, respondents specified their level of agreement or disagreement on a 
five-level Likert scale for a series of statements; “strongly disagree = 1”, “disagree = 2”, “neutral 
= 3”, “agree = 4”, and “strongly agree = 5”. The average values of each statement are calculated 
for both Shaanxi and Kentucky farmers. The higher mean would indicate that respondents are 
more likely to agree with a particular statement. We present a Mean Ratio calculated by dividing 
Shaanxi mean by Kentucky mean (Mean Ratio = Shaanxi Mean/Kentucky Mean). To compare 
the entrepreneurial attitudes of Kentucky farmers with Shaanxi farmer, we apply T-Test which 
determines whether two samples with unequal variance (heteroscedastic) are likely to have come 
from the same two underlying populations that have the same mean. If the P-Value is greater 
than 0.05, then entrepreneurial attitudes/ characteristics of two countries are similar, otherwise 
they are different.    
Table 4.1 shows the opinion about level of support provided for new businesses in two 
communities. On average, we find similar opinions in the following statements. First, Shaanxi 
and Kentucky farmers agree that those with successful businesses get a lot of attention and 
admiration. Second, they are relatively neutral about bankers go out of their way to help new 
businesses get started. The different opinions among two regions about the level of support for 
new businesses are as follows. First, Shaanxi farmers agree that young people are encouraged to 
start their own businesses but Kentucky farmers are neutral about it. Second, Shaanxi farmers are 
neutral but Kentucky farmers disagree that local governments provide good support for people 
starting new businesses. Third, Shaanxi farmers relatively disagree but Kentucky farmers seem 
to be neutral about other community groups provide good support for people starting new 
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businesses; and the local media does a good job of covering local business news. Fourth, Shaanxi 
farmers are relatively neutral but Kentucky farmers agree that most of the leaders in this 
community are people who own their own businesses. Lastly, Kentucky farmers are more likely 
to agree that there are many examples of well-respected people who made a success of 
themselves starting new businesses.  
  
Table 4.1: Level of support for new businesses in community 
The level of support provided for new businesses in your 
community 
Shaanxi 
Mean  
Kentucky 
Mean 
Mean 
Ratio P>z 
Those with successful businesses get a lot of attention and admiration 3.74 3.74 1.00 0.90481 
Young people are encouraged to start their own businesses 3.75 2.90 1.29 0.00000 
State and local governments provide good support for people starting 
new businesses 3.02 2.79 1.08 0.00046 
Bankers go out of their way to help new businesses get started 2.84 2.81 1.01 0.46762 
Other community groups provide good support for people starting new 
businesses 2.67 3.12 0.86 0.00000 
The local media does a good job of covering local business news  2.60 3.16 0.83 0.00000 
Most of the leaders in this community are people who own their own 
businesses 2.72 3.44 0.79 0.00000 
There are many examples of well-respected people who made a success 
of themselves starting new businesses 3.52 3.71 0.95 0.00006 
 
Next, we asked respondents “Imagine that you have decided to start a new business. 
Please indicate how accurately you think the following statements would describe each possible 
start-up problem your new business might face.” On average, both Shaanxi and Kentucky 
farmers have different opinions on all statements concerning start-up problems. Kentucky 
farmers are more likely to agree that being taken seriously as a business person and balancing 
time between business and personal or family time are the possible start-up problems they might 
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face. However, Shaanxi farmers are more likely to agree that their start-up problem is lacking of 
mentors or a support structure who can provide advice and support. Table 4.2 presents the 
attitudes of Shaanxi and Kentucky farmers about possible start-up problems. 
Table 4.2: Possible start-up problems 
Each possible start-up problem your new business might face 
(Imagine that you have decided to start a new business) 
Shaanxi 
Mean  
Kentucky 
Mean 
Mean 
Ratio P>z 
Start-up Problem: Being taken seriously as a business person 2.99 3.21 0.93 0.00006 
Start-up Problem: Balancing time between business and personal or 
family time  3.46 3.61 0.96 0.00560 
Start-up Problem: Lack of mentors or a support structure who can 
provide advice and support 3.35 3.22 1.04 0.01888 
 
 Table 4.3 indicates mean of farmers‟ attitude about the certainty of their new business 
accomplishment. The results from T-test show that on average Shaanxi farmers and Kentucky 
farmers have different views about the certainty of new business accomplishment. Kentucky 
farmers are more likely to agree that they will be able to accomplishment in 1) Obtain raw 
materials, 2) Deal with distributors, 3) Attract customers, 4) Compete with other businesses, 5) 
Keep up with technological advances, and 6) Obtain a bank financing. However, Shaanxi 
farmers are more likely to agree about the accomplishment in attracting employees, and 
complying with local, state & federal regulations. Kentucky farmers are relatively neutral but 
Shaanxi farmers relatively disagree that they will be able to accomplish in obtaining start-up 
capital and working capital. Finally, Shaanxi farmers are more likely to disagree that they will be 
able to obtain venture capital financing.   
 
  
 120 
 
Table 4.3: The certainty of new business accomplishment  
How certain you are that your new business will be able to 
accomplish each of the following 
Shaanxi 
Mean  
Kentucky 
Mean 
Mean 
Ratio P>z 
Obtain raw materials 3.13 3.32 0.94 0.000709 
Attract employees 3.31 3.16 1.05 0.010015 
Obtain start-up capital 2.70 2.99 0.90 0.000002 
Obtain working capital 2.55 3.00 0.85 0.000000 
Deal with distributors 2.84 3.38 0.84 0.000000 
Attract customers 3.05 3.36 0.91 0.000009 
Compete with other businesses 2.93 3.22 0.91 0.000000 
Comply with local, state & federal regulations 4.02 3.43 1.17 0.000000 
Keep up with technological advances 2.86 3.34 0.86 0.000000 
Obtain a bank financing 2.35 3.25 0.72 0.000000 
Obtain venture capital financing 2.13 2.86 0.74 0.000000 
 
Further, we examine farmers‟ attitudes about their entrepreneurial abilities and business 
situation among two regions. Lazear (2004) uses the survey data of Stanford University MBA 
graduates and concludes that individuals who become entrepreneurs have a special ability to 
acquire general skills applying to their own businesses. Entrepreneurial abilities and business 
situation in two communities are presented in Table 4.4. 
Results show that Shaanxi and Kentucky farmers have different opinions about their 
entrepreneurial abilities and business situation. Kentucky farmers are more likely to agree that 1) 
If I work hard, I can successfully start a new business, 2) Overall, my skills and abilities will 
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help me start a business, and 3) My past experience will be very valuable in starting a business. 
On the contrary, Shaanxi farmers are more likely to agree that they can put in the effort needed 
to start a business but they are more likely to disagree that several new companies opened in 
their community in the last three years. Finally, Kentucky farmers are more likely to disagree 
that they will have to move to another community if they want to start a new business. 
 
Table 4.4: Entrepreneurial abilities and business situation in community 
 
Imagine that you have decided to start a new business.  Please 
indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each 
statement. 
Shaanxi 
Mean  
Kentucky 
Mean 
Mean 
Ratio P>z 
If I work hard, I can successfully start a new business 3.54 3.75 0.94 0.00002 
Overall, my skills and abilities will help me start a business  3.72 3.93 0.95 0.00000 
My past experience will be very valuable in starting a business  3.79 3.96 0.96 0.00010 
I am confident I can put in the effort needed to start a business  3.90 3.67 1.06 0.00000 
Several new companies opened in my community in the last three years 2.24 2.94 0.76 0.00000 
I will have to move to another community if I want to start a new 
business 2.81 2.51 1.12 0.00000 
 
 
Table 4.5 presents attitude about business activity in community. We find that on average 
farmers in two countries have different attitudes about business activity in their community as 
follows. First, Shaanxi farmers disagree that many new people moved into my community in the 
last three years while Kentucky farmers agree with this statement. Second, Kentucky farmers 
disagree that many people in their community start new businesses but Shaanxi farmers seems to 
be neutral about it. Third, Shaanxi farmers agree that people in their community often talk about 
new business opportunities but Kentucky farmers neither agree nor disagree with this statement. 
Lastly, Shaanxi farmers disagree that local government official suggests new business 
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possibilities but Kentucky farmers are relatively neutral about it. 
Table 4.5: Business activity in community 
Business activity in your community 
Shaanxi 
Mean  
Kentucky 
Mean 
Mean 
Ratio P>z 
Many new people moved into my community in the last three years 2.06 3.54 0.58 0.00000 
Many people in my community start new businesses 2.84 2.54 1.12 0.00000 
People in my community often talk about new business opportunities 3.20 2.94 1.09 0.00000 
Local government official suggests new business possibilities 2.43 3.08 0.79 0.00000 
 
Finally, we investigate and compare entrepreneurial characteristics between Shaanxi and 
Kentucky farmers. They have similar agreement on the following statements. They both agree 
that when they get what they want, it is usually because they worked hard for it. Second, they 
have been very impressed with the people they know who have their own business. However, 
Shaanxi and Kentucky farmers have different entrepreneurial characteristics as follows. First, 
Kentucky farmers are more likely to agree that 1) they are successful in completing new tasks, 2) 
they can reach goals they set for themselves, 3) they are successful when confronting obstacles, 
4) they can do anything they set my mind to, 5) they have no trouble making and keeping 
friends, 6) when they make plans they are almost certain to make them work 7) they usually 
know what is appropriate in any social situation, and 7) they are a good judge of character. 
Second, Shaanxi farmers are more likely to agree that they would be proud of their children if 
they started their own business. Third, Kentucky farmers disagree with these two statements 
“owning my own business is more important than spending time with my family”, and “I 
consider myself a loner” but Shaanxi farmers are neutral. Fourth, Kentucky farmers agree that 
they would probably choose the same career path again but Shaanxi farmers are relatively 
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neutral. Lastly, Shaanxi farmers relatively disagree that they are often concerned about what 
others think of them but Kentucky farmers seems to be neutral. Table 4.6 presents the mean 
entrepreneurial characteristics of Shaanxi and Kentucky farmers. 
Table 4.6: Entrepreneurial characteristics of Shaanxi and Kentucky farmers 
 
Respondent's characteristics 
Shaanxi 
Mean  
Kentucky 
Mean 
Mean 
Ratio P>z 
I am successful in completing new tasks 3.71 4.12 0.90 0.00000 
I can reach goals I set for myself 3.69 4.12 0.90 0.00000 
I am successful when confronting obstacles 3.50 4.01 0.87 0.00000 
I can do anything I set my mind to 3.60 3.97 0.91 0.00000 
Owning my own business is more important than spending time with my 
family 3.19 2.01 1.59 0.00000 
I have no trouble making and keeping friends 3.82 3.96 0.96 0.00202 
When I make plans I am almost certain to make them work 3.56 3.88 0.92 0.00000 
When I get what I want, it is usually because I worked hard for it 3.94 4.13 0.96 0.05090 
I would be proud of my children if they started their own business 4.33 4.21 1.03 0.00813 
I have been very impressed with the people I know who have their own 
business 3.81 3.87 0.98 0.14953 
I would probably choose the same career path again 2.87 3.65 0.78 0.00000 
I usually know what is appropriate in any social situation 3.48 3.86 0.90 0.00000 
I consider myself a loner 2.64 2.32 1.14 0.00000 
I am often concerned about what others think of me 2.62 3.10 0.84 0.00000 
I am a good judge of character 3.43 3.95 0.87 0.00000 
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4.5 Determinants of Entrepreneurial Intention 
Economists and sociologists have made extensive contributions to the literature on the 
adoption and diffusion of technological innovations in agriculture (see Feder et al. (1985); 
Rogers (1995)). Such research typically focuses on the long-term rate of adoption and the factors 
that influence the adoption decision. The perceived or real characteristics of a new innovation are 
widely known to influence the adoption decision. Rogers (1995) hypothesizes five technology 
attributes that affect the rate of adoption: 1) relative advantage (i.e., profitability, initial cost, 
status, time savings, and immediacy of payoff over conventional practice); 2) compatibility (i.e., 
similarity with previously adopted innovations); 3) complexity (degree of difficulty in 
understanding and use); 4) trialability (i.e., ease of experimentation); and 5) observability (i.e., 
degree to which the results of the innovation are visible). These factors might also affect 
entrepreneurial adoption decision, for example; new venture expected profit over profit of 
current activity, ease of entrepreneurial activity and business process, and observable profit and 
result of other entrepreneurs.           
We draw an analogy between factors affecting technology and entrepreneurial adoption 
and investigate whether Shaanxi and Kentucky farmers are influenced by different factors when 
making decisions to enter entrepreneurship. Literature reported a number of determinants of 
entrepreneurial activities. In this section some of the determinants are reviewed. 
Demographic factors  
Demographic factors include age, ethnicity, and the changes in regular family structure 
such as death and divorce are found to have a significant impact on entrepreneurial intention. 
Ardagna et al. (2009) show that individual characteristics, such as gender and age are important 
determinants of entrepreneurship. Pushkarskaya (2008) suggests the family structure and internal 
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family events, such as death of a household member or divorce, strongly influence the decision 
to start a new business. 
Economic Factors, Farm Structure/Size  
The technology adoption requires a large initial investment. Farmers use some of their 
own income and equity to finance at least part of their investments. However, low income, 
unemployment, fear of job loss, or dissatisfaction with the previous job are considered main 
“push” motives for entering entrepreneurship (Brockhaus (1980); Cromie et al. (1991)). In 
addition, a basic hypothesis regarding technology transfer is that the adoption of an innovation 
will tend to take place earlier on larger farms than on smaller farms. Just et al. (1980) note that 
given the uncertainty, and the fixed transaction and information costs associated with 
innovations, there may be a critical lower limit on farm size that prevents smaller farms from 
adopting. As these costs increase, the critical size also increases. It follows that innovations with 
large fixed transaction and/or information costs are less likely to be adopted by smaller farms.  
Shaanxi and Kentucky farmers are particularly vulnerable to policy changes in the 
economy. Thus, many farmers have to adjust to the new economic conditions and are likely to 
experience the changes of income and business environment. In the analysis, we include income 
level, land size, and business climate variables which may significantly correlate with technology 
and entrepreneurial adoption. Moreover, variables indicating the receipt of a tobacco buyout 
check and availability of payment options are included in Kentucky farmers‟ entrepreneurial 
study. 
Human Capital  
The ability to adapt new technologies for use on the farm clearly affects the adoption 
decision. Most adoption studies attempt to measure this trait through operator age, formal 
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education, or years of farming experience, see Fernandez-Cornejo et al. (1994). More years of 
education and/or experience is often hypothesized to increase the probability of adoption 
whereas increasing age reduces the probability. Younger farmers tend to have higher education 
and are often hypothesized to be more willing to adopt an innovation. Prior research indicates 
that educational level strongly correlates with self-employment. In this study, the human capital 
variables consist of education level, internet access and having computer at home. The difference 
in human capital i.e. education and knowledge-based learning may have a significant influence 
in entrepreneurial adoption.  
Social network and Learning 
The agricultural community may establish customs and other social and institutional 
arrangements for mutual help in technology adoption. Smaller farms may also increase their 
adoption because of social and government support. Individual who has a strong tie within social 
network and knows other entrepreneurs is more likely to start the new business. Renzulli et al. 
(2000) explore social  capital  and  the likelihood  of  starting  a business and find that  networks  
across multiple  areas  of social  life obviously provide nascent entrepreneurs with greater access 
to multiple  sources of information  than  do more  homogeneous  networks  and  thus  enable  
them  to make the  transition  from  idea  to action. Moreover, Djankov (2006a) uses data from 7 
cities across China and finds that entrepreneurs are more likely to have family members who are 
entrepreneurs as well as childhood friends who became entrepreneurs, suggesting that social 
networks play an important role in entrepreneurship. In addition, Raffo et al. (2000) suggest that 
micro and small enterprises (MSEs) in the cultural industries sector learn best by being able to 
experiment with ideas, by “doing” and networking with others and by working with more 
experienced mentors in their sector.  
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Distance and geography 
The role of distance and geography in technology adoption is emphasized in the social 
science literature on innovation, Rogers (1995). The emergence of a national media and the 
reduction in the cost of access that resulted from the establishment of railroads, the interstate 
highway system, and rural electrification is one of the reasons for the faster rate of technological 
adoption in the US.  Producers living farther away from a regional center are likely to adopt 
technologies and new venture later.  
Tenure 
 Land ownership is generally believed to encourage adoption of technologies associated 
with land. While several empirical studies support this hypothesis, the results are not consistent 
and the subject has been widely debated. For example, Bultena et al. (1983) find that land tenure 
has no significant influence on adoption of conservation tillage. The apparent inconsistencies in 
the empirical results are due to the nature of the innovation. Land ownership is likely to 
influence adoption if the innovation requires investments tied to the land. Apparently, tenants are 
less likely to adopt these types of innovations because they perceive that the benefits of adoption 
will not necessarily accrue to them.  
Credit constraint 
Evans et al. (1989) argue that capital  is essential  for  starting a business and suggest that 
liquidity constraint will  prevent  some  people from  trying  entrepreneurship. The similar 
conclusion is found in the study by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994) suggesting that liquidity constraints 
exert a noticeable influence on the feasibility of entrepreneurial  enterprises. Even though, 
several studies report the evidence that liquidity constraints are a prevention to new business 
formation, but Hurst et al. (2008) argue that this conclusion is premature. They provide evidence 
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that high levels of liquidity are not essential for starting a small business and the survival of 
businesses is not affected by the wealth of the entrepreneurs. They conclude, however, that even 
if some households that want to start small businesses are currently constrained in their 
borrowing, such constraints are not empirically important in deterring the majority of small 
business formation in the United States.  
Attitude toward Risk 
Previous literatures find that attitude toward risk is significantly associated with 
technology adoption and business start-up.  Knight (1921) argues that bearing risk is one of the 
essential characteristics of entrepreneurship. In addition, Djankov et al. (2006a) suggest that 
entrepreneurs differ strongly from non entrepreneurs in their attitudes towards risk and their 
work-leisure preferences. They find that entrepreneurs are more willing to take risks. 
 
Hypotheses  
Along with previous studies, the hypotheses of factors affecting entrepreneurial adoption 
decision are formulated as follows; 
Demographic factors  
H1: Age, white (race of farmers in Kentucky), death, and divorce are strongly correlated with 
entrepreneurial intentions. 
Economic factors  
H2: Low income can “push” individuals into starting new businesses. 
H3: Farm size and business climate are strongly correlated with entrepreneurial intentions. 
Human capital  
H4: Education level, computer and internet access are positively associated with entrepreneurial 
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intentions. 
Social network and Learning  
H5: Social network, learning by doing and learning by using significantly affect entrepreneurial 
intentions. 
Distance and geography  
H6: Urban community and distance from university or college are significantly correlated with 
entrepreneurial intentions.  
Tenure  
H7: Rent (acres of land that farmers rent) which is a proxy of tenure significantly correlates with 
entrepreneurial intentions. 
Credit constraint 
H8: Risk rationed and quantity rationed individuals are less likely to become entrepreneurs. 
Attitude toward risk 
H9: Agents who are risk averse and prudent are less likely to start new business. 
 
4.6 A Conceptual Model of Entrepreneurship 
Studies of technology adoption behavior focus on factors that affect if and when a 
particular individual will begin utilizing an innovation. The purpose of this study is to identify 
the determinants of entrepreneurial adoption decisions. This section sets out a simple model of 
an individual farmer‟s decision of whether or not to participate in entrepreneurial activity that we 
use to guide our empirical work. We modify the threshold models that focus on studies of the 
adoption behavior of individual farmers and a search for sources of heterogeneity. In the existing 
approach, the dependent variables denote whether or not certain technologies are adopted by a 
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farm product or unit at a certain period, and econometric techniques like logit or probit are used 
to explain discrete technology choices. Similarly, the dependent variables in our model denote 
whether or not entrepreneurial activities are adopted by Shaanxi farmers if the transaction of land 
use rights is implemented and by the tobacco farmers at the time after the tobacco buyout 
program in 2004. A bivariate probit model is applied to explain binary entrepreneurial choices.  
Adoption behavior is depicted by a discrete choice, whether or not to start new business, 
and a continuous choice, how much time or resources to devote to the new activity. Formally, we 
suppose that adoption of entrepreneurship depends both on the profitability of current ventures 
versus potential entrepreneurial ventures, and the degree of learning by doing. Here 
heterogeneity in learning by doing, or knowledge generated by direct or indirect experience, is 
determined by the degree to which the individual is connected to an entrepreneurial social 
network. Formally, let S be the degree to which an individual is integrated into a network of 
individuals or institutions that have created ventures. Consider an individual facing a choice 
between continuing in their current employment and earning 0 , or starting an entrepreneurial 
activity and earning some random profit e  with some known distribution.  The individual thus 
will solve  
                                                                                                         (4.5) 
where t is the percentage of working time devoted to the entrepreneurial activity, T is leisure 
time, U is a standard utility of wealth function,   are personal and property characteristics that 
can influence one‟s ability to obtain profit in either activity (e.g., education, location, etc.) and 
                      
 
  
                 is the subjective expected utility of profit in 
the new venture given the degree of learning by doing, learning by using, the personal 
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characteristics and the time devoted to the new activity. Learning by doing and learning using 
may raise both the mean and lower the variation associated with e , as the individual obtains 
specific knowledge not only about how to begin and run one‟s own venture, but also learns more 
about the potential market for new products or services. Thus,                       
Denote total time               where           Three possible solutions exist for (4.5). 
The first order conditions for an internal solution to (4.5) is given by  
                                                        
 
  
                                  (4.6)  
where 02  is the derivative of profit in the initial activity with respect to time devoted to that 
activity, and    is the derivative of the probability density function of profit for the new activity 
with respect to time devoted to this activity. Equation (4.6) will imply the optimum if (4.6) can 
hold for some  0,1t . Alternatively, the individual will not engage in entrepreneurship if    
                                                  
 
  
                                             (4.7) 
where (4.7) is the first order condition with time in entrepreneurship replaced with 0. The 
individual will completely abandon the old activity if  
                                                  
 
  
                                             (4.8) 
 and if               
where now time in entrepreneurship has been replaced with 1. Thus, the degree to which one is 
socially connected to entrepreneurship will both increase the likelihood of being an entrepreneur, 
and increase the probability of abandoning other activities altogether. Further, factors that 
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decrease the profitability of the old activity will increase the likelihood of entering 
entrepreneurial ventures. For this reason we expect an event such as the tobacco buyout and land 
use rights transaction to spur new entrepreneurship at some level. 
A bivariate probit model was used in both Shaanxi and Kentucky cases. First, consider a 
rational farmer in Kentucky that seeks to maximize the present value of benefits from tobacco 
production and expected benefits from a new business venture. Two decisions were made by the 
same Kentucky farmer and those two decisions are interrelated. First, the Kentucky farmer has to 
decide whether or not to continue growing tobacco and second, the farmer decides whether or 
not to engage in entrepreneurial effort. The time devoted to a tobacco farm and new venture is 
subject to a utility maximization of both tobacco farm profit and new venture expected profit as 
in equation (4.5). The probability of quitting tobacco farming is determined by the livelihood 
disruption of a tobacco buyout program and characteristics of farmers which affect a tobacco 
producer‟s profit. While, the likelihood to engage in entrepreneurship is determined by farmers 
characteristics as well as social network which affect an expected profit of new venture. 
Farmers are assumed to make adoption decisions based upon an objective of utility 
maximization. The first term in equation (4.5) can be represented as a utility maximization of 
tobacco farm profit; 
        
                                                                       (4.9) 
where   
  is a maximized utility function of Kentucky farmer i growing tobacco farm,    is an 
alternative activity. Denoting    as the observed binary variable of farmer i equal to 1 if a farmer 
does not plan to raise tobacco in the future, otherwise, it equals to 0, we have:  
      
       
                          
         
                            
                           (4.10) 
Farmers evaluate whether or not to quit tobacco farm. When the discounted expected benefits of 
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adoption (entrepreneurial activities) are greater than the benefits of tobacco farming, the new 
venture will be adopted. 
The second term in equation (4.5) can be represented as an expected utility maximization 
of entrepreneurial profit; 
      
                                       
 
  
                           (4.11) 
where    
  is an expected maximized utility function of Kentucky farmer i engaging in new 
venture. The farmer i makes a decision whether or not to start a new business, regardless of 
quitting tobacco farm. The observable choices are    equal to 1 if farmer i plan to start a new 
business and 0 otherwise.  
                                               
         
                           
           
                             
                         (4.12) 
His expected profit of new venture compared to benefits from tobacco production affect decision 
whether or not to engage in entrepreneurship. 
 
Net benefits   
  and    
  are assumed to be random functions of vectors of exogenous 
variables    and   , respectively, 
                                  
                
                                                      (4.13) 
where    and    are random errors assumed to be independently and normal distributed with zero 
mean and variance one.    and    are vectors of unknown parameters. 
The system of equations (4.10) and (4.12) should be estimated using a bivariate probit 
procedure. This is because when the random factors affecting the two decisions are not 
independent because of unobserved factors that could affect both decisions, then                
In this case, the disturbances of the two selection equations (4.10) and (4.12) have a bivariate 
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normal distribution with mean vector zero and covariance matrix    
  
  
  , Hausman et al. 
(1978).  A joint (simultaneous) decision model with a four way classification of observations 
into the following groups would result:             ,             ,              and 
            . This four-way grouping of observations with a nonzero   leads to a bivariate 
model with the probabilities of the four outcomes; 
                                           (4.14) 
                                                                           
                                      (4.15)  
                                                                                 
                                
                                     (4.16)  
                                                                  
                                                             
                                                       (4.17)                 
                                                                            
                                                                           
where     and       are the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution 
and the standard bivariate normal distribution with correlation coefficient  , respectively. 
Equation (4.10) and (4.12) allow us to derive several testable implications, and set out the 
determinants of entrepreneurial intention.  
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Similarly, the above model is also applied with Shaanxi farmers who seek to maximize 
the present value of benefits from farm production and expected benefits from a new business 
venture. Two decisions were made by the same Shaanxi farmer and those two decisions are 
interrelated. First, the Shaanxi farmer has to decide whether or not to buy or sell land use rights 
and second, the farmer decides whether or not to engage in entrepreneurial effort.  
The first term in equation (4.5) can be represented as a utility maximization of farm 
profit; where   
  is a maximized utility function of Shaanxi farmer i growing crop farm,    is an 
alternative activity. Denoting    as the observed binary variable of farmer i equal to 1 if a farmer 
plan to sell land use rights, otherwise, it equals to 0. The model structure of Shaanxi farmers also 
follows equation (4.10) – (4.17). Finally, we are able to compare entrepreneurial results between 
Shanxi and Kentucky farmers.    
 
4.7 Survey and Data 
The unique data for this study were collected through surveys from two regions. The first 
farm household survey was conducted in Shaanxi province, Yangling district in November 2010 
with 730 respondents. Each household was interviewed by either one or two graduate students 
from Northwest Agriculture and Forestry University. The survey itself dealt exclusively with 
entrepreneurial intention, attitude and transaction of land use rights. We specifically asked 
farmers if the Government made it legal for farmers to buy or sell land use rights, would you buy 
or sell land use rights?, and are you planning to start a new business?     
The characteristics of these communities are as follows. The average age of respondents 
is approximately 49 years old and the average education level of respondents is between 
attending middle school and completing middle school. On average there are about 5 people 
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living in each household. The average number of years farming is 28 years, and the average farm 
size is 5mu (about 5/6th of an acre). Household income average is 23,796 RMB/year with 
approximately 39% of household income coming from farm activities. The average profit per 
year earned from cropped land is 953 RMB/mu. The average asset per household is 318,904 
RMB. There are 203 farmers indicating the amount of their debt and the average debt per 
household is 29,330 RMB.  
In addition, there are 295 farmers or about 41 percent who plan to start new business. Of 
all 730 farmers, there are 210 farmers who want to sell land use rights; 240 farmers want to buy 
land use rights and 280 farmers want to do nothing. Approximately 60 percent of Shaanxi 
farmers personally know people who started their own business in a community or elsewhere but 
only 16 percent of Shaanxi farmers participate in social groups. 
The similar farm household survey was conducted in Kentucky from the summer of 2005 
through the fall of 2006 which is the time that tobacco farmers received their first buyout checks. 
During this period, tobacco farmers adjusted to the new environment and decided whether to 
involve in the entrepreneurial activities. Seven hundred one individuals in Kentucky were 
surveyed. Approximately 45 percent of farmers in both groups had income in the range of 
$30,000 – $79,999. The majority in both groups owned or rented the land size of less than 499 
acres and finished college education. In addition, about 80 percent of tobacco farmers in both 
groups participated in social groups. There are 101 farmers who planned to start new business, 
and 568 farmers did not plan to start new business. 
List of the dependent and independent variables as well as survey questions is shown in 
Table 4.8 in the Appendix. The dependent variable in the outcome equation of a biprobit model 
is “Entrepreneur” variable indicating farmer‟s decision to start new business. The dependent 
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variable in a selection equation is “Sell land use rights” for Shaanxi farmers and “Quit tobacco 
farm” for Kentucky farmers. Independent variables consist of various factors that might be 
related to entrepreneurial intention. First, demographic factors include age, ethnicity, and the 
changes in regular family structure such as death and divorce. Second, economic factors 
comprise income level, farm size, business climate, Kentucky farmer‟s buyout check and 
payment option. Third, we include education level, having computer, and internet access as 
human capital factors. Fourth, social network and learning factors used in the analysis are as 
follows. Variables as a measure of social network are, 1) “know entrepreneurs” dummy variable 
indicates whether a farmer knows other entrepreneurs, 2) “social group” dummy variable shows 
whether a farmer participate in any social groups, and 3) “loner” variable is farmer‟s 
characteristics opposed to social network. Learning factors can be divided to Learning by doing 
and Learning by using. Learning by doing in technology adoption is comparable to prior 
experience with other entrepreneurs, whereas; learning by using is the information obtained from 
other entrepreneurs. Learning by doing is measured by two variables, 1) “good support” variable 
shows level of farmers‟ agreement with the statement “other community groups provide good 
support for people starting new businesses.”, and 2) “past experience” variable indicates the 
extent to which farmers agree or disagree with the statement “My past experience will be very 
valuable in starting a business”. We include two variables as a measure of learning by doing, 1) 
“success entrepreneur example” variable indicates whether there are many examples of well-
respected people who made a success of themselves starting new businesses in their community, 
and 2) “talk about new business” variable presents whether people in their community often talk 
about new business opportunities. Furthermore, “keep up technology” variable showing farmer‟s 
level of certainty that their business will be able to keep up with technology advances and “start 
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up problem” variable are included. Fifth, distance and geography factors include “urban” dummy 
variable and “distance” variable. In Kentucky, distance variable represents miles from farmer‟s 
home to nearest school. In Shaanxi, distance takes value 1 if farmer‟s village is located further 
away from Xi‟an city, and value 0 if it is located near Xi‟an city. Sixth, tenure factor is 
represented by “rent” dummy variable taking value 1 if area of rented farm is greater than that of 
owned farm, and value 0 otherwise. Seventh, credit constraint factors include dummy variables 
of price rationed farmers and quantity rationed farmers. The definition of risk rationed and 
quantity rationed farmers are presented in Chapter 3. Finally, attitude toward risk factors are 
measured by risk aversion score and prudence score variables. The explanation of risk aversion 
and prudence score estimation are presented in Chapter 2.       
 
4.8 Results 
Using bivariate probit specification, a maximum likelihood was used for estimation. 
Estimates are exhibited in Table 4.7. We find three factors have a significant impact on venture 
creation of both Shaanxi and Kentucky farmers. First, age of respondents is strongly associated 
with entrepreneurial intention for both Shaanxi and Kentucky farmers. Shaanxi and Kentucky 
farmers with the age less than 54 are the most entrepreneurial adopters. This is consistent with 
previous finding that younger agents are more likely to start new business and take more risk 
relative to older farmers.  
Second, death of a family member has a significant impact on entrepreneurial decision. 
On average, an exogenous shock in the family reduces the probability of running new business 
for Shaanxi farmers. In contrast, Kentucky farmers who experience death in their household 
within the last three years are more likely to create a new venture. 
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Third, learning by doing factor is strongly associated with entrepreneurial intention. We 
find that both Shaanxi and Kentucky farmers are more likely to start new business if they agree 
that their past experience will be very valuable in starting a business. 
Several factors affecting venture creation are different between two regions. In Shannxi, 
factors that are also strongly associated with entrepreneurial decision are business environment, 
human capital and social network. First, if Shaanxi farmers perceive that the business climate is 
getting worse compared to last year, the probability of being entrepreneurs will increase. Second, 
it is surprising that farmers with high education have a lower probability to become 
entrepreneurs. High-educated farmers should have knowledge and more opportunity to explore 
in ways that interest them. Nevertheless, as they know more, they might be less willing to take 
risk. Third, having a computer at home which is a proxy of human capital is a factor affecting 
Shaanxi farmer‟s entrepreneurial decision but it is not supported in Kentucky study. Shaanxi 
farmers who have a computer at home are more likely to start new business. Fourth, social 
network factor is found to be related to business start-up in Shaanxi. Knowing people who 
started their own business in a community has a positive relationship to the entrepreneurial 
decision, which supports our hypothesis. The coefficient of the variable is positive and 
significant. Farmers who know other entrepreneurs are more likely to be supported in 
entrepreneurial activities in a community. Individuals will transfer business know-how, 
experience, expertise and advanced technology to each other which encourage learning and 
increase knowledge in human capital and thus productivity growth.  However, income, credit 
constraint and attitude toward risk are not significantly correlated with Shaanxi farmer‟s 
entrepreneurial decision.   
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In Kentucky, other 4 variables, namely low income, ethnicity, payment option and start 
up problem have a significant relation with the decision of whether or not entrepreneurial 
activities are adopted. First, the income less than $29,999 is significant at 1 percent indicating 
farmer with low income is more likely to start a new business. This finding supports the “push” 
hypothesis as farmers with low income are pushed into starting a new business. The result is 
consistent with the study by Pushkarskaya (2008) stating that low income significantly correlates 
with entrepreneurial intentions. Pushkarskaya found that farmers with household incomes less 
than $29,999 were two times more likely to start a new business than farmers with incomes 
greater than $30,000. However, the result is not consistent with Evans and Jovanovic (1989) that 
examine whether a person have to be wealthy before he can  start a business. They show that 
wealthier people are more inclined to become entrepreneurs. Moreover, Hurst and Lusardi 
(2008) show that the survival of businesses is not affected by the wealth of the entrepreneurs. 
Second, concerning ethnicity and livelihood disruption, results in Kentucky show that white 
farmers are less likely to start new business. Third, farmers who received tobacco buyout checks 
by choosing single lump sum payment option tend to become entrepreneurs. This is likely to be 
the case that farmers can use a large amount of money they received to start a new business. 
Finally, start up problem variable is decreasing with probability of being entrepreneurs. As 
expected, Kentucky farmers who have more start up problem are less likely to create business 
venture. 
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Table 4.7: Bivariate Probit Results 
 
 
Bivariate Probit (Outcome Equation) 
  Shaanxi   Kentucky 
  Coefficient P>z   Coefficient P>z 
Entrepreneur 
     age <35 1.9064*** 0.000 
 
1.3678** 0.010 
age 35-54 1.1875** 0.011 
 
1.1882*** 0.009 
age 55-64 -0.1055 0.823 
 
0.6747 0.139 
White 
   
-0.8937* 0.066 
Death -0.3527* 0.096 
 
0.7061*** 0.001 
Divorce 0.3222 0.595  0.2994 0.535 
Low income 0.0322 0.903 
 
0.7457* 0.079 
Medium income -0.1795 0.449 
 
0.0704 0.792 
High income 0.0138 0.956 
 
0.3700 0.234 
Land 0.0765 0.667 
 
0.0817 0.725 
Buyout check 
   
0.0000 0.191 
Payment option 
   
0.5532** 0.045 
Business Climate -0.2305* 0.060  -0.1429 0.428 
Education -0.1071** 0.049 
 
0.0958 0.196 
Computer 0.8698** 0.020 
 
-0.5184 0.242 
Internet -0.2705 0.509  0.5131 0.164 
Know entrepreneurs 0.5023*** 0.008 
 
-0.3413 0.229 
Social group 0.2682 0.211 
 
0.0644 0.873 
Loner -0.0561 0.412 
 
-0.0548 0.571 
Good support  -0.0076 0.924 
 
-0.0177 0.892 
Past experience 0.1965** 0.045 
 
0.3496* 0.058 
Success entrepreneur example -0.0710 0.422 
 
0.0155 0.911 
Talk about new business 0.0915 0.282 
 
0.1760 0.140 
Keep up technology 0.1179 0.140 
 
-0.0439 0.701 
Start up problem 0.1636 0.161  -0.3766** 0.011 
Urban 
   
-0.3537 0.334 
Distance -0.1299 0.498  0.5607 0.349 
Rent -0.1939 0.534   0.1560 0.538 
Risk rationed 0.2592 0.464 
   Quantity rationed 0.1242 0.611    
Risk aversion score 0.0074 0.172 
   Prudence score 0.0039 0.373    
Constant -2.8214*** 0.003   -3.0958** 0.029 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Bivariate Probit (Selection Equation) 
  Shaanxi   Kentucky 
 
Sell Land Use Rights 
 
Quit Tobacco Farm 
 Coefficient P>z   Coefficient P>z 
age <35 0.4838 0.265 
 
0.1762 0.622 
age 35-54 0.1648 0.678 
 
-0.0783 0.760 
age 55-64 0.5630 0.166 
 
0.1206 0.631 
White 
   
0.9540 0.168 
Death -0.1579 0.467 
 
0.2949 0.128 
Divorce 0.7404 0.149  0.1752 0.636 
Low income -0.2780 0.260 
 
-0.2437 0.524 
Medium income -0.0857 0.686 
 
-0.3096 0.260 
High income -0.2424 0.294 
 
-0.3545 0.218 
Land 0.0689 0.668 
 
-0.1564 0.478 
Buyout Check 
   
0.0000 0.210 
Payment option 
   
0.3559 0.155 
Business Climate -0.3159*** 0.007  -0.4800*** 0.008 
Education 0.0375 0.427 
 
0.1470** 0.034 
Computer 0.1636 0.638 
 
-0.2050 0.505 
Internet 0.0092 0.981  -0.3559 0.184 
Urban 
   
0.5402 0.119 
Distance -0.2796 0.106 
 
0.4239 0.393 
Rent -0.5394* 0.070  -0.0026 0.992 
Risk rationed 0.2355 0.470 
   Quantity rationed 0.0941 0.642    
Risk aversion score -0.0007 0.884 
   Prudence score -0.0001 0.975    
Tobacco acres 
   
-0.0014 0.682 
Tobacco sell 
   
-0.0000*** 0.000 
Hay 
   
0.3612 0.105 
Beef 
   
0.3990* 0.075 
Horses 
   
0.1058 0.678 
Vegetable 
   
0.4142 0.150 
Grains 
   
-0.0460 0.838 
Corn 0.5074** 0.020 
   Wheat -0.2086 0.267 
   Constant -0.3836 0.504  -2.8702** 0.012 
Log pseudolikelihood -368.5063 
  
-223.7582 
 Observations 316   302  
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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4.9 Conclusions 
The purpose of this study is to compare the similarities of venture creation and the 
adoption of a new technology and investigate the factors influencing farmers‟ entrepreneurial 
adoption decision during the transition period of the local economy in Shaanxi and Kentucky. In 
general, decision-makers select technologies with the best-expected net benefits. Therefore, 
when a new technology is available decision-makers continuously evaluate whether or not to 
adopt; when the discounted expected benefits of adoption are greater than the cost, the 
technology will be adopted. Similarly, when the expected profit of new venture is greater than 
current activities, decision-makers will start new businesses.  
 Using the 2010 survey data of farmers in Shaanxi 2005-2006 and the survey data of 
tobacco farmers in Kentucky, the study shows that several factors have a significant impact on 
farmers‟ entrepreneurial intentions.  
Social network factor is significantly associated with farmer‟s entrepreneurial decision in 
Shaanxi but not in Kentucky. Shaanxi farmers who know other entrepreneurs are more likely to 
start new business. Social relations play an important role in establishing a firm. The study 
suggests that knowing people who are entrepreneurs affects entrepreneurial intentions. In 
addition, “learning by doing” or prior experience with other entrepreneurs have a strong impact 
on entrepreneurial decision in both Shaanxi and Kentucky. The relationship between 
entrepreneurs provides the resources that are crucial in starting and sustaining a new business. 
Even though, entrepreneurs have ability to run their business successfully, they also need 
complementary resources to produce and deliver their goods and service (Teece 1987). Thus, 
they need support, knowledge and access to distribution channels through social network. 
Moreover, the link and the interaction among entrepreneurs and their social network can enlarge 
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the availability of resources that help maintain a new firm (Hansen 1995).  
The adoption decision depends on the age of farmer. Younger farmers both in Kentucky 
and Shaanxi are more likely to adopt venture. This is consistent with previous studies indicating 
that increasing age reduces the probability of adoption. The exogenous shock such as death of a 
household member is also significantly associated with decision to become entrepreneurs.    
Some adoption factors are statistically significant in one region but not significant in 
another region. The analysis illustrates that ethnicity, payment option, and start up problem 
strongly influence a decision to start a new business in Kentucky but not in Shaanxi. The 
analysis in Kentucky supports the hypothesis that farmers with low income are “pushed” into 
entrepreneurial activities. In contrast, a human capital factor and business environment are 
strongly associated with Shaanxi farmer‟s entrepreneurial decision. Research findings suggest 
that the policy maker should support entrepreneurial social network. The human capital 
development is very important to encourage entrepreneurial activities and opportunities 
especially in developing countries.   
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4.10 Appendix 
Figure 4.1: A Typical Diffusion Curve  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.8: List of the dependent and independent variables 
 
        
        Shaanxi 
Variables Survey questions Coding 
Dependent Variable 
Technology adoption (start 
business) 
Are you planning to start a new 
business? 
1, if yes, 0 o/w 
 
Independent Variable 
Demographic  
  
Age <35 What is your age? 1, if <35, 0 o/w 
Age 35-54  1, if 35-54, 0 o/w 
Age 55-64  1, if 55-64, 0 o/w 
Age >64  1, if >64, 0 o/w 
Death Have you experience death in your 
household within last three years? 
1, if yes, 0 o/w 
 
Divorce Have you experienced divorced 
within last three years? 
1, if yes, 0 o/w 
 
Independent Variable 
Economic factor 
  
Income What was the total household 
income in the past year from all 
sources including farming, part time 
labor and remittances (best guess)? 
 
Land size (own + rent) How many mu do you own? 
How many mu do you rent? 
 
Land size Less than 6 mus  1, if yes, 0 o/w 
Business climate In general, how would you describe 
the current business climate for 
farmers in your area compared to 
last year? 
1, if getting better 
0, if about the same 
-1, if getting worse 
 
Rate of diffusion 
Time 
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Independent Variable 
Human capital 
  
Education What is your level of education? 0, if never went to school, 1, if 
some elementary school, 2, if 
completed elementary school, 3, if 
some middle school, 4, if completed 
middle school, 5, if some high 
school, 6, if completed high school, 
7, if some university or college, 8, if 
completed college or university 
Computer  Do you have a computer at home? 1, if yes, 0 o/w 
Internet access Do you have internet access from 
you home? 
1, if yes, 0 o/w 
Independent Variable 
Social network and Learning 
  
Knowing people who started their 
own business 
Do you personally know people 
who started their own business in 
your community or elsewhere? 
1, if yes, 0 o/w 
Social group participation Do you belong to any social groups 
in your community (e.g., religious, 
service, clubs, etc.)? 
1, if yes, 0 o/w 
Loner I consider myself a loner. 1, if completely untrue, 2, if untrue, 
3, if neutral, 4, if true, 5 if 
completely true 
Good support Other community groups provide 
good support for people starting 
new businesses. 
1, if strongly disagree, 2, if 
disagree, 3, if neutral, 4, if agree, 5, 
if strongly agree 
Past experience My past experience will be very 
valuable in starting a business. 
1, if strongly disagree, 2, if 
disagree, 3, if neutral, 4, if agree, 5, 
if strongly agree 
Success entrepreneur example There are many examples of well-
respected people who made a 
success of themselves starting new 
businesses. 
1, if strongly disagree, 2, if 
disagree, 3, if neutral, 4, if agree, 5, 
if strongly agree 
Talk about new business People in my community often talk 
about new business opportunities. 
1, if strongly disagree, 2, if 
disagree, 3, if neutral, 4, if agree, 5, 
if strongly agree 
Keep up technology How certain you are that your new 
business will be able to accomplish 
each of the following: Keep up with 
technological advances. 
1, if highly uncertain, 2, if 
uncertain, 3, if neutral, 4, if certain, 
5, if highly certain 
Start up problem Each possible start-up problem your 
new business might face 1) Being 
taken seriously as a business person 
2) Balancing time between business 
and personal or family time 3) Lack 
of mentors or a support structure 
who can provide advice and support 
 
1, if completely untrue, 2, if untrue, 
3, if neutral, 4, if true, 5 if 
completely true 
Independent Variable 
Distance and geography 
  
Distance From what village are you 
reporting?                
1, if village is far from Xi’an, 0 o/w 
Independent Variable 
Tenure 
  
Own vs rent  How many mu do you own? 
How many mu do you rent? 
1, if rent (mu) is greater than own 
(mu), 0 o/w  
Independent Variable 
Credit constraint 
  
Risk rationed  1, if risk rationed farmer, 0 o/w 
Quantity rationed  1, if quantity rationed farmer, 0 o/w 
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Independent Variable 
Attitude toward risk 
  
Risk aversion score Risk aversion score is calculated 
based on farmers‟ willingness to 
take risk, risk management options 
use and perceptions. 
 
Prudence score Prudence score is calculated based 
on the purposes of their 
precautionary savings 
 
 
 
        Selection model 
Variables Survey questions Coding 
Dependent Variable 
Sell land use rights 
 
If the Government made it legal for 
farmers to buy or sell land use 
rights, I would buy or sell land use 
rights? 
1, if sell land use rights, 0 if buy 
land use rights 
 
Independent Variable   
The independent variables in a selection model include independent variables in the main model except social 
network and learning factors, plus the following variables; 
Corn Please list the top five crops you 
have grown in the past 12 months 
and sales in order of revenue 
1, if corn, 0 o/w 
Wheat Please list the top five crops you 
have grown in the past 12 months 
and sales in order of revenue 
1, if wheat, 0 o/w 
 
 
        Kentucky 
Variables Survey questions Coding 
Dependent Variable 
Technology adoption (start 
business) 
Are you planning to start a new 
business? 
1, if yes, 0 o/w 
 
Independent Variable 
Demographic  
  
Age <35 What is your age? 1, if <35, 0 o/w 
Age 35-54  1, if 35-54, 0 o/w 
Age 55-64  1, if 55-64, 0 o/w 
Age >64  1, if >64, 0 o/w 
Ethnicity What is your ethnicity? 1, if white, 0 o/w 
 
Death Have you experience death in your 
household within last three years? 
1, if yes, 0 o/w 
 
Divorce Have you experienced divorced 
within last three years? 
1, if yes, 0 o/w 
 
Independent Variable 
Economic factor 
  
Income What is your household income? 
 
 
Income 1 Less than $29,999  1, if yes, 0 o/w 
Income 2 $30,000-$79,999  1, if yes, 0 o/w 
Income 3 $80,000-$119,999  1, if yes, 0 o/w 
Income 4 More than $120,000  1, if yes, 0 o/w 
Land size (own + rent) How many acres do you own? 
How many acres do you rent? 
 
Land size Less than 499 acres  1, if yes, 0 o/w 
Buyout check What is the total $ amount you 
expect to receive in tobacco buyout 
check? 
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Payment options There were several payment options 
available for those who were to 
receive tobacco buyout checks. 
Which option did you choose? 
1, if a single lump sum payment, 0 
o/w 
 
Business climate In general, how would you describe 
the current business climate for 
farmers in your area compared to 
last year? 
1, if getting better 
0, if about the same 
-1, if getting worse 
Independent Variable 
Human capital 
  
Education What is your level of education? 1, if no formal education, 2, if 
completed grade school, 3, if some 
high school, 4, if completed high 
school, 5, if some college/technical, 
6, if completed 4 year college, 7, if 
some graduate work, 8, if graduate 
degree. 
Computer  Do you have a computer at home? 1, if yes, 0 o/w 
Internet access Do you have internet access from 
you home? 
1, if yes, 0 o/w 
Independent Variable 
Social network and Learning 
  
Knowing people who started their 
own business 
Do you personally know people 
who started their own business in 
your community or elsewhere> 
1, if yes, 0 o/w 
Social group participation Do you belong to any social groups 
in your community (e.g., religious, 
service, clubs, etc.)? 
1, if yes, 0 o/w 
Loner I consider myself a loner. 1, if completely untrue, 2, if untrue, 
3, if neutral, 4, if true, 5 if 
completely true 
Good support Other community groups provide 
good support for people starting 
new businesses. 
1, if strongly disagree, 2, if 
disagree, 3, if neutral, 4, if agree, 5, 
if strongly agree 
Past experience My past experience will be very 
valuable in starting a business. 
1, if strongly disagree, 2, if 
disagree, 3, if neutral, 4, if agree, 5, 
if strongly agree 
Success entrepreneur example There are many examples of well-
respected people who made a 
success of themselves starting new 
businesses. 
1, if strongly disagree, 2, if 
disagree, 3, if neutral, 4, if agree, 5, 
if strongly agree 
Talk about new business People in my community often talk 
about new business opportunities. 
1, if strongly disagree, 2, if 
disagree, 3, if neutral, 4, if agree, 5, 
if strongly agree 
Keep up technology How certain you are that your new 
business will be able to accomplish 
each of the following: Keep up with 
technological advances. 
1, if highly uncertain, 2, if 
uncertain, 3, if neutral, 4, if certain, 
5, if highly certain 
Start up problem Each possible start-up problem your 
new business might face 1) Being 
taken seriously as a business person 
2) Balancing time between business 
and personal or family time 3) Lack 
of mentors or a support structure 
who can provide advice and support 
 
1, if completely untrue, 2, if untrue, 
3, if neutral, 4, if true, 5 if 
completely true 
Independent Variable 
Distance and geography 
  
rural or urban community Would you describe the community 
you live in as rural, urban or 
suburban? 
1, if urban, 0 o/w 
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distance from university or college How far is the closest school from 
you home? 
1, if less than 50 miles, 0 o/w 
Independent Variable 
Tenure 
  
Own vs rent  How many acres do you own? 
How many acres do you rent? 
1, if rent (acres) is greater than own 
(acres), 0 o/w  
 
       Selection model 
Variables Survey questions Coding 
Dependent Variable 
Quit tobacco 
 
Have you raised tobacco during last 
three years? 
Do you plan to grow tobacco in the 
future? 
1, if had grown tobacco in the past 
three years, but does not plan to 
grow tobacco in the future, 0 o/w 
 
Independent Variable   
The independent variables in a selection model include independent variables in the main model except social 
network and learning factors, plus the following variables; 
Tobacco acres How many acres of tobacco did you 
raise last year? 
 
Tobacco sell How many pounds of tobacco did 
you sell last year? 
 
Hay Which of the farm activities listed 
below are you involved in? 
1, if hay, 0 o/w 
Beef Which of the farm activities listed 
below are you involved in? 
1, if beef, 0 o/w 
Horses Which of the farm activities listed 
below are you involved in? 
1, if horses, 0 o/w 
Vegetables Which of the farm activities listed 
below are you involved in? 
1, if vegetables, 0 o/w 
Grains Which of the farm activities listed 
below are you involved in? 
1, if grains, 0 o/w 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
China is an example of successful policy of gradual and partial economic reform. In 
agricultural sector, the government has directed redistribution  in land reform and the 
transformation away from private  farming to collectivization. A financial system reform has 
provided an important boost to the desired transformation of China's economic growth. In 
addition, urbanization in China has encouraged venture creation, increased nonfarm labor to the 
cities and provided sustainable investment which became key factors in strengthening the 
country's growth. However, how far the rural reforms have succeeded is still ambiguous. After 
the reform began,  the agricultural production rised immediately, but by the second half of the 
1980s, the production dropped as more profitable job opportunities attracted rural labor away 
from agriculture. Despite the growth of township and village enterprises, regional inequalities 
became one of major problems. The performance of the Chinese financial system is still 
questionable due to unclear regulatory environment, lack of market freedom, and business 
restrictions. What will become evident is that policy agendas have become increasingly complex 
and  interrelated. Hence, this dissertation aims to provide an assessment of the structural changes 
and its effect on other markets in the economy. We focus on the hypothetical policy allowing 
farmers to transact LURs and its impact on risk rationing in a rural credit market and 
entrepreneurial decision.  
This dissertation makes key contribution in 1) exploring the economics of transaction in 
LURs, 2) providing a specific test of Boucher et al. (2008) framework on risk rationing, and 3) 
identifying the determinants of entrepreneurial adoption decisions caused by structural changes. 
The study in chapter 2 is the first to examine how Chinese farmers might respond if the Chinese 
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government made it legal for farmers to buy or sell LURs. The market of LURs, the demand and 
supply of LURs, the estimated equilibrium price, and the price elasticity have been explored. In 
addition, the study in Chapter 3 is believed to be among the first empirical validation of the risk 
rationing theory. We find the existence of risk rationing in the rural credit market in China. The 
results confirm that risk aversion and prudence are significantly correlated with risk rationing, 
therefore; efforts to enhance credit access must also deal with risk. Chapter 4 presents the 
similarities of venture creation and the adoption of a new technology and investigates the factors 
influencing farmers‟ entrepreneurial adoption decision during the transition period of the local 
economy in Shaanxi and Kentucky. 
The empirical investigations in Chapter 2-4 have been done using the household data 
from Shaanxi province in China. The survey conducted in Kentucky, US has also been analyzed 
to compare with Shaanxi farmers in term of the entrepreneurial attitude and factors associated 
with venture creation. The rural areas in China and US, as a developing country and a developed 
country respectively, are totally different in term of economic and social system. It is interesting 
to examine the similarities and dissimilarities in entrepreneurial intention between two different 
countries where their entrepreneurial policy, support and education are different. 
The significant findings of these chapters are summarized as follows. The objectives of 
these chapters are reiterated. 
5.1 Chapter 2: On the Transaction Values of Land Use Rights in Rural China under Rural 
Policy Reform 
Objective 1: examine how Chinese farmers might respond if the Chinese government made it 
legal for farmers to buy or sell LURs. The Chinese government has considered the possibility of 
liberalizing farmers‟ ability to transact LURs including selling and mortgaging the rights, to 
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boost rural development. 
In 2008, The Chinese government has considered the policy and possibility of LURs 
transfer and transactability as farmers are allowed to buy and sell LURs for the first time. This 
could draw hundreds of millions of farmers more firmly into the market economy. We find a 
significant portion of the population participating in the market which numbers over 131 million 
farmers representing 800 million farmers employed in an agricultural sector in China. 
Objective 2: examine the economics of transaction in LURs, estimate the value at which LURs 
could transact in equilibrium. Land use rights requires a complex understanding of market 
transparency, credit markets, farm size-productivity relationships, agency conflicts, market risks, 
covariate risks, contingent markets, rent seeking, government intrusion and market distortions     
(Binswanger et al. 1993), many of which are absent in rural China. It is important to understand 
how, in the presence of these complexities, a market for transactions in land use rights will 
evolve in rural China, who would be buyers, who would be sellers and at what price.   
According to the analysis, the demand curve is represented by the percentage of farmers 
who would definitely buy or might buy LURs. We find the estimated aggregate demand or 
willingness to buy LURs is           
        The supply curve is represented by percentage 
of farmers who would definitely sell or might sell LURs. The estimated aggregate supply or 
willingness to sell LURs is           
                                  
The equilibrium price of LUR is 39,156 RMB. At this price 16.43% of farmers would be 
willing to sell their LURs while 16.43% of farmers would be willing buyers. Approximately 67% 
of farmers would not transact even at this price.  
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Objective 3: analyze the price elasticity of LURs and factors that would affect changes of LURs 
value. We determine some baseline characteristics that define and differentiate buyers and sellers 
and WTP and WTB values. Factors of interest are demographic factors, farm attribute and 
production factors, profitability factors, debt, credit and liquidity factors, attitude toward risk 
factors, and other variables including business climate, migrant farm labor, entrepreneurship, 
computer and internet, politics, and urban factor.  
The results show that the price elasticity of demand is -0.952 and the price elasticity of 
supply is 0.8623. The inelasticity of demand and supply would imply changes in LURs value 
have a relatively small effect on the changes in percentage of farmers willing to buy and sell 
LURs. 
We use ordinary least squares (OLS) and Tobit regressions to investigate which factors 
affect buy and sell positions. The maximum WTB and minimum WTS data obtained from self-
declare questions are applied in the OLS analysis. The results show that variables significantly 
associated with maximum WTB are tomato farm, risk rationed and quantity rationed farmers, 
computer, village committee, and urban factor; while the entrepreneurship has significant impact 
on minimum WTS. The maximum WTB and minimum WTS data obtained from a Multiple 
Bounded Discrete Choice questions are applied in the Tobit analysis. We find that crop type, 
saving, internet and computer, political factor, and business climate appear to have significant 
impact on maximum WTB. The minimum WTS for LURs depends on gender, percentage of 
income from farming, saving, and internet. 
Objective 4: evaluate farmer‟s intention to buy and sell LURs and how much they are willing to 
pay and receive for LURs. Because no formal market exists to transact land use rights, this paper 
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is the first to provide a preliminary assessment of farmers‟ willingness to buy and willingness to 
sell LURs. We employ a self-declare questions approach and a Multiple Bounded Discrete 
Choice (MBDC) approach, and use contingent valuation (CV) techniques to extract measures of 
willingness to sell (WTS) and willingness to buy (WTB) land use rights. 
We examine how participants respond to each LURs value in order to reveal their 
willingness to buy (WTB) and willingness to sell (WTS) and provide the percentages of 
respondents that would buy or sell at the stated price. The distribution of responses follow 
expected patterns. The proportion of “Definitely Buy” and “Might Buy” responses generally 
increase but the proportion of “Definitely Sell” and “Might Sell” responses decline as threshold 
values decrease. The results show, as anticipated, that as the price falls farm households migrate 
from sellers to buyers. 
We observe substantial differences in mean WTB and WTS. The self-declared WTB 
averages 24,571 RMB while the MBDC measure averages 58,443, almost twice as high. 
Likewise, the self-declared WTS is 71,748 RMB which is again almost half as much as the 
110,857 RMB under the MBDC measure. The results suggest that in the near term there are not 
enough buyers (at a price of 24,000 RMB) to satisfy the price at which buyers would sell (at a 
price of 72,000 RMB). These results indicate that at the present there is a significant excess 
demand for LURs. 
Objective 5: examine characteristics of potential buyers and sellers. Understanding the similarity 
and difference of these characteristics between LURs buyers and sellers will help the 
government formulate a better policy to directly support a target group. 
The characteristics of potential buyers and sellers differ depending on the production, 
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formal credit access, urban, asset, income, geographical location, etc. The results show that 
tomato farmers are less likely to be sellers of land use rights because growing tomato can make 
high profit to them. Furthermore, farmers who can access a formal credit and who live near the 
city are less likely to be sellers of land use rights. On the contrary, the greater assets farmers hold 
would increase the probability of selling land use rights. The probability of buying and selling 
land use rights also varies between village regions. 
Objective 6: explore potential policy implications. More detailed investigation of the factors 
affecting the implementation of legal and institutional change aiming to make property rights 
more secure could provide important insights for policy makers. 
Proposed policy implications are as follows. First, the Chinese government should 
encourage farmers to buy LURs, increase farm invest and expand the production in order to 
enhance rural development through the LURs market which would benefit both the agricultural 
sector and farmer wealth. Second, it is important to enhance the certainty and security of LURs 
contract. Also, the consideration whether land contracts should be extended to 70 years from 30 
years should be seriously addressed as it would give farmers more security and presumably 
increase the value of their LURs. 
5.2: Chapter 3: Risk Rationing in China’s Rural Credit Markets 
Objective1: provide a specific test of Boucher et al. (2008) framework on risk rationing. We 
find risk rationing as a topic of inquiry to be critically important in understanding borrower 
behavior and credit decisions.  
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Objective 1.1: explore whether the insurance markets, asymmetric information, risk and 
collateral are essentially related to risk rationing in economic context. From definition, they 
assume these conditions are important for risk rationing to occur. 
We find that the evidence is not consistent with BCG suggesting that risk rationing 
occurs when insurance markets are absent. We find risk averse households tend to have a higher 
willingness to pay for insurance and participate in insurance markets and are more likely to be 
risk rationed. In term of asymmetric information, a credit worthy and being a member of group 
guarantee appear to have no impact on risk rationing. However, credit worthy is significantly 
decreasing with quantity rationing as anticipated. We find relatively high risk averse and prudent 
farmers tend to be risk rationed. 
Objective 1.2: test hypotheses that describe the most important factors explaining the 
existence of risk and quantity rationing, namely 1) Wealth-biased quantity rationing, 2) Risk 
rationing and financial wealth, 3) Risk rationing and productive wealth. 
We find the incidence of risk rationing in rural China. There is a strong support to the 
theory that the financial poor is more likely to be quantity rationed. However, the result does not 
significantly support that the financial wealthy is more likely to be risk rationed. In addition, the 
productive wealth appears to have to no impact on all types of credit constraint status. Risk 
aversion and prudence are significantly correlated with risk rationing.  
Objective 2: use the direct elicitation methodology (DEM) where a set of questions directly 
elicits the household‟s status as either credit constrained versus unconstrained. 
We apply DEM to gather information on the credit market perceptions of both borrowers 
and non-borrowers. Constraint categories can be defined as follows. First, Price Rationed or 
Unconstrained farmer is the one who may be either non-borrower or borrower and was happy 
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with the amount he received. Second, Quantity Rationed or Supply-Side-Constrained farmer may 
be either an applicant who was rejected a loan or a non-applicant who knew that he would be 
rejected. Third, Risk Rationed or Demand-Side-Constrained farmer does not face a binding limit 
and therefore does not have excess demand for credit. The limiting constraint comes from the 
demand side. The demand is lower because of the risk-sharing rules associated with the loan 
contract. Among 730 respondents, the majority of farmers are price rationed which accounts for 
79.9%. Approximately 14% and 6.2% of all respondents are quantity rationed and risk rationed 
farmers respectively.  
Objective 3: estimate credit demand elasticities by credit constraint status. We want to explore 
the sensitivity to interest rate of risk rationed, quantity rationed, and price rationed farmers. 
Elasticity of demand for credit is different among risk rationed, quantity rationed, and 
price rationed farmers. Quantity rationed individuals are less sensitive to high interest rate than 
others, but price rationed individuals are more sensitive to high interest rate and less sensitive to 
low interest rate. This illustrates the excess demand for credit of quantity rationed farmers as 
interest rate increases or decreases relative to price rationed farmers. We also find that a large 
proportion of risk rationed farmers has perfectly inelastic of demand for credit but in fact, when 
interest rate is low enough, risk rationed individuals are more likely to borrow.  The results 
support that risk rationed farmers are more sensitive to low interest rate. 
Objective 4: examine the attributes of risk rationed, quantity rationed, and price rationed 
farmers. Independent variables designed to capture the effects on credit rationing are 
demographic variables, Measures for wealth, Measuring for risk aversion and prudence, Measure 
of insurance market participation, asymmetric information, Elasticity of demand for credit, 
formal and informal credit, the willingness to borrow if they can use their land use rights as 
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collateral for a loan, and entrepreneurial activity. 
The significant factors associated with risk rationed, quantity rationed, and price rationed 
farmers are as follows. First, there appears to be a strongly negative relationship between formal 
borrowing and risk rationing. The results suggest that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between informal borrowing and quantity rationed farmers. This does not appear to 
be the case for the price rationed farmers, which has a negative and significant coefficient for 
informal borrowing variable. The constraint to access in formal credit markets of quantity 
rationed farmers causes the increasing participation in informal credit markets relative to price 
rationed farmers.  
Second, we find the coefficients of land use rights as collateral variable on risk rationing 
and price rationing are not different from zero. However, the variable is significant and 
negatively associated with quantity rationing. This could imply that quantity rationed farmers 
tend to borrow more when they can use land as collateral for a loan.  
Third, we find female is more likely to be risk rationed but male is more likely to be price 
rationed. This is consistent with most studies indicating that women are found to be more averse 
to risk than men. 
Finally, in the logit model, the coefficient of plan to start business variable is negative 
and significant on price rationed farmers. Farmers who plan to start business are not likely to be 
price rationed.  
Objective 5: explore potential policy implications. 
The interest rate subsidy and pricing strategies designed to increase credit access might 
be ineffective because of the inelasticity demand for credit of risk rationed individuals. In 
addition, a policy to increase land use rights and security would be successful if collateral played 
 163 
 
a key role in borrowing agreements. However, if credit were constrained because of risk 
perception, then this policy would be unlikely to reduce credit constraint. Land use rights in 
China will be only partially effective as it does not increase farmers‟ willingness to offer up the 
collateral needed to obtain loans. As a result, policies that decrease the risk associated with loan 
contract to rural households would be more appropriate in the presence of risk rationing. Efforts 
to enhance the working of rural credit markets and credit access in order to increase agricultural 
investment and alleviate poverty must also deal with risk. 
 
5.3 Chapter 4: Livelihood Disruption and Venture Creation: Entrepreneurship as Technology 
Adoption, A Comparison between Shaanxi Farmers and Kentucky Farmers 
Objective 1: propose the conceptual model of entrepreneurship based on the technology 
adoption literature. We compare the similarities of the adoption of a new technology and the 
venture creation. Specifically, when a new technology is available, decision-makers continuously 
evaluate whether or not to adopt. The technology will be adopted when the discounted expected 
benefits of adoption are greater than the cost. Similarly, when the expected profit of new venture 
is greater than current activities, decision-makers will start new businesses.  
The economics of technology adoption is a well developed literature with many accepted 
and testable models. Most prominent are the theories of learning by using and learning by doing. 
Learning by doing in technology adoption is comparable to prior experience with other 
entrepreneurs, whereas; learning by using is the information obtained from other entrepreneurs. 
A bivariate probit model was used in both Shaanxi and Kentucky cases. The Kentucky 
farmer has to decide whether or not to continue growing tobacco and then decides whether or not 
to engage in entrepreneurial effort. The Shaanxi farmer has to decide whether or not to buy or 
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sell land use rights and then decides whether or not to engage in entrepreneurial effort.  
Objective 2: examine and compare entrepreneurial characteristics and attitude of Shaanxi and 
Kentucky farmers to better understand their entrepreneurial uniqueness, opinion and business 
environment among two regions.  
In the survey, respondents specified their level of agreement or disagreement on a five-
level Likert scale for a series of statements related to 1) the level of support provided for new 
businesses in two communities, 2) the possible start-up problems, 3) the certainty of their new 
business accomplishment, 4) farmers‟ attitudes about their entrepreneurial abilities and business 
situation among two regions, 5) business activity in community, and 6) the entrepreneurial 
characteristics of Shaanxi and Kentucky farmers. 
Objective 3: examine factors influencing entrepreneurial adoption decision and estimate the 
effect of internal family events on the decision to start a new business. We draw an analogy 
between factors affecting technology and entrepreneurial adoption and investigate whether 
Shaanxi and Kentucky farmers are influenced by different factors when making decisions to 
enter entrepreneurship. Key determinants of entrepreneurial intention are demographic factors, 
economic factors, farm structure, human capital, social network and learning, distance and 
geography, tenure, credit constraint, and attitude toward risk. 
We find that social network factor is significantly associated with farmer‟s 
entrepreneurial decision in Shaanxi but not in Kentucky. In addition, “learning by doing” or prior 
experience with other entrepreneurs have a strong impact on entrepreneurial decision in both 
Shaanxi and Kentucky.  
The adoption decision depends on the age of farmer. Younger farmers both in Kentucky 
and Shaanxi are more likely to adopt venture. The exogenous shock such as death of a household 
 165 
 
member is also significantly associated with decision to become entrepreneurs.   
The analysis illustrates that ethnicity, payment option, and start up problem strongly 
influence a decision to start a new business in Kentucky but not in Shaanxi. The analysis in 
Kentucky supports the hypothesis that farmers with low income are “pushed” into 
entrepreneurial activities. In contrast, a human capital factor and business environment are 
strongly associated with Shaanxi farmer‟s entrepreneurial decision.  
Objective 4: explore potential policy implication. 
Research findings suggest that the policy maker should support entrepreneurial social 
network. Social relations play an important role in establishing a firm. The results show that 
knowing people who are entrepreneurs strongly affects entrepreneurial intentions. In addition, 
“learning by doing” or prior experience with other entrepreneurs have a strong impact on 
entrepreneurial decision in both Shaanxi and Kentucky. Entrepreneurial firms have become an 
important driving force in the development of the Chinese economy. We find a human capital 
and business environment are strongly associated with Shaanxi farmer‟s entrepreneurial 
decision. Even though, China has placed more emphasis on the importance of entrepreneurship 
education in recent years, the participation is still low. Therefore, the government should develop 
effective entrepreneurship education and training, and boost the motivation for a consciousness 
of entrepreneurship. There is also a large gap between China and countries with a higher level of 
entrepreneurial activities in research and development transfer. Hence, it is important to 
encourage research and development at the level of firms, to increase productivity, to reinforce 
the protection of intellectual property rights, and to support the establishment of a combined 
research centre and increase connection among household and firms.  
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5.4 Final thoughts  
The land reform in China characterized by the household contract responsibility system 
has driven the development of agricultural production and the rural economy, increased the 
income of farmers, and pushed the transfer of rural surplus labor forces and the rapid expansion 
of township-and-village enterprises. The efforts to increase the security of LURs and the policy 
allowing LURs to be transactable would also affect LURs values. Since farmland is the major 
factor of production and asset of farmers, factors affecting LURs values have significant 
implications for the opportunity cost of agricultural production. Changes in LURs values imply 
changes in farmer wealth which may affect the well-being of farm households.  
It is clear that in order to increase the household income and reduce income instability 
caused by agricultural risks such as price and yield risks, it is crucial to promote the rural 
enterprises. A number of measures have been carried out to ensure a favorable institutional 
environment for rural enterprises. However, financial reforms in China have failed to create an 
effective system in which farmers can borrow from a formal credit market. Major problems in 
China‟s rural finances are asymmetric information, a lack of collateral, the unique structure of 
costs and risks, and the nonproductive use of loans. Therefore, informal credit is the dominant 
financing source for new ventures in China. Key improvements for an entrepreneurial 
environment should be to create a better financing environment and establish a credit system. 
More attention should be paid to improving bank loans by providing incentives for banks to 
grant loans to entrepreneurial firms.  
In 2010, the Chinese government has considered launching trial programs that would 
allow farmers in some areas to use rights to farmland and residential land as collateral for loans. 
Secure property rights which can be pledged as collateral for loans would facilitate farmers' 
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application for loans from financial institutions which helps increase entrepreneurial activities 
and economic growth. Nevertheless, the empirical results verify the existence of risk rationing in 
China rural credit markets indicating that some farmers voluntarily withdraw from the credit 
market even they have the collateral wealth needed to qualify for a loan contract. Evidence of 
risk rationing in rural credit markets would suggest that the effectiveness of land titling policy 
encouraging farmers to pledge their rights as collateral security may be overestimated. Efforts to 
enhance agricultural investment and the working of agricultural credit markets must step beyond 
land titling and also deal with risk. Nonetheless, results show that elasticities were highly 
heterogenous across borrowers. Even though, the demand elasticity for credit is more inelastic 
for risk rationed farmers than quantity or price rationed farmers. When interest rates are low 
enough, some risk rationed farmers have high elastic demand and despite being non borrowers, 
could actually enter the credit market. Consequently, rural credit finances with favorable interest 
rate policy would partially increase credit market participation of risk rationed farmers. 
All in all, the security of land program supporting producers‟ ability to use their land as 
collateral, the transaction of LURs, the risk rationing in rural credit markets and the 
entrepreneurial intention are interrelated. A better understanding of these related issues would 
have important implications for resource use, agricultural investment, the distribution of 
household welfare, rural credit markets, and off-farm labor markets which can further affect land 
productivity, output and economic growth. 
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APPENDIX A 
PARTICIPANT SURVEYS IN ENGLISH 
Cornell University/Northwest Agriculture and Forestry University  
Survey of Villagers to Assess  
Credit Demand, Risk, Crop Insurance, Land Use Rights and Entrepreneurship 
 
NARRATIVE TO BE READ TO RESPONDENTS: First of all I would like to thank you for taking 
the time to meet with us. This survey should take approximately 45 to 60 minutes and again I 
thank you for your time. The survey we are conducting is a joint product between Cornell 
University in the United States and Northwest Agriculture and Forestry University. We are 
interested in collecting information about the problems that you face in borrowing from your 
local lender and how you cope with risk and credit. We will also ask some questions about Crop 
Insurance, Land Use Rights and Entrepreneurship. Your responses will be completely 
confidential and under no circumstances will your responses be identifiable. In addition we 
understand that you may not have all of the precise information available. In these cases all we 
ask is that you provide us with your best estimates or best judgments.  Finally, you have the right 
to refuse to answer any question we might ask. 
 
Given these objectives are you willing to participate in this survey?  Yes    No 
 
If NO then “Ok, that is fine. For our records can you tell us why you do not want to participate? 
 
 
 
NOTE to interviewer: If answer above is because respondent does not feel they have the 
information we need then ask why and explain again that we only require a best effort on their 
part, and that we expect that not all respondents will have precise information. And then ask if 
they will reconsider. 
 
NOTE to interviewer: If answer above is related to privacy issues, then remind respondent that 
their participation will be most helpful to our research and that they will remain anonymous and 
that their privacy is guaranteed. And then ask if they will reconsider.  
 
IF YES….” Thank you very much for your consent. Let us begin. We would like to start off by 
asking some general questions about your farm household”……. Go to question 1. 
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A: Farm Characteristics and Farmer Risk Attitude  
1. Sex of Respondent. ________Male; ___________Female.  
 
2. Age of Respondent. ________ 
 
3. From what village are you reporting?               _____________________ 
 
4. a) Including yourself how many people live in this house ________________ (INTERVIEWER: 
this is the total number of people sharing the house of the respondent including children, parents 
etc.) 
 
 b) Are you a head of the household? 
 YES_____, NO_____ 
 
5.    What is your highest education level:  
a) Never Went to School_____  
b) Some elementary school _____ 
c) Completed Elementary School_____ 
d) Some middle school_____ 
e) Completed middle school_____ 
f) Some high school_____  
g) Completed High School _____  
h) Some University or college_____ 
i) Completed College or University_____  
 
 
6. Do you belong to any social groups in your community (e.g., cooperative, religious, volunteer 
group, clubs, etc.)?  YES_____, NO_____ 
 
7. How many cell/mobile phones are there in your household? __________ 
 
8. How many years have you been farming?     ________ 
 
9. What is the total size (1 acre = 6.07 Mu) of your household farm excluding rented?  __________ 
 
10. How many additional Mu do you rent for agricultural production? _________ 
 
11. If you rent land how much do you pay on average per Mu per Year? __________ 
 
12. In general, how would you describe the current business climate for farmers in your area 
compared to last year?  
a) ____GETTING BETTER 
b) ____ABOUT THE SAME 
c) ____GETTING WORSE 
 
13. Please list the top five crops you have grown in the past 12 months and sales in order of revenue 
from the most valuable to the least valuable 
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Rank Crop Total Sales (RMB) 
1   
2   
3   
4   
5   
  
14. Is your farm your major source of income? YES_____, NO_____ 
 
15. What was the total household income in the past year from all sources including farming, part 
time labor and remittances (best guess)? ______________ RMB 
 
16. Please approximate the percent of your income in Q15 that comes from your entire farming 
operation only _______________ (INTERVIEWER: Prod for this number. If they do not know 
exactly then say “we do not need an exact number just an approximate number” or “was it less or 
more than 50%, less than 25% etc. until a number is obtained.)  
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INTERVIEWER “Thank you that is very helpful. Now I would like to ask you some questions about your 
attitudes towards risk and the risks that you face on your farm” 
 
B.  Sources of Risk and Risk Perceptions 
17. Please indicate if you are willing or not willing to take risks (Circle the most appropriate 
response). 
Statement Not Willing to 
Take Risk 
 Neutral to 
Take risk 
 Willing to 
Take Risk 
I am willing to accept greater production risks to 
increase the chance of higher profits  
1 2 3 4 5 
I am willing to take risks with new technologies 
before I see good results in other farms 
1 2 3 4 5 
I am willing to take risks with new management 
practices before I see good results in other farms 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
For Q18 – Q20, if no growing corn or wheat, skip Q18 - Q20  
 
 
18. If you grow corn or wheat, identify the lowest price you believe possible, the price that you 
believe is most likely to be received, and the highest possible price you believe possible 
(RMB/jin) where (1jin = 500g) in the next crop year (2010/11) (INTERVIEWER: for each crop 
production the respondent for lowest, most likely and highest: you may say things like „we do not 
need the exact numbers, just your own personal judgment about what the prices might be‟ by 
most likely price ask them what price they expect to receive in the next harvest. Note: most likely 
can be the same as lowest and highest) 
 
 Crop Lowest possible price 
(RMB/jin) 
Most likely price 
(RMB/jin) 
Highest possible price 
(RMB/jin) 
1 Corn    
2 Wheat    
 
 
19. If you grow corn or wheat, identify the lowest yield you believe possible, the yield that you 
believe is most likely to be received, and the highest possible yield you believe possible (jin/mu) 
in the next crop year (2010/11) If you do not recall exacts, please answer to nearest within 10 
jin/mu  
(INTERVIEWER: for each crop production the respondent for lowest, most likely and highest: 
you may say things like „we do not need the exact numbers, just your own personal judgment 
about what the yields might be‟ by most likely yield ask them what yield they expect to receive in 
the next harvest. Note: most likely can be the same as lowest and highest) 
 
 Crop Lowest possible yield 
(jin/mu) 
Most likely yield 
(jin/mu) 
Highest possible yield 
(jin/mu) 
1 Corn    
2 Wheat    
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20. If you grow corn and wheat, what is the lowest and highest yield (jin/mu) that you recall from 
your years in farming? If you do not recall exacts, please answer to nearest within 10 jin/mu 
(INTERVIEWER: if cannot recall exact year, ask how ago many years and decode year it 
occurred = 2010 – number of years ago) 
 
 Crop Lowest historical 
yield 
(jin/mu) 
Year it 
occurred 
 
Highest historical 
yield 
(jin/mu) 
Year it 
occurred 
 
Average yield 
across year 
1 Corn      
2 Wheat      
 
 
C.   Risk Management Options Use and Perceptions  
21. Please indicate how important you believe each item to be in terms of risk management in your 
farm. Then, mark a “0” if you do not use this to manage risk in your operation. Scale with 1 = 
not important, 2 = less important, 3 = neutral, 4 = important, and 5 = very important (Circle the 
most appropriate response). 
 
Risk Management Options 
0 if not 
used 
Not 
Important 
   Very 
Important 
More than one crop, animal, or farm diversification 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Fields or farms in different locations (geographic diversification) 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Irrigation 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Spreading sales: selling each product over a period of time rather 
than all at once (diversified marketing) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Using contracts to market your crop in advance at a fixed price 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Government programs  0 1 2 3 4 5 
Maintaining financial reserves: having cash and readily 
convertible assets(e.g. machineries, livestock) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Investing off-farm for other sources of income 0 1 2 3 4 5 
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D. Crop Insurance Use and Perceptions 
INTERVIEWER: Crop insurance is a common tool used by western farmers. Crop insurance will 
pay you if your crop yield falls below some percentage of your average yields. For example if 
your average yield is 500 jin/mu for a particular crop, insurance may provide a payment if 
actual crop yield falls below this average. For example if actual yield is 400 jin/mu then you 
would receive a payment based on the difference between 500 jin and 400 jin (=100 jin) times 
the average harvest price. If the price is 0.75RMB/jin then you would receive 0.75*(500-400) = 
RMB75 but if yields are above 500 jin/mu you receive nothing from the insurer. 
 
22. Is the crop insurance currently available to you?    
Yes_____  No_____(if no skip to Q25) 
 
23. (If answer to Q22 is Yes) Do you purchase crop insurance?  
Yes_____  No_____(if no skip to Q26) 
 
24. (If answer to Q23 is Yes) List crops covered. How much do you pay per mu? 
   
 Crop covered Insurance premium 
(RMB/mu) 
1   
2   
3  
4  
5  
  
 
25. (If answer to Q22 is No) If crop insurance were offered in China do you think that you would 
purchase crop insurance?    Yes_____ No____ 
 
26. If you grow either corn and/or wheat which do you believe has a higher chance of a significant 
yield loss next year  Corn_____________  Wheat _______________? (Only one can be selected. 
If only one of corn or wheat is grown enter that crop) 
 
27. Imagine a crop insurance product that would guarantee that your revenue per mu on (for crop 
indicated in Q26) never falls below 300 RMB/mu. Taking into account all past crop yields, and 
what you believe about next year‟s crop yield,  
 
a)  Would you be willing to pay 18 RMB/mu to guarantee a minimum of 300 RMB/mu.? 
Definitely Buy___ Might Buy ___ Would Unlikely Buy ____ Definitely would not buy_____ 
 
b) Would you be willing to pay 9.0 RMB/mu to guarantee a minimum of  300 RMB/mu? 
Definitely Buy___ Might Buy ___ Would Unlikely Buy ____ Definitely would not buy_____ 
 
c)  Would you be willing to pay 3.5 RMB/mu to guarantee a minimum of  300 RMB/mu? 
Definitely Buy___ Might Buy ___ Would Unlikely Buy ____ Definitely would not buy_____ 
 
d) Would you be willing to pay 1.0 RMB/mu to guarantee a minimum of  300 RMB/mu? 
Definitely Buy___ Might Buy ___ Would Unlikely Buy ____ Definitely would not buy_____ 
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28. Considering all aspects of the household including the farm, operations, house, contents, 
automobiles, machinery and equipment do you regularly purchase insurance for any of the 
following items (Leave blank if not applicable): 
 
a. Life Insurance        Yes_____ No____ 
b. Fire insurance for home and contents      Yes_____ No____ 
c. Automobile Insurance       Yes_____ No____ 
d. Health/Medical Insurance     Yes_____ No____ 
e. Farmer’s minimum living standard security    Yes_____ No____ 
f. Rural old-age insurance       Yes_____ No____ 
g. Protection against crop loss (crop insurance)   Yes_____ No____ 
h. Protection against livestock loss (livestock insurance)  Yes_____ No____ 
i. Other ___________________________________________________ 
 
 
29. Imagine a new loan product that had a built-in insurance mechanism so that when a severe 
drought occurs the amount of debt you have to repay decreases as the intensity of the drought 
increases. Would you be interested in such a loan product even if it required an increased interest 
rate? 
a. Not at all interested 
b. Moderately interested 
c. Very Interested 
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E. Farm Finance and Risk Management 
 
30. Do you have any debt outstanding? YES  ____ NO _____ 
 
a. IF YES please indicate the total amount of money you owe _______RMB  
b. Interest Rates Based on  Per Year ______ 
 
 Loan Amount Annual Interest Rate 
a.Friends,    
b.Relatives   
c.Formal Lenders (RCC, ABC, Postal 
Savings, etc.)  
  
d.Money Lenders/ Pawn Shop   
e.Other   
 
31. If you sell all your assets (home, land, livestocks, agriculture produce, etc.) how much will you 
get (in RMB) _____________________.  
 
32. Regarding to your current total amount of debts, assets and productivity, what do you think about 
your debt level?  
             1 = very low,      2 = low,      3 = adequate,       4 = high,      5 = very high 
 
33. In your village which of these two statements is most correct 
a. Local RCC or Bank evaluates my creditworthiness and offers me a loan without me 
requesting a loan TRUE___________ FALSE__________ 
b. I must formally request a loan from my local RCC or Bank TRUE______FALSE______ 
(Surveyor: Q33 a and b are mutually exclusive: If one is False the other is True) 
IF Q33b is TRUE skip to Q40 
 
34. (if answer to Q33a is TRUE) On the most recent loan OFFER approximately how much (RMB) 
in loan did RCC or Bank OFFER to lend you?_______ RMB 
 
35. Of the amount offered in Q34, how much of loan (RMB) did you ACTUALLY use? (Do not 
leave blank. put 0 if no loan was used, If don‟t know put 9999)______________RMB 
 
36. (If answer to Q35 is greater than zero) What are purposes of loan in Q35 that you 
ACTUALLY used (answer more than one if necessary)? 
 
a. Agricultural production     Yes_____ No____ 
b. House construction/renovation   Yes_____ No____ 
c. Purchase of car/motorcycle/bicycle   Yes_____ No____ 
d. Household consumption   Yes_____ No____ 
e. Medical expenses      Yes_____ No____ 
f. Education expenses     Yes_____ No____ 
g. Other?_______ 
 
37. Is the amount of loan you used in Q35 (INTERVIWER: remind a respondent of answer to Q35) 
less than, equal to or more than the amount that you ACTUALLY needed for the purpose stated 
in Q36? 
   Less than _____   Equal to ______  More than _______   
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38. (If answer to Q35 is less than Q34) If the amount you actually borrowed was less than the amount 
that the lender was willing to provide you, what do you believe are the major reasons you did not 
use the total amount of credit made available to you (answer more than one if necessary)?  
a. I do not need loan/ I do not invest  Yes_____ No____ 
b. I have own money and saving to invest   Yes_____ No____ 
c. I borrowed from friends    Yes_____ No____ 
d. Interest rate is too high     Yes_____ No____ 
e. I am afraid of losing collateral    Yes_____ No____ 
f. I am not  credit worthy     Yes_____ No____ 
g. I cannot get a guarantee    Yes_____ No____ 
h. Loan products are not flexible enough  
to meet my ability to repay   Yes_____ No____ 
i. Other       Yes_____ No____ 
 
39. Do you think you have sufficient collateral to secure a higher loan amount than you identified in 
Q35?  Yes______ No______ 
 
THEN SKIP TO Q52 
 
 
 
40. (If answer to Q33b is TRUE) Have you applied for a loan from RCC or bank within the past 2 
years?  Yes____ No_______(If No skip to Q49) 
 
41. (If answer to Q40 is YES) On the most recent loan request approximately how much (RMB) in 
loan did you request? _______RMB 
 
42. How much (RMB) did RCC or banks offer to you? _______RMB (include zero if loan fully 
denied) 
 
43. (If answer to Q42 is greater than zero) Did you accept the offered loan? Yes______  
No_______(If No skip to Q46) 
 
44. (If answer to Q43 is Yes) What are purposes of offered loan that you used (answer more 
than one if necessary)? 
 
a. Agricultural production     Yes_____ No____ 
b. House construction/renovation   Yes_____ No____ 
c. Purchase of car/motorcycle/bicycle   Yes_____ No____ 
d. Household consumption   Yes_____ No____ 
e. Medical expenses      Yes_____ No____ 
f. Education expenses     Yes_____ No____ 
g. Other       Yes_____ No____ 
 
45. Is the amount of loan you received in Q42 (INTERVIWER: remind a respondent of answer to 
Q42) less than, equal to or more than the amount that you ACTUALLY needed for the purpose 
stated in Q44? 
   Less than _____   Equal to ______  More than _______   
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46. (If answer to Q43 is No) Why didn‟t you accept the offered loan (answer more than one if 
necessary)? 
a. The amount of offered loan is too little for what I planned to invest Yes_____ No____ 
b. I borrowed from friends instead      Yes_____ No____ 
c. Interest rate is too high      Yes_____ No____ 
d. I am afraid of losing collateral     Yes_____ No____ 
e. Loan products are not flexible enough  
to meet my ability to repay     Yes_____ No____ 
f. Other          Yes_____ No____ 
 
 
47. Do you think you have sufficient collateral to secure a higher loan amount than you identified in 
Q42?  Yes______ No______ 
 
48. (If answer to Q42 is less than Q41) what do you believe are the major reasons you were 
denied your partial or full credit request (answer more than one if necessary)? 
 
Reasons Very 
Likely 
Moderately 
likely 
Likely Not likely Not very 
likely 
a.Insufficient collateral        
b.Crops/Livestock subject to too 
much price risk   
     
c.Subject to too much yield risk      
d.The crop grown are vulnerable 
to the extreme weather 
     
e.I have failed to repay the loan in 
the past 
     
f.Bank does not believe I am 
trustworthy 
     
g.My bank doesn‟t believe that I 
earned enough income   
     
h.The repayment schedule 
required by RCC does not match 
the timing of sales from my farm 
     
i.Could not find someone to 
guarantee loan 
     
j.Other      
 
 
Then skip to Q52 
 
 
 
49.  (If answer to Q40 is No) Why you have not applied for loan from RCC or bank in the last 2 
years (answer more than one if necessary)? 
a. I do not need loan/ I do not invest  Yes_____ No____ 
b. I have own money and saving to invest   Yes_____ No____ 
c. I borrowed from friends    Yes_____ No____ 
d. Interest rate is too high     Yes_____ No____ 
e. I am afraid of losing collateral    Yes_____ No____ 
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f. I am not a credit worthy    Yes_____ No____ 
g. I cannot get a guarantee    Yes_____ No____ 
h. Loan products are not flexible enough  
to meet my ability to repay   Yes_____ No____ 
i. Other       Yes_____ No____ 
 
50. Do you believe you have sufficient collateral to obtain adequate farm credit? 
Yes ________  No ________  Not sure ________ 
51. (If answer to Q50 is No or Not sure) assuming that you had sufficient collateral to secure any 
amount of loan that you need to borrow, would you borrow more? 
Yes ________  No ________  Not sure ________ 
 
Then continue to Q52 
 
 
 
52. (If answer to Q38(e) OR Q49(e) is Yes) In the previous response, you indicated that you 
are afraid of losing collateral. Why you are afraid of losing collateral? 
a. I cannot risk losing my business 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____ 
 
b. I cannot risk not sending my kids to school 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____ 
 
c. I cannot risk not having enough money to buy food 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____ 
 
d. I cannot risk not having enough money for medical expenses 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____ 
 
e. I cannot risk not having a place to live 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____ 
 
f. I cannot risk not having enough money when I am retired/old 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____ 
 
g. I cannot risk losing a chance for future credit 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____ 
 
h. I cannot risk losing my social reputation within the village 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____ 
 
i. I cannot risk not having enough savings to cover collateral losses 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____ 
 
j. I am old and I want to live securely 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____ 
 
k. I do not have skill outside off-farming 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____ 
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53. (If answer to Q38(g) OR Q49(g) is Yes) If you could get guarantee, would you apply for 
loan?  Yes ___ No ___ 
 
 
Everybody answers following questions  
 
54. Are you currently considered a „Credit Worthy‟ borrower by your local RCC?  Yes ___   No ____  
 
55. Does your current formal lender require a „Group Guarantee‟ in order for you to get a loan?    
        Yes ___ No ___ 
 
56. Are you a member of a Group Guarantee?   Yes ___ No ___ 
 
57.  (If answer to Q56 is Yes) Because I am a member of a Group Guarantee I can get a larger 
loan than I could get otherwise? 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____ 
 
58. (If answer to Q56 is Yes) Because I am a member of a Group Guarantee I can get a lower 
interest rate than I could get otherwise? 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____ 
 
59. (If answer to Q56 is No) I am not a member of a Group Guarantee because I do not need 
to borrow from RCC or Bank. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____ 
 
60. (If answer to Q56 is No) I am not a member of a Group Guarantee because I do not want 
to borrow from RCC or Bank. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____ 
 
61. (If answer to Q56 is No) I am not a member of a Group Guarantee because I am not 
considered to be Credit Worthy. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____ 
 
62. (If answer to Q56 is No) I am not a member of a Group Guarantee because I do not want 
to guarantee someone else’s debt. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____ 
 
63. (If answer to Q56 is No) I am not a member of a Group Guarantee because the 
procedures are too bothersome 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____ 
 
 
64. How much do you currently owe to RCC or Banks ?   ________ RMB 
If > 0 go to Q64 a) , if = 0 go to Q64 b) 
 
64 a) Suppose that the current RCC rate of interest is 7% per year. Assume that you can borrow 
as much as you need at this interest rate so that all of you credit needs are satisfied, if interest 
rates changed from 7% to the following rate, you would 
 181 
 
 
New 
Interest 
rate % 
Definitely 
Borrow a lot 
more 
Definitely 
Borrow 
some more 
Maybe 
borrow a lot 
more 
Maybe 
borrow 
some more 
Definitely 
not borrow 
anymore 
6 
     5 
     4 
     3 
      
New 
Interest 
rate % 
Definitely 
Borrow a lot 
less 
Definitely 
Borrow 
some less 
Maybe 
borrow a lot 
less 
Maybe 
borrow 
some less 
Definitely 
not borrow 
any less 
8 
     9 
     10 
     11 
      
 
64 b) You indicated that you have no debt to RCC or banks. Suppose you can have all your 
loan needs met at the following rate. What would your borrowing activity be given the following 
annual interest rate?  
 
New 
Interest 
rate % 
Definitely 
Borrow a lot  
Definitely 
Borrow 
some  
Maybe 
borrow a lot  
Maybe 
borrow 
some 
Definitely 
not borrow 
any 
3 
     4 
     5 
     6 
     7 
     8 
     9 
     10 
     11 
      
 
65. If I could borrow more from my lender than I am currently borrowing at the same interest rate I 
would be more likely to borrow from my lender. 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree ____ 
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66. I would be willing to pay more than the current interest rate in order to obtain loan larger than 
RCC or Bank currently provides. 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree ____ 
 
67. If interest rates were lower than current interest rates I would be more likely to borrow 
from a lender. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____ 
 
68. If the cost of obtaining a loan (fees, non-interest charges) on RCC or bank loans were 
lower than current costs I would be more likely to borrow from a bank or RCC. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
69. Have you ever been late in repaying a loan to the following lender? (INTERVIEWER: By „being 
late‟ we mean that payment was not promptly paid as agreed upon by the lender, but payment was 
eventually made) 
 
 Yes No 
a.Friends,    
b.Relatives   
c.Formal Lenders (RCC, ABC, Postal 
Savings, etc.) 
  
d.Money Lenders/ Pawn Shop   
e.Other   
 
 
70. Have you ever defaulted (that is not repaid) on a loan from the following lender? 
(INTERVIEWER: By defaulting we mean that loan was NEVER repaid as agreed upon by the 
lender) 
 
 Yes No 
a.Friends,    
b.Relatives   
c.Formal Lenders (RCC, ABC, Postal 
Savings, etc.) 
  
d.Money Lenders/ Pawn Shop   
e.Other   
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INTERVIEWER: Now I would like to ask you some questions about the saving and borrowing 
environment.  
 
71. What proportion of Household income are you able to save in a year? 
a) None     b) Less than 5% c) Between 5 and 10%  d) More than 10% 
 
 
72. What are purposes of your saving (answer more than one if necessary)? 
a. I save because I have nothing to spend money on 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
b. I save to buy, build or renovate a house 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
c. I save to repair a house 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
d. I save to purchase automobile (e.g. car, motorcycle, tractor) 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
e. I save in case my automobile (e.g. car, motorcycle, tractor) breaks down 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
f. I save for traveling/leisure expenses 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
g. I use my saving for future off-farm investment 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
h. I want to make sure that savings cover my loan  
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
i. I save for unexpected medical emergency  
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
j. I save to send kids to school/university  
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
k. I save for child marriage 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
l. I save to take care of my parents  
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
m. I save to protect job loss  
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
n. I save for unanticipated crop loss 
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Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
o. Other 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
  
73. In your opinion, do you think saving is important? 
 Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree ___ Agree ____ Disagree ____ Strongly Disagree ____  
 
74.  
(a) I have any apprehension of obtaining a loan from a Bank or Rural Cooperative  
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
(b) I have unpaid debts on previous RCC or bank loans. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
(c) Interest rates on RCC or bank loans are higher than interest rates on loans from friends or 
relatives. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
(d) Interest rates on RCC or bank loans are higher than I am able to pay. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
(e) I would prefer to borrow from a friend or relative. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
(f)  I do not like to be indebted to a bank or RCC. 
 Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
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Credit Rationing Impact 
 
Please answer the following questions. Interviewer here we use the term ‘borrowing 
constraint’. By borrowing constraint we mean that the farmer cannot obtain all of the funds 
requested from an RCC or bank in the amounts or time frame required. 
 
75. If I faced a borrowing constraint I would use less input than is required for maximizing 
farm income. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
76. If I faced a borrowing constraint I would need wages from off-farm employment.  
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
77. If I faced a borrowing constraint I would not be able to provide a strong education and 
adequate health care for my children. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
78. If I faced a borrowing constraint my family members (including me) would not be able to 
get adequate food throughout the year. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
79. If I could get adequate credit as much credit as I needed from a bank or RCC, I would be 
more likely to (choose YES only one) 
 
a) leave agriculture and start a non-farm enterprise   Yes_____ No____ 
b) leave agriculture and work as off-farm labor    Yes_____ No____ 
c) Remain in agriculture and expand agricultural production  Yes_____ No____ 
d) Remain in agriculture and also start a non farm business  Yes_____ No____ 
e) None of the above        Yes_____ No____ 
 
80. I would prefer getting a loan at very low interest rate rather than borrow from relative. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
81. I would prefer getting a loan at the current market interest rate rather than borrow from 
a relative. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
82. I would prefer getting a loan at very low interest rate rather than borrow from a friend. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
83. I would prefer getting a loan at the current market interest rate rather than borrow from 
a friend. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
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Land Use Rights 
There are political discussions around the sale of farmland use rights.  Suppose that the 
Government made it legal for farmers to buy or sell land use rights, answer the following 
questions. 
 
84. On average how much profit per year does your farm earn from every mu of cropped 
land?__________ RMB 
 
85. How many mu are in one land use rights?_________mu 
 
86. If the Government made it legal for farmers to buy or sell land use rights, I would 
(choose YES only one)  
 
a) Sell land use rights and start a non-farm enterprise     Yes______ No______ 
b) Sell land use rights and work as off-farm labor   Yes______ No______ 
c) Buy land use rights and expand agricultural production Yes______ No______ 
d) Buy land use rights and start a non farm business  Yes______ No______ 
e) Do nothing        Yes______ No______ 
 
 
87. (If answer to Q86 is a or b) If you were to sell your land use rights today, what is the 
minimum amount you would be willing to receive for the land use rights? 
_________RMB 
 
88. (If answer to Q86 is a or b)  
 
  You are offered the opportunity to buy 3 lottery tickets (A, B and C) that give you, with the 
different pair of probabilities (50% : 50%), (70% : 30%) and (30% : 70%) either 
  
- if your lottery ticket is drawn, it would provide you free of cost and with all rights contained, an 
additional land user right with the rate you specified in Q87.  
- if your lottery ticket is not selected within, you receive nothing 
 
 
(Instruction: Ask the respondent column by column to consider the following lottery. The 
probabilities (which can be explained as a chance of winning) for each of the two outcomes 
should be read to the respondent. For each lottery the respondent needs to be reminded of the 
price indicated in Q87 since that is the amount that will be won. After making sure the 
respondent understands what is to be won or lost you can simplify by saying something like 
how much would you be willing to pay for the lottery if there was a 50% chance of winning 
and a 50% chance of losing , or a 70% chance of winning and 30% chance of losing. BOTH 
probabilities must be read to the respondent. If it is easier you can show the following table 
to the respondent. The respondent may want to think about it for a few seconds. When all 
three lotteries are complete, show the table to the respondent and ask if he/she is satisfied 
with the bids; allow for revision) 
 
What is the most you are prepared to pay for each lottery ticket? (If do not want then = 0) 
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 Lottery A 
probability 
Lottery B 
probability 
Lottery C 
probability 
if your lottery ticket is drawn, you win an additional 
land use rights worth the price you specified in Q87 
which you can sell 
50% 70% 30% 
if your lottery ticket is not selected, you receive 
nothing 
 
 
50% 30% 70% 
What is the most you are prepared to pay for this 
lottery ticket (in RMB)? (If do not want then = 0) 
 
   
 
89. (If answer to Q86 is a or b) What do you plan to do with the land use rights money you 
receive? (Mark the number for all that apply.) 
a)  PAY OFF DEBTS 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
b)  SPEND ON USUAL HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
c)  PAY MEDICAL EXPENSES 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
d) RETIREMENT FUND 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
e) INVEST IN FINANCIAL ASSETS (e.g., STOCKS, BONDS, CDs, MUTUAL FUNDS) 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
f) INVEST IN EXISTING ON FARM BUSINESS ACTIVITY 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
g) INVEST IN EXISTING OFF FARM BUSINESS ACTIVITY 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
h) INVEST IN NEW ON FARM BUSINESS ACTIVITY 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
i) INVEST IN NEW OFF FARM BUSINESS ACTIVITY 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
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j) SPEND ON ONE-TIME HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
k) GIFTS OR CHARITY 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
l) I HAVE NOT DECIDED HOW TO USE THIS MONEY 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
m) OTHER 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
 
 
 
 
 
90. (If answer to Q86 is c or d) If you were to buy a land use rights today, what is the 
maximum amount you would be willing to pay for the land use rights?_________RMB 
 
91. (If answer to Q86 is c or d)  
 
  You are offered the opportunity to buy 3 lottery tickets (A, B and C) that give you, with the 
different pair of probabilities (50% : 50%), (70% : 30%) and (30% : 70%) either 
  
- if your lottery ticket is drawn, it would provide you free of cost and with all rights contained, an 
additional land user right with the rate you specified in Q90.  
- if your lottery ticket is not selected within, you receive nothing 
 
(Instruction: Ask the respondent column by column to consider the following lottery. The 
probabilities (which can be explained as a chance of winning) for each of the two outcomes 
should be read to the respondent. For each lottery the respondent needs to be reminded of the 
price indicated in Q90 since that is the amount that will be won. After making sure the 
respondent understands what is to be won or lost you can simplify by saying something like 
how much would you be willing to pay for the lottery if there was a 50% chance of winning 
and a 50% chance of losing , or a 70% chance of winning and 30% chance of losing. BOTH 
probabilities must be read to the respondent. If it is easier you can show the following table 
to the respondent. The respondent may want to think about it for a few seconds. When all 
three lotteries are complete, show the table to the respondent and ask if he/she is satisfied 
with the bids; allow for revision) 
 
 
What is the most you are prepared to pay for each lottery ticket? (If do not want then = 0) 
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 Lottery A 
probability 
Lottery B 
probability 
Lottery C 
probability 
if your lottery ticket is drawn, you win an additional 
land use rights worth the price you specified in Q90 
in which you can grow more crop 
50% 70% 30% 
if your lottery ticket is not selected, you receive 
nothing 
 
 
50% 30% 70% 
What is the most you are prepared to pay for this 
lottery ticket (in RMB)? (If do not want then = 0) 
 
   
 
 
92. (everybody answers this question) If you can use your land use rights as a collateral for a loan, 
you would  
Definitely borrow more ______ Maybe borrow some more ______ Only borrow a little more______ 
Not borrow any more ______  
 
 
93. Suppose that you had the opportunity to either buy or sell your land use rights, would you buy or 
sell your land use rights at the following value of land use rights? 
 
 
  
If Buy If Sell You would 
Scenario LUR 
Borrow 
and must 
pay for 
10 years 
Receive sell 
amount and 
receive 
investment 
income of 
10%/year 
definitely 
Buy 
Might 
buy 
neither 
buy nor 
sell 
might 
sell 
definitely 
sell 
1 300,000 44,709 30,000 
     2 150,000 22,354 15,000 
     3 100,000 14,903 10,000 
     4 75,000 11,177 7,500 
     5 60,000 8,942 6,000 
     6 50,000 7,451 5,000 
     7 42,857 6,387 4,286 
     8 37,500 5,589 3,750 
     9 33,333 4,968 3,333 
     10 30,000 4,471 3,000 
     11 27,273 4,064 2,727 
     12 25,000 3,726 2,500 
     13 23,077 3,439 2,308 
     14 21,429 3,193 2,143 
     15 20,000 2,981 2,000 
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Entrepreneurship 
 
Please tell us what you think about the possibility of starting a new business.  
 
94. Have you ever started a new business? Yes ___ No ___ 
 
 
95. Other than yourself, do you personally know people who started their own business in your 
community or elsewhere? Yes ___ No ___ 
 
96. Have you ever considered starting a new business, either full-time or part-time  
a) ____YES, FULL-TIME 
b) ____YES, PART-TIME 
c)  ____NO 
 
97. Are you planning to start a new business? Yes ___ No ___ 
 
 
98. (If answer to Q97 is Yes), what type of business do you plan to start?  
a) Retail ________ 
b) Wholesale ________ 
c) Food processing ________ 
d) Manufacturing ________ 
e) Franchise _______ 
f) Service ________ 
g) Catering and Accommodation ________ 
h) Construction ________ 
i) Other ________ 
 
 
99. If you could buy or sell your Land Use Rights, would this influence your decision on whether or 
not to start a new business? Yes ___ No ___ 
 
 
100. Do you have a computer at home? Yes ___ No ___ 
 
 
101. Do you have internet access from your home? Yes ___ No ___ 
 
 
102. Do you use the internet and e-mail for business activities? Yes ___ No ___ 
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103. What is the employment status for you and your spouse, if applicable? (Mark number of one 
choice in each column.) 
 
 
YOU   SPOUSE 
1____  1____ EMPLOYED FULL-TIME ON FARM 
 2____  2____ EMPLOYED FULL-TIME LOCALLY OFF FARM 
3____ 3____  MIGRANT WORKER FARM LABOR 
4____ 4____  MIGRANT WORKER OFF-FARM LABOR 
5____  5____ EMPLOYED PART-TIME 
 6____  6____ EMPLOYED TEMPORARILY 
 7____  7____ UNEMPLOYED 
8____  8____ HOME MAKER 
9____  9____ MAKING CRAFT 
 10____  10____ RETIRED 
 11____  11____ IN SCHOOL 
 
 
104. A) Please mark “X” if you or immediate family or close friend a village leader  
Self_______       Family _______  Close friend ________ 
 
B) Please mark “X” if you or immediate family or close friend on the village committee  
Self_______       Family _______  Close friend ________ 
 
C) Please mark “X” if you or immediate family or close friend work for the state 
government  
Self_______       Family _______  Close friend ________ 
 
D) Please mark “X” if you or immediate family or close friend work for the county 
government  
Self_______       Family _______  Close friend ________ 
 
E) Please mark “X” if you or immediate family or close friend work for state enterprise  
Self_______       Family _______  Close friend ________ 
 
F) Please mark “X” if you or immediate family or close friend work for RCC/Bank  
Self_______       Family _______  Close friend ________ 
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105. We would like to learn about the level of support provided for new businesses in your 
community.  Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement by 
marking your answer. 
 
   Statements       (Please mark “X” your answer.) 
1 Those with successful 
businesses get a lot of attention 
and admiration… 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
AGREE 
 
 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
2 Young people are encouraged 
to start their own 
businesses………………… 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
AGREE 
 
 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
3 State and local governments 
provide good support for 
people starting new 
businesses……………….. 
 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
4 Bankers go out of their way to 
help new businesses get 
started……. 
………………………. 
 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
5 RCC  go out of their way to 
help new businesses get 
started……. 
………………………. 
 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
6 Investors go out of their way to 
help new businesses get 
started……. 
………………………. 
 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
7 Other community groups 
provide good support for 
people starting new 
businesses……………………
…… 
 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
8 The local media does a good 
job of covering local business 
news ………………… 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
AGREE 
 
 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
9 Most of the leaders in this 
community are people who 
own their own 
businesses……………………
…… 
 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
10 There are many examples of 
well-respected people who 
made a success of themselves 
starting new 
businesses……………………
…… 
 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
 
106. Once again, imagine that you have decided to start a new business.  Please indicate how 
accurately you think the following statements would describe each possible start-up problem your 
new business might face by marking your answer. 
 
   Statements       (Please mark ‘X” your answer.) 
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1 Being taken seriously as a 
business person....………….. 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
UNTRUE 
 
UNTRUE 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
TRUE 
 
COMPLETELY 
TRUE 
2 Balancing time between 
business and personal or 
family time ………………..……. 
 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
UNTRUE 
 
 
UNTRUE 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
TRUE 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
TRUE 
3 Lack of mentors or a 
support structure who can 
provide advice and 
support……………………..……… 
 
 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
UNTRUE 
 
 
 
UNTRUE 
 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
 
TRUE 
 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
TRUE 
 
 
107. We would like to turn our attention to the news media and learn about sources of 
communication in your community.  Please indicate how reliable you think each source of 
information is by marking your answer. 
 
   Statements       (Please mark ‘X” your answer.) 
1 Newspaper……………....………….. 
 
NOT 
RELIABLE 
SLIGHTLY 
RELIABLE 
RELIABLE QUITE 
RELIABLE 
VERY 
RELIABLE 
2 TV/Radio ……. ………………………. 
 
NOT 
RELIABLE 
 
SLIGHTLY 
RELIABLE 
 
RELIABLE 
 
QUITE 
RELIABLE 
 
VERY 
RELIABLE 
3 Internet…………. ….……………….. NOT 
RELIABLE 
 
SLIGHTLY 
RELIABLE 
 
RELIABLE 
 
QUITE 
RELIABLE 
VERY 
RELIABLE 
4 Family member ……………..……. 
 
NOT 
RELIABLE 
 
SLIGHTLY 
RELIABLE 
 
RELIABLE 
 
QUITE 
RELIABLE 
VERY 
RELIABLE 
5 Friend…….……………………..……… 
 
NOT 
RELIABLE 
 
SLIGHTLY 
RELIABLE 
 
RELIABLE 
 
QUITE 
RELIABLE 
VERY 
RELIABLE 
6 Local government official … NOT 
RELIABLE 
SLIGHTLY 
RELIABLE 
RELIABLE QUITE 
RELIABLE 
VERY 
RELIABLE 
       
7 Local university/college……… NOT 
RELIABLE 
SLIGHTLY 
RELIABLE 
RELIABLE QUITE 
RELIABLE 
VERY 
RELIABLE 
       
8 Village/Local lender…………… NOT 
RELIABLE 
SLIGHTLY 
RELIABLE 
RELIABLE QUITE 
RELIABLE 
VERY 
RELIABLE 
       
       
 
 
108. Imagine that you have decided to start a new business.  Please indicate the extent to 
which you agree or disagree with each statement about how certain you are that your new 
business will be able to accomplish each of the following by marking your answer. 
 
   Statements       (Please mark ‘X” your answer.) 
1 Obtain raw 
materials………………… 
 
 
HIGHLY 
UNCERTAIN 
 
UNCERTAIN 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
CERTAIN 
 
HIGHLY 
CERTAIN 
2 Attract 
employees………………… 
 
 
HIGHLY 
UNCERTAIN 
 
UNCERTAIN 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
CERTAIN 
 
HIGHLY 
CERTAIN 
3 Obtain start-up 
capital……………………… 
 
 
HIGHLY 
UNCERTAIN 
 
UNCERTAIN 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
CERTAIN 
 
HIGHLY 
CERTAIN 
4 Obtain working 
capital……………………… 
 
 
HIGHLY 
UNCERTAIN 
 
UNCERTAIN 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
CERTAIN 
 
HIGHLY 
CERTAIN 
5 Deal with 
distributors…………… 
 
 
HIGHLY 
UNCERTAIN 
 
UNCERTAIN 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
CERTAIN 
 
HIGHLY 
CERTAIN 
6 Attract      
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customers………………… 
 
HIGHLY 
UNCERTAIN 
UNCERTAIN NEUTRAL CERTAIN HIGHLY 
CERTAIN 
7 Compete with other 
businesses………………. 
 
 
HIGHLY 
UNCERTAIN 
 
UNCERTAIN 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
CERTAIN 
 
HIGHLY 
CERTAIN 
8 Comply with local, state 
& federal 
regulations……………. 
 
 
 
HIGHLY 
UNCERTAIN 
 
 
UNCERTAIN 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
CERTAIN 
 
 
HIGHLY 
CERTAIN 
9 Keep up with 
technological 
advances………………….. 
 
 
 
HIGHLY 
UNCERTAIN 
 
 
UNCERTAIN 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
CERTAIN 
 
 
HIGHLY 
CERTAIN 
10 Obtain a bank 
financing…………………. 
 
 
HIGHLY 
UNCERTAIN 
 
UNCERTAIN 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
CERTAIN 
 
HIGHLY 
CERTAIN 
11 Obtain venture capital 
financing…… 
 
 
HIGHLY 
UNCERTAIN 
 
UNCERTAIN 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
CERTAIN 
 
HIGHLY 
CERTAIN 
 
 
 
109. Imagine that you have decided to start a new business.  Please indicate the extent to 
which you agree or disagree with each statement by marking your answer. 
 
   Statements       (Please mark ‘X” your answer.) 
1 If I work hard, I can 
successfully start a new 
business.………………………….. 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
AGREE 
 
 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
2 Overall, my skills and 
abilities will help me start 
a business ………………………. 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
AGREE 
 
 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
3 My past experience will be 
very valuable in starting a 
business ………………………….. 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
AGREE 
 
 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
4 I am confident I can put in 
the effort needed to start 
a business ………………………. 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
AGREE 
 
 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
5 Several new companies 
opened in my community 
in the last three years……… 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
AGREE 
 
 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
6 I will have to move to 
another community if I 
want to start a new 
business…………………………… 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110. Listed below are some statements about business activity in your community.  Please 
indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement by marking your answer. 
 
   Statements       (Please mark ‘X” your answer.) 
 195 
 
1 Many new people moved 
into my community in the 
last three years………………… 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
AGREE 
 
 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
2 Many people in my 
community start new 
businesses………………………… 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
AGREE 
 
 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
3 People in my community 
often talk about new 
business opportunities…….. 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
AGREE 
 
 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
4 Local government official 
suggests new business 
possibilities…… 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
AGREE 
 
 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
5 Local university/college 
suggests new business 
possibilities 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
AGREE 
 
 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
6 Village lender suggests 
new business 
possibilities………………………. 
 
 
 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
AGREE 
 
 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
 
 
111. We would like to understand characteristics about you.  Please indicate how accurately 
the following statements would describe you by marking the answer that applies. 
 
   Statements       (Please mark ‘X” your answer.) 
1 I am successful in 
completing new tasks….…. 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
UNTRUE 
 
UNTRUE 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
TRUE 
 
COMPLETELY 
TRUE 
2 I can reach goals I set for 
myself……. ……………………… 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
UNTRUE 
 
UNTRUE 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
TRUE 
 
COMPLETELY 
TRUE 
3 I am successful when 
confronting obstacles….…. 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
UNTRUE 
 
UNTRUE 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
TRUE 
 
COMPLETELY 
TRUE E 
4 I can do anything I set 
my mind to….. ………………. 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
UNTRUE 
 
UNTRUE 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
TRUE 
 
COMPLETELY 
TRUE 
5 Owning my own business 
is more important than 
spending time with my 
family………………………..…… 
 
 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
UNTRUE 
 
 
 
UNTRUE 
 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
 
TRUE 
 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
TRUE 
6 I have no trouble making 
and keeping friends………… 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
UNTRUE 
 
UNTRUE 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
TRUE 
 
COMPLETELY 
TRUE 
7 When I make plans I am 
almost certain to make 
them work……………………… 
 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
UNTRUE 
 
 
UNTRUE 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
TRUE 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
TRUE 
8 When I get what I want, 
it is usually because I 
worked hard for it………….. 
 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
UNTRUE 
 
 
UNTRUE 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
TRUE 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
TRUE 
9 I would be proud of my 
children if they started 
their own business………… 
 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
UNTRUE 
 
 
UNTRUE 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
TRUE 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
TRUE 
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10 I have been very 
impressed with the people 
I know who have their 
own business………….………. 
 
 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
UNTRUE 
 
 
 
UNTRUE 
 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
 
TRUE 
 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
TRUE 
11 I would probably choose 
the same career path 
again…………………………….... 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
UNTRUE 
 
 
UNTRUE 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
TRUE 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
TRUE 
 
12 I usually know what is 
appropriate in any social 
situation………………………..… 
 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
UNTRUE 
 
 
UNTRUE 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
TRUE 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
TRUE 
13 I consider myself a loner.. 
 
COMPLETELY 
UNTRUE 
UNTRUE NEUTRAL TRUE COMPLETELY 
TRUE 
14 I am often concerned 
about what others think 
of me……………………………... 
 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
UNTRUE 
 
 
UNTRUE 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
TRUE 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
TRUE 
15 I am a good judge of 
character…………………………. 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
UNTRUE 
 
UNTRUE 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
TRUE 
 
COMPLETELY 
TRUE 
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Risk Perceptions and Risk Motives         
112. "Imagine an honest stranger comes up to you and offers a gamble with the payout 
depending on the flip of a coin. If the coin lands heads you get the amount in the first 
column and if it lands tails you get the amount in the second column. Each has a 50% 
chance of occurring. If the gamble was repeated by many flips of the coin you would 
expect to receive the amount in the third column. While the odds of receiving the amount 
in the first column are the same as the odds in the second column the high and low values 
are different. Study the six gambles in the table and select the one gamble that you would 
prefer". 
 
Choice Gain in Good luck: 
(RMB): 50% chance 
Gain in Bad luck: 
(RMB): 50% chance 
Expected value 
(RMB) 
1 500 500 500 
2 950 450 700 
3 1200 400 800 
4 1500 300 900 
5 1900 100 1000 
6 2000 0 1000 
 
 
113. You are offered the opportunity of acquiring a security that provides 50% chance of 
winning 5,000 RMB and a 50% chance of winning nothing and losing all the capital invested. 
What is the most you are prepared to pay for this security? 
________ RMB 
 
114. Assume you have enough savings to buy a following security that provides 50% chance 
of winning 5,000 RMB and a 50% chance of winning nothing and losing all the capital invested. 
What is the most you are prepared to pay for this security? 
________ RMB 
 
115.  
 
(Instruction: Ask the respondent column by column to consider the following lottery. The payoffs and 
probabilities (which can be explained as a chance of winning) for each of the two outcomes should be 
read to the respondent. After making sure the respondent understands what is to be won you can simplify 
by saying something like how much would you be willing to pay for the lottery if there was a 50% chance 
of winning 100 RMB and a 50% chance of winning 200 RMB , or a 30% chance of winning 226.93 RMB 
and 70% chance of winning 117.03 RMB. BOTH probabilities and BOTH payoffs must be read to the 
respondent. If it is easier you can show the following table to the respondent. The respondent may want to 
think about it for a few seconds. When all three lotteries are complete, show the table to the respondent 
and ask if he/she is satisfied with the bids; allow for revision) 
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Lottery A B C 
Probabilities 
 
0.5 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.3 
Payoff  (RMB) 
 
100 200 226.93 117.03 182.37 73.26 
How much are you willing to 
pay for this lottery ticket 
(RMB)? 
   
 
A) Imagine you are offered the opportunity to buy a lottery ticket. You either have a 50% chance 
of winning 100 RMB or a 50% chance of winning 200 RMB. How much are you willing to 
pay for this lottery ticket (RMB)? 
 
B) Imagine you are offered the opportunity to buy a lottery ticket. You either have a 30% chance 
of winning 226.93 RMB or a 70% chance of winning 117.03 RMB. How much are you 
willing to pay for this lottery ticket (RMB)? 
 
C) Imagine you are offered the opportunity to buy a lottery ticket. You either have a 70% chance 
of winning 182.37 RMB or a 30% chance of winning 73.26 RMB. How much are you willing 
to pay for this lottery ticket (RMB)? 
 
 
 
The following questions may be sensitive. It would help to understand your situation by asking about 
important events that may have occurred in your life recently.   
 
116. In your house, is there a family member (within past 3 years) getting divorce?  
             YES_____, NO_____ 
 
117. In your house, have you experienced (within past 3 years) death of a family member? 
YES_____, NO_____ 
 
118. In your house, is there a family member (within past year) suffering from severe sickness?  
             YES_____, NO_____ 
 
 
To be answered by interviewer only 
 
119. In your opinion the respondent was engaged in this survey and answered truthfully all 
questions? 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
120. In your opinion the quality of answers provided in this survey is adequate to include in 
any written reports. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
Please make any other relevant comments here: 
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APPENDIX B 
PARTICIPANT SURVEYS IN CHINESE 
康奈尔大学/西北农林科技大学 
关于信贷需求，风险，农业保险，土地使用者的权利和创业方面评估的村民调查 
致受访者：首先感谢您抽出宝贵时间与我们见面。这项调查大约需要45至60分钟，让我
再次感谢您的参与。我们正在进行的调查是美国康奈尔大学和西北农林科技大学的合作项
目/产品。我们希望收集一些您在当地借款以及应对风险和信用方面面临问题的信息。我
们也将询问一些农作物保险，土地使用者的权利和创业方面的问题。您的回答将完全保
密，并在任何情况下不可能被识别。此外，我们知道您无法准确记得精确的数字。如果这
样，您只需要提供给我们您最佳的判断或估计。最后，您有权利拒绝回答我们问的任何问
题。 
鉴于此您是否愿意参加这个调查呢？是     否 
如果不愿意参加，可以告诉我们为什么您不愿参与吗? 
 
 
 
 
访问者请注意：如果以上的答案是因为受访人觉得他们没有我们需要的信息，可以问为
什么，再解释我们只需要他们尽其努力，而且我们并没有预期所有的受访者都有确切的信
息。然后询问他们是否会重新考虑。 
 
访问者请注意 ：如果以上回答涉及隐私的问题，可以提醒受访者，他们的参与将是非常
有利于我们的研究，他们将保持匿名，而且他们的隐私将得到保障。然后询问他们是否会
重新考虑。 
如果是...“非常感谢您同意参与。让我们开始吧。我们想先问您一些一般性问
题... ...，请翻到问题1。 
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A: 农场的特点与农民风险态度 
       
1. 性别________男; ___________女 
2. 年龄________ 
3. 村名 ________ 
4. a) 你家有几口人，包括你自己? ________（调查人：这里指与受访人分享房屋的所
有人口，包括父母，孩子） 
   b) 你是户主吗? 是_____, 否____ 
 
5．您最高的教育程度： 
             a) 没上过学 
             b) 上过几年小学 
             c) 小学毕业 
             d) 上过几年初中 
             e) 初中毕业 
             f) 上过几年高中 
             g) 高中毕业 
             h) 大专或大学 
             i) 大专或大学  
 
6．在您生活的村落（社区）您是否从属某个社会团体？（例如：合作社，宗教，志愿服
务团体 ，俱乐部等等）？是_____, 否_____ 
 
7.你们家有几部手机？________ 
 
8.您从事农业有多少年了？________ 
 
9.您家总共有几亩地（1英亩=6.07亩）？不包括租来的？________ 
 
10. 您家还有多少亩地是租来生产农业的？_________ 
 
11. 如果您是租来的土地，每亩每年平均租金是多少？__________ 
 
12. 总体来讲，与去年相比您会如何描述您所在地区目前的商业环境？ 
             a)  _______ 变好了 
             b)  ________相同 
             c)  ________变差了 
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13. 请列出过去1年，在你种植的作物中，种植和销售排名前5的作物。请按照销售额由高
到低排列 
 
排名 作物 总销售 (RMB) 
1   
2   
3   
4   
5   
 
 14.  农业收入是您的主要收入吗? 是_____, 否_____ 
 
 15. 您去年全年的收入有多少?包括农场经营，兼业收入，汇款（大约）? 
______________ 元 
 
 16. 请估计您的全部农场经营收入占15题中您填写的收入的百分比______________（调
查者：如果受访者不知道确切的数字，告诉他们“我们并不需要一个确切的数字只是一
个概数”或“它是少于或超过50％，低于25％等，直到获得一个数字。） 
采访者：“谢谢您，您的回答对我们非常有帮助。现在我想问一些关于您对风险的态度
及您的农场所面临的风险方面的问题”。 
 
B. 风险来源与风险认知 
 
17. 请指出您是否愿意承担这些风险（圈出您认为最适合的选择） 
陈述 不愿
意 
 中立  愿意 
我愿意接受更大的生产风险，增加获得较高利润
的机会 
1 2 3 4 5 
在我看到其他农场运用新技术并产生好的结果之
前，我愿意承担新技术带来的风险 
1 2 3 4 5 
在我看到其他农场运用新管理方法并产生好的结
果之前，我愿意承担新的管理实践带来的风险 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
如果您没有种植玉米或小麦，请忽略18-20题 
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18．如果您种植玉米和小麦，您预期明年（2010／11）最可能卖到的价格是每斤多少
元？您预期的最高／最低可能卖到每斤多少元（1斤=500g）？（采访人提示：在调查最
可能价格预期与最高／最低销售价格预期时，可以告诉采访对象“我们并不需要准确数
字，依靠你们过去的生产经验对未来价格作出预测即可”。“最可能价格”是指生产者
预期的明年可以卖到的价钱。注意最可能价格预期与最低／最高销售价格预期可以相
等。） 
   
作物种类 最低销售价格预期 
（元／斤） 
最可能销售价格 
（元／斤） 
最高销售价格预期 
（元／斤） 
1 玉米    
2 小麦    
  
 
 
19．如果您种植玉米或小麦，您预期明年（2010／11）最可能的产量是每亩多少斤？您
预期的最高／最低可能的每亩产量是多少斤？如果您无法准确估计，请将误差控制在10斤
／亩内即可。（采访人提示：在调查最可能产量预期与最高／最低产量预期时，可以告
诉采访对象“我们并不需要准确数字，依靠你们过去的生产经验对未来产量作出预测即
可”。“最可能产量”是指生产者预期的明年的产量。注意最可能产量预期与最低／最高
产量预期可以相等。） 
 
作物种类 最低生产产量预期 
（斤／亩） 
最可能生产产量 
（斤／亩） 
最高生产产量预期 
（斤／亩） 
1 玉米    
2 小麦    
 
 
20．如果您种植玉米或小麦，在您的记忆中曾经有过的最低和最高产量是多少斤／亩？历
史平均产量是多少斤／亩,各自发生的年份是什么时候? 如果您无法准确估计，请将误差
控制在10斤／亩内即可。（采访人提示：如果采访对象不能准确记忆最高／最低产量出
现的年份，请提问“这是几年前的产量”，并用以下公式计算：发生年份=2010－X年
前）。 
 
作物种类 最低历史产量 
（斤／亩） 
年份 
 
最高历史产量 
（斤／亩） 
年份 
 
历史平均产量 
（斤／亩） 
1 玉米      
2 小麦      
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C. 风险管理方法使用和认知 
 
21． 请分别指出以下各选项中的风险管理方法对你的农场的重要性。如果在你的生产中
不使用这些来进行风险管理，请选择“0”。1 =不重要，2 =不很重要，3 =中性，4 
=重要，5 =非常重要（圈出您认为最适合的选择）。 
风险管理选择 
0  
如果没
有使用 
完全
不重
要 
   非常重
要 
不止一种作物或牲畜，作物多样化 0 1 2 3 4 5 
田块在不同地点（地理多样化） 0 1 2 3 4 5 
灌溉 0 1 2 3 4 5 
分散销售：产品的销售不是一次售
出，而是在一段时间里销售（多元
化营销） 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
使用合约，事先以固定价格来营销
作物 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
政府项目 0 1 2 3 4 5 
保持财物储备：有现金和随时可转
换资产（如机械，畜牧） 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
投资非农以获取其他收入来源 0 1 2 3 4 5 
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D. 农业保险的使用和认知 
采访者：农作物保险是一种西方农户常用的工具。如果你的某些农作物的产量低于平均
单产的百分比之下时，农作物保险将赔付你损失的部分。例如，如果你所种植的特定作物
的平均产量为500斤/亩，当实际产量低于这一平均水平的90％时，保险可提供付款。例
如，如果实际产量为400斤，你可获得的赔付为（500－400）×平均收获价格。如果价格
为0.75元/斤，那么您将收到0.75 ×（500－400）= 75元，但如果产量超过500斤，你将
不会从保险公司得到任何赔付。 
 
22．你所在的地区目前是否有这样的作物保险？  是_____  否_____ 
(如果“否”跳至 Q25) 
 
23．（如果Q22回答“是”）您是否购买了作物保险？ 是_____ 否_____ 
( 如果“否”跳至 Q26) 
 
24．（如果Q23回答“是”）请列出所保的作物。每亩您支付多少钱？ 
 保险的作物 保险费 
 (元/亩) 
1   
2   
3  
4  
5  
 
 25．（如果Q22回答“否”）如果中国将提供作物保险，您是否会购买？ 
                  是_____ 否____ 
  
26．如果您种植玉米和/或小麦，在来年您认为哪种作物可能有更高的产量损失？ 
              玉米 _____________ 小麦 ______________（只能选一种作物） 
 
27．想象一下，如果政府为你在26题中选择的作物提供一个农作物保险产品，它将保证
您的每亩年收入不会低于300元人民币。基于过去所有的农作物产量以及您对明年的作物
产量的估计， 
a) 你愿意付18元人民币每亩，以保证300元/亩的最低收入？ 
    肯定买_______可能买____ ___不大可能买_____肯定不买_________ 
 
b) 你愿意付9元人民币每亩，以保证300元/亩的最低收入？ 
    肯定买_______可能买____ ___不大可能买_____肯定不买_________ 
 
c) 你愿意付3.5元人民币每亩，以保证300元/亩的最低收入？ 
    肯定买_______可能买____ ___不大可能买_____肯定不买_________ 
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d) 你愿意付1元人民币每亩，以保证300元/亩的最低收入？ 
    肯定买_______可能买____ ___不大可能买_____肯定不买_________ 
 
28. 考虑到包括农场，家具家电，房屋，汽车，机械及设备等，您是否定期购买下列保险
（如果不适用请留空）： 
       a. 人寿保险                              是_____ 否___ 
b. 家庭火灾保险                        是_____ 否____ 
c. 汽车保险                           是_____ 否____ 
d. 健康/医疗保险                       是_____ 否____ 
e. 农民最低生活保障                    是_____ 否____ 
f. 农村养老保险                        是_____ 否____ 
g. 防止作物损失（作物保险）                   是_____ 否____ 
h. 防止牲畜损失（牲畜保险）                    是_____ 否____ 
i. 其他____________________ 
 
   29．想象一下一个新的贷款产品，有一个内置的保险机制，这样，当发生严重干旱
时，随着干旱强度增加你所需偿还的贷款额减少。你是否对这样的贷款产品感兴
趣，即使它的贷款利率会增加？ 
         a. 不感兴趣 
b. 中度感兴趣 
c. 非常感兴趣 
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  E. 农场融资和风险管理 
  30. 你有任何未偿还的债务吗？是____否____ 
a. 如果有，请注明你欠的总金额及利率 
b. 月利率是_____   年利率是____ 
  贷款额 利率 
a. 朋友   
b. 亲戚   
c.正规机构（信用社，农业银
行,邮政储蓄等) 
  
d. 放贷者/当铺   
e. 其他   
 
 
31．如果你卖掉你所有的资产（房屋，土地，家畜，农业生产资料等），你会得到多少
（人民币）____________________ 
 
32．对于您目前的债务，资产和生产力，您觉得您的债务水平如何？ 
             1 =非常低，2 =低，3 =适中，4 =高，5 =非常高 
 
33. 在你的村庄，这两个说法哪个是最正确的 
a. 当地农村信用社或银行对我进行资信评估，并提供贷款，不需要我的申请 
对___________ 错__________ 
b. 我必须正式向当地农村信用社或银行申请贷款   对______错______ 
   （问题33 a和b是相互排斥的：如果一个是错的，则另一个是对的） 
 
如果Q33b选择“对”，即跳到Q40 
 
34. （如果Q33a回答是“对”）在最近的贷款中农村信用社或银行给您提供约多少贷
款？________________（人民币） 
 
35.在Q34所提供的金额中，有多少贷款（人民币）是你实际使用的？ （不要留空。如果
没有使用，就填0；如果不知道，就填9999 )______________ 
 
36.（如果Q35回答大于零）您将贷款用于什么目的？（可多选 ）      
   a. 农业生产                                是_____ 否____ 
b. 房屋建筑/翻修                        是_____ 否____ 
c. 购买汽车/摩托车/自行车        是_____ 否____ 
d. 生活消费                                 是_____ 否____ 
e. 医疗消费                                  是_____ 否____ 
f. 教育费用                                  是_____ 否____ 
g. 其他费用                                  是_____ 否____ 
 207 
 
  
37.  在Q35中您所回答的贷款额（采访者：提醒受访人Q35的回答）小于，等于或大于你
在Q36所述的实际所需要的金额吗？ 
小于______ 等于_____  大于_______ 
 
38. （如果你的实际贷款金额低于银行提供给你的信贷额度）你认为你没有使用全部信
贷总额主要的原因是什么（可多选）？ 
a. 我不需要贷款/我不投资                     是_____ 否____ 
b. 我有自己的钱和储蓄用来投资                是_____ 否____ 
c. 我从朋友处借钱                            是_____ 否____ 
d. 利率过高                                  是_____ 否____ 
e. 担心失去抵押品                            是_____ 否____ 
f. 我信用不够好                              是_____ 否____ 
        g. 没有担保                                  是_____ 否____ 
       h. 贷款产品不够灵活，无法满足我的偿付能力    是_____ 否____ 
 i. 其他?________                            是_____ 否____ 
 
39．你认为你有足够的抵押，以确保比你在Q37中的贷款更高的贷款额吗？ 
       是_____ 否____ 
 
跳至Q52 
    
40．（如果Q33b的回答是“对”）在近2年你有从信用社或银行申请贷款吗？ 
是_____ 否____（如果否，跳至 Q49） 
    
41.（如果Q40的回答“对”）在最近的贷款申请中大约有多少_____________（人民币） 
    
42． 信用社或银行给你提供了多少贷款_________________（如果贷款被拒就填0） 
   
43．（如果Q42大于0）你接受了贷款吗？是_____ 否____（如果否，跳至 Q46） 
 
44. （如果 Q43 回答是 ）你使用这些贷款的目的是 （可多选）？ 
a. 农业生产     是_____ 否____ 
b. 房屋建设/翻修   是_____ 否____ 
c. 购买汽车/摩托车/自行车   是_____ 否____ 
d. 生活消费    是_____ 否____ 
e. 医疗开销      是_____ 否____ 
f. 教育开销     是_____ 否____ 
g. 其他?                         是_____ 否____     
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   45．你在Q42接受的贷款额（采访人：提醒受访人Q42的回答）小于，等于或大于你基
于Q44目的实际所需要的金额吗？ 
              小于__________等于______ _____大于___________ 
46．（如果Q43的回答是“否”）你为什么没有接受贷款（可多选）？ 
a. 银行提供的贷款比我计划投资的少           是_____ 否____ 
b. 从朋友处借钱                             是_____ 否____ 
c.  利率过高                                是_____ 否____ 
d. 担心失去抵押品                           是_____ 否____ 
       e.  贷款产品不够灵活，不能满足我的偿付能力  是_____ 否____ 
f.  其他?                                   是_____ 否____ 
 
47．你认为你有足够的抵押，以确保比你在Q42中的贷款更高的贷款额吗？ 
       是_____ 否____ 
 
48．（如果Q42的回答比Q45小）银行拒绝了你的部分或全部贷款的主要原因是什么
（可多选）？ 
原因 非常
可能 
很可能 可能 不太
可能 
不可能 
a. 抵押品不足        
b. 作物/牲畜的价格风险太
大   
     
c.产量风险太大      
d. 作物生长受到天气影响的
脆弱性 
     
e.过去有过还不了款的经历      
f.银行对我不信任      
g.我的银行不相信我有足够
的收入   
     
h.信用社还款的时间与我农
场销售的时间不吻合 
     
i.找不到人担保      
j.其他，请指出      
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跳至Q52 
 
49．（如果Q40的回答是否）在近2年里你为什么没有向信用社或银行借款？（可多选） 
a. 我不需要贷款/我不投资                       是_____ 否____ 
b. 我有自己的钱和储蓄用来投资                  是_____ 否____ 
c. 从朋友处借钱                                是_____ 否____ 
d. 利率过高                                    是_____ 否____ 
e. 担心失去抵押品                              是_____ 否____ 
f. 我信用不够好                                是_____ 否____ 
        g. 没有担保                                    是_____ 否____ 
       h. 贷款产品不够灵活，不能满足我的偿付能力      是_____ 否____ 
i. 其他?                                        是_____ 否____ 
 
 50．你是否相信你有足够的抵押品获得足够的贷款？ 
       是_____  否____不确定________ 
 
 51．（如果Q50的回答是否或不确定）假设你有足够的抵押品保证你需要的贷款，你会多
借吗？ 
 是_____  否____不确定________ 
 
继续回答Q52 
 
 
52．（如果Q38(e) 或 Q49(e)的回答“是”，即在前面你指出了自己担心失去抵押
品）你为什么担心失去抵押品呢？ 
 
 a. 我不能冒险失去我的生意 
非常同意_____比较同意______同意______不同意______非常不同意_______ 
 
 b. 我不能冒险不送孩子上学 
非常同意_____比较同意______同意______不同意______非常不同意_______ 
 
 c. 我不能冒险没有足够的钱买食物 
非常同意_____比较同意______同意______不同意______非常不同意_______ 
 
 d. 我不能冒险没有足够的钱支付医药费 
非常同意_____比较同意______同意______不同意______非常不同意_______  
 
 e. 我不能冒险没有房子住 
非常同意_____比较同意______同意______不同意______非常不同意_______ 
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f. 我不能冒险当我退休或年老的时候没有足够的钱 
非常同意_____比较同意______同意______不同意______非常不同意_______ 
 
g. 我不能冒险失去未来获贷的机会? 
非常同意_____比较同意______同意______不同意______非常不同意_______ 
 
h. 我不能冒险失去在村里的社会声誉 
非常同意_____比较同意______同意______不同意______非常不同意_______ 
 
i. 我不能冒险没有足够的储蓄来弥补抵押品的损失 
非常同意_____比较同意______同意______不同意______非常不同意_______ 
 
j. 我已经老了，我想要安稳的生活 
非常同意_____比较同意______同意______不同意______非常不同意_______ 
 
k. 我没有从事非农工作的技能 
非常同意_____比较同意______同意______不同意______非常不同意_______ 
 
53．（如果Q38(g) 或 Q49(g)的回答“是”）如果你可以获得担保，你会申请贷款吗？  
是_____  否____ 
 
   以下的问题每位受访人都必须回答 
 
54．你当地的信用社认为你是否是个有信用的借款人吗？是_____  否____ 
 
55．目前贷款正规机构有要求小组担保/农户联保以获得贷款吗？是_____ 否____ 
56．你是小组担保/农户联保的成员吗？是_____  否____ 
 
57．（如果Q56的回答“是”）因为我是担保小组的成员，我可以得到更多的贷款 
非常同意_____比较同意______同意______不同意_______非常不同意________ 
 
58．（如果Q56的回答“是”）因为我是担保小组的成员，我可以得到较低的利率 
非常同意_____比较同意______同意_______不同意_______非常不同意________ 
 
59．（如果Q56的回答“否”）我不是担保小组的成员，因为我不需要从信用社或银行借
款 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
60．（如果Q56的回答“否”）我不是担保小组的成员，因为我不想从信用社或银行借款 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
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61．（如果Q56的回答“否”）我不是担保小组的成员，因为我不被认为是值得放贷的人 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
62．（如果Q56的回答“否”）我不是担保小组的成员，因为我不愿为其他人贷款担保 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
63．（如果Q56的回答“否”）我不是担保小组的成员，因为手续太麻烦 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
64．目前你欠信用社或银行多少钱______________元 
如果数额> 0 请回答 Q64 a) , 如果数额  = 0请回答 Q64 b) 
 
64 a) 假设目前信用社的年利率为7%。你可以在此利率下满足你所有的信贷需求，如果年
利率发生如下变化，你将有何行为？ 
新利率
% 
肯定借很
多 
肯定借一
些 
可能借很
多 
可能借一
些 肯定不借 
6      
5      
4      
3      
 
 
新利率
% 
肯定借的
很少 
肯定借的
少 
可能借的
很少 
可能借的
少 肯定不借 
8      
9      
10      
11      
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64b) 你在信用社或银行没有借款，假设如下利率可以满足你所有的信贷需求。给定如下
利率，你会如何调整自己的借贷行为？ 
 
利率% 肯定多借  
肯定借一
些 可能多借 
可能借一
些 肯定不借 
3      
4      
5      
6      
7      
8      
9      
10      
11      
 
65．在相同利率下，如果我可以从放贷人那里借到比我目前更多的款项，我会更倾向从放
贷人那里借钱。 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
 
66．我愿意付比目前信用社或银行更高的利率获得更大数量的贷款 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
67．如果放贷人的利率比现行利率低，我会更倾向向放贷人借款 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________  
 
68．如果从信用社或银行获得贷款的成本（收费，非利息费用）比目前的成本低，我会倾
向从信用社或银行贷款。 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
69．在以下每种情况下，你有过推迟还款吗？（采访人：推迟是指没有在贷款人约定的
时间还，但最终偿还了） 
 是 否 
a. 朋友   
b. 亲戚   
c.正规金融机构（信用社，农
业银行，邮储 
  
d. 放贷人/当铺   
e. 其他？请指出   
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70． 在以下每种情况下，你有过还款违约吗（没有还款）？（采访人：违约是指没有按
贷款人约定还款） 
 是 否 
a. 朋友   
b. 亲戚   
c.正规金融机构（信用社，农
业银行，邮储 
  
d. 放贷人/当铺   
e. 其他？请指出   
 
 
 采访者：现在我想了解一下您周围的储蓄和借贷环境。 
 
71．您一年的家庭收入中有多少比例可用于存款： 
a) 没有     b) 少于5％   c)  5 - 10%  d) 大于10％ 
 
72．你存款的目的是什么（如果有必要，可多个答案）？ 
a. 我存款是因为我目前没有需要花钱的地方 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
b. 我存款是因为我想要盖房子/扩建房子 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
 
c. 我存款是为了防止我需要修房子 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
d. 我存款想买机动车(例如汽车,摩托车,拖拉机等) 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
e. 我存款以防备我的机动车(例如汽车,摩托车,拖拉机等)突然坏掉 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
f.我存款想旅游/休闲花费 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
g. 我存款想在未来进行非农投资 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
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h. 我存款以确定我能偿还我的贷款 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意_______非常不同意_______ 
 
i. 存款以防紧急医疗需要 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
j. 存款送孩子上学/上大学 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
k.存款为了将来给孩子结婚盖房子、送彩礼 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
l. 存款赡养父母 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
m. 存款以防失业 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
n. 存款以防不可预期的作物损失 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
o. 其他 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
73．你认为储蓄重要吗？ 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
74． 
(a) 从信用社或银行获得贷款你有顾虑吗？有__________没有_________ 
(b) 我曾经有未偿还的贷款 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
(c) 信用社和银行的贷款利率比我从朋友亲戚处借款来得高 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
(d) 信用社和银行的贷款利率高负担不起 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
（e）我更愿意从朋友和亲戚处借钱 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
 215 
 
(f) 我不喜欢欠银行或农村信用社的钱 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意______非常不同意________ 
 
F.信贷配给的影响 
请回答下列问题。在这里我们使用术语”借款约束”。借款约束是指农民无法获得从信
用社或银行要求的数额或在急需贷款的时间内筹集到全部资金。 
 
75. 如果面临借款约束我会使用比要求更少的投入来最大化我的农业收入 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意_______非常不同意_______ 
 
76. 如果面临借款约束我将需要从事非农生产以获得收入 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意_______非常不同意_______ 
 
77.如果面临借款约束我将不能为我的孩子提供足够好的教育和足够的健康保护 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意_______非常不同意_______  
 
78. 如果面临借款约束，我的家人包括我自己不能获得整年的食物 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意_______非常不同意_______ 
 
79. 如果我能从信用社获得足够的我需要的贷款,我可能会(只选择是的回答) 
a）离开农业开始非农业生产                  是_____ 否____ 
b）离开农业在非农部门工作                  是_____ 否____ 
c）继续留在农业扩大农业生产                是_____ 否____ 
d）留在农业也开始非农经营                   是_____ 否____ 
e）以上皆非  
 
80．与其跟亲戚借钱我更喜欢获得很低利率的贷款 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意_______非常不同意_______ 
 
81．与其跟亲戚借钱我更喜欢按当前市场利率申请贷款 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意_______非常不同意_______ 
 
82．与其跟朋友借钱我更喜欢获得很低利率的贷款 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意_______非常不同意_______ 
 
83． 与其跟朋友借钱我更喜欢获得价格为当前市场利率的贷款 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意_______非常不同意_______ 
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G.土地使用权 
政治上有关于农田使用权转让（此指买卖）的讨论。假设政府使农民购买或出售土地使用
权合法化，请回答下列问题。 
       
84．您种植的作物每亩的平均利润是多少？___________元 
      
85．每个土地使用权包括多少亩土地？____________亩 
       
86．如果政府使农民购买或出售土地使用权合法化，我将(只选择是的回答) 
        a）出售土地使用权，并开始非农业生产           是______否______ 
        b）出售土地使用权在非农业部分工作            是______否______ 
        c）购买土地使用权并扩大农业生产               是______否______ 
        d）购买土地使用权，并开始非农经营             是______否______ 
        e）什么也不做                              是______否______ 
       
87．（若Q86 的回答是 a 或 b）如果今天出售土地使用权，你可以接受的最低价格是多
少？______________________元 
       
88．（若Q86 的回答是 a 或 b） 
   
你有买3张彩票的机会(A, B 和 C)，中奖概率各不相同(50% : 50%), (70% : 30%) 和 
(30% : 70%)。如果你的彩票中了，你会得到一个土地使用权（它的价值是你在Q87中指出
的价值），除了彩票本身的价格以外你不需要支付其他成本。你将享受土地使用权范围内
的所有权利。如果你的彩票没有被选中，你什么也得不到。 
 
说明：请要求受访者逐列作答。每种概率（可以看作是赢的机会）的结果请读给受访者
听。对于每张彩票都需要提醒受访人他在Q87的出价，因为这是他将要赢得的金
额。在确认被受访人明白他将赢到或者输掉什么之后，可以简单的解释，如果赢的
机会各有50％，或70％的获胜机会，30％会输，你愿意为彩票出价多少？两种概率
都必须读给受访人听。你也可以把下表给受访人看，受访人可能要考虑几秒钟。当
所有三个彩票填完整后，再次把表格给受访人看，询问他/她是否满意出价。（允
许修改） 
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你最希望付的每张彩票的价格（如果不想买请填写0） 
 
 彩票 A 
的概率 
彩票 B 
的概率 
彩票 C 
的概率 
如果你的彩票中了，你会得到一个土地使用权
（它的价值是你在Q87中指出的价值），除了彩
票本身的价格以外你不需要支付其他成本。你将
享受土地使用权范围内的所有权利。 
50% 70% 30% 
如果你的彩票没有被选中，你什么也得不到 
 
50% 30% 70% 
你最希望付的每张彩票的价格（如果不想买请填
写0） 
 
   
 
89．（若Q86 的回答是 a 或 b），你打算如何使用你出售土地使用权获得的金钱？ 
a) 支付债务 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意_______非常不同意_______ 
 
b) 日常家庭开支 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意_______非常不同意_______ 
 
c）支付医疗费用 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意_______非常不同意_______ 
 
d) 退休基金 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意_______非常不同意_______ 
  
e) 投资金融资产（例如：股票，债券，共同基金等） 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意_______非常不同意_______ 
 
f) 投资现有的农业商业活动 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意_______非常不同意_______ 
 
g) 投资现有的非农商业活动 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意_______非常不同意_______ 
 
h) 投资新的农业商业活动 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意_______非常不同意_______ 
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i) 投资新的非农商业活动 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意_______非常不同意_______ 
 
j) 花费在一次性的家庭支出中（如房屋修缮，购买机械等） 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意_______非常不同意_______ 
 
k) 礼物或慈善 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意_______非常不同意_______ 
 
i）还没决定如何使用这些钱 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意_______非常不同意_______ 
 
m) 其他？ 
非常同意______比较同意______同意________不同意_______非常不同意______ 
 
90．（若Q86 的回答是 c 或 d）如果今天购买土地使用权，你愿意支付最高的价格是多
少？______________________元 
        
91. (若Q86 的回答是 c 或 d) 
            
你有买3张彩票的机会(A, B 和 C)，中奖概率各不相同(50% : 50%), (70% : 30%) 和 
(30% : 70%)。如果你的彩票中了，你会得到一个土地使用权（它的价值是你在Q90中指出
的价值），除了彩票本身的价格以外你不需要支付其他成本。你将享受土地使用权范围内
的所有权利。如果你的彩票没有被选中，你什么也得不到。 
 
说明：请要求受访者逐列作答。每种概率（可以看作是赢的机会）的结果请读给受访者
听。对于每张彩票都需要提醒受访人他在Q90的出价，因为这是他将要赢得的金
额。在确认被受访人明白他将赢到或者输掉什么之后，可以简单的解释，如果赢的
机会各有50％，或70％的获胜机会，30％会输，你愿意为彩票出价多少？两种概率
都必须读给受访人听。你也可以把下表给受访人看，受访人可能要考虑几秒钟。当
所有三个彩票填完整后，再次把表格给受访人看，询问他/她是否满意出价。（允
许修改） 
 
你最希望付的每张彩票的价格（如果不想买请填写0） 
 
 彩票 A 
的概率 
彩票 B 
的概率 
彩票 C 
的概率 
如果你的彩票中了，你会得到一个土地使用权
（它的价值是你在Q90中指出的价值），除了彩
票本身的价格以外你不需要支付其他成本。你将
享受土地使用权范围内的所有权利。 
50% 70% 30% 
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如果你的彩票没有被选中，你什么也得不到 
 
50% 30% 70% 
你最希望付的每张彩票的价格（ 如果不想买请
填写0） 
 
   
 
92. （每个人必须回答的问题）如果你可以用你的土地使用权作为贷款抵押，你将 
肯定多借很多__________可能多借很多__________不会多借很多__________多借很少
___________不多借_______ 
 
93．假设你有机会可以买卖土地所有权，在以下每种价值下，你会选择买还是卖？ 
 
  若买 若卖                     你会 
方案 
土地使
用权 
借款10
年付完 
获得销
售额以
及每年
10％的
投资收
入 肯定买 可能买 
不买不
卖 可能卖 肯定卖 
1 300,000 44,709 30,000      
2 150,000 22,354 15,000      
3 100,000 14,903 10,000      
4 75,000 11,177 7,500      
5 60,000 8,942 6,000      
6 50,000 7,451 5,000      
7 42,857 6,387 4,286      
8 37,500 5,589 3,750      
9 33,333 4,968 3,333      
10 30,000 4,471 3,000      
11 27,273 4,064 2,727      
12 25,000 3,726 2,500      
13 23,077 3,439 2,308      
14 21,429 3,193 2,143      
15 20,000 2,981 2,000      
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H.创业 
请告诉我们您认为自己创业的可能性。 
       
94．你曾经有过新生意吗？是_________否__________ 
       
95. 除你之外，你自己知道在你们社区或其他地方有人开始他们自己的生意吗？是
________否__________ 
      
96．你是否考虑过开始新的生意，全职或兼职的 
                 a)_______是，全职 
                 b)_______是，兼职 
                 c)________否 
       
97. 你计划开始新生意吗？是______否_______ 
 
98. (若 Q97回答“是”),你计划开始什么生意?  
j) 零售商________ 
k) 批发商 ________ 
l) 食品加工 ________ 
m) 制造商 ________ 
n) 特许权经营 _______ 
o) 服务业________ 
p) 旅店 ________ 
q) 建筑 ________ 
r) 其他________ 
 
 99. 如果你可以买卖土地使用权，这是否会影响你开始新生意的决定？ 
      是_____否______ 
 
100. 你家里有电脑吗？是_____否______ 
 
101. 你家里能上网吗？是_____否______ 
 
102．你用网络和e-mail从事商业活动吗？是_____否______ 
 
103. (如果适用)您和您的配偶工作状况如何？（在每栏数字后做标记） 
您本人   配偶 
1____  1____ 全职干农活 
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2____  2____ 全职当地非农工作 
3____      3____  外出务农 
4____      4____  外出务工 
5____  5____ 全职工作 
6____  6____ 临时工作 
7____  7______ 失业 
8____  8____ 家庭工作/家庭主妇 
9____  9____ 家庭手工制作 
10____ 10____ 退休 
11____ 11____ 在上学 
 
104.             
A)如果您或家人(直系亲属)或好朋友是村领导的请标上“X” 
自己_______       家人 _______  好朋友 ________ 
 
B)如果您或家人(直系亲属)或好朋友在村委会的请标上“X” 
自己_______       家人 _______  好朋友 _______ 
 
C)如果您或家人(直系亲属)或好朋友在省政府工作的请标上“X” 
自己_______       家人 _______  好朋友 _______ 
 
D)如果您或家人(直系亲属)或好朋友在县政府工作的请标上“X” 
自己_______       家人 _______  好朋友 _______ 
 
E)如果您或家人(直系亲属)或好朋友在国有企业工作的请标上“X” 
自己_______       家人 _______  好朋友 _______ 
 
F)如果您或家人(直系亲属)或好朋友在信用社或银行工作的请标上“X” 
自己_______       家人 _______  好朋友 _______ 
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105. 我们想了解您所在的社区对新的商业的支持程度。请说明在何种程度上你同意或不
同意以下的说法。 
表述             （请在您的回答处标上“X”） 
1 那些成功的商业/生意
获得很多关注和尊敬 
 
 
非常不
同意 
 
 
不同意 
 
 
 
中立 
 
 
同意 
 
 
非常同意 
 
2 年轻人被鼓励创业（开
始他们自己的生
意）…… 
 
 
非常不
同意 
 
 
不同意 
 
 
 
中立 
 
 
同意 
 
非常同意 
 
3 省和地方政府给创业人
员提供较好的支持 .. 
 
 
非常不
同意 
 
 
不同意 
 
 
 
中立 
 
 
同意 
 
 
非常同意 
 
4 银行家在创业初期也给
予帮助……. 
 
 
非常不
同意 
 
 
不同意 
 
 
 
中立 
 
 
同意 
 
 
非常同意 
 
5 信用社在创业初期也给
予帮助…… 
 
 
非常不
同意 
 
 
不同意 
 
 
 
中立 
 
 
同意 
 
 
非常同意 
 
6 投资者在创业初期也给
予帮助……. 
 
 
非常不
同意 
 
 
不同意 
 
 
 
中立 
 
 
同意 
 
 
非常同意 
 
7 其他社区团体在创业初
期也给予支持…… 
 
 
非常不
同意 
 
 
不同意 
 
 
 
中立 
 
 
同意 
 
 
非常同意 
 
8 当地媒体对当地商业新
闻做了很好的工作…… 
 
 
非常不
同意 
 
 
不同意 
 
 
 
中立 
 
 
同意 
 
 
非常同意 
 
9 在这一社区多数的领导
都有他们自己的生
意……… 
 
 
非常不
同意 
 
 
不同意 
 
 
 
中立 
 
 
同意 
 
 
非常同意 
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10 有很多那些创业获得成
功倍受尊重的榜
样…………… 
 
非常不
同意 
 
 
不同意 
 
 
 
中立 
 
 
同意 
 
 
非常同意 
 
 
 106．再次想象一下如果你决定开始创业，请对以下这些在你创业初期你可能遇到的问题
选择你的真实想法    
              表述       （请在您的回答处标上“X”） 
1 作为商人被特殊对待 完全不
正确 
 
不正
确 
 
中立 
 
正确 
 
完全正确 
 
2 协调好生意，个人和家
庭的时间 
完全不
正确 
 
不正
确 
 
中立 
 
正确 
 
完全正确 
 
3 没有导师提供建议和支
持..……… 
 
完全不
正确 
 
不正
确 
 
中立 
 
正确 
 
完全正确 
 
 
    
107．现在将我们的关注转向新闻媒体和你们社区的交流来源，对于每个来源的信息你认
为有多可靠，请选择你的答案    
表述     （请在您的回答处标上“X”） 
1 报纸 不可信 有点可信 可信 很可信 非常可信 
2  电视/广播 不可信 有点可信 可信 很可信 非常可信 
3 网络 不可信 有点可信 可信 很可信 非常可信 
4 家庭成员 不可信 有点可信 可信 很可信 非常可信 
5 朋友 
 
不可信 有点可信 可信 很可信 非常可信 
6 当地政府官员  不可信 有点可信 可信 很可信 非常可信 
7 当地大学/学院 不可信 有点可信 可信 很可信 非常可信 
8 村放贷人 不可信 有点可信 可信 很可信 非常可信 
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108．想像你决定创业，对于下列每个方面你有多大程度的把握？请标出你是否同意以下
的说法  
表述             （请在您的回答处标上“X”） 
1 获得原材料 
 
 
非常不确定 
 
不确定 
 
中立 
 
确定 
 
非常确定 
2 吸引员工  
非常不确定 
 
不确定 
 
中立 
 
确定 
 
非常确定 
3 获得创业资本  
非常不确定 
 
不确定 
 
中立 
 
确定 
 
非常确定 
4 获得流动资本 
 
 
非常不确定 
 
不确定 
 
中立 
 
确定 
 
非常确定 
5 与分销商打交道  
非常不确定 
 
不确定 
 
中立 
 
确定 
 
非常确定 
6 吸引客户  
非常不确定 
 
不确定 
 
中立 
 
确定 
 
非常确定 
7 与他企业竞争 
 
 
非常不确定 
 
不确定 
 
中立 
 
确定 
 
非常确定 
8 遵守地方，省和
国家的规定 
 
 
非常不确定 
 
不确定 
 
中立 
 
确定 
 
非常确定 
9 保持先进的技术  
非常不确定 
 
不确定 
 
中立 
 
确定 
 
非常确定 
10 获得银行的融资  
非常不确定 
 
不确定 
 
中立 
 
确定 
 
非常确定 
11 获得风险投资的
融资 
 
 
非常不确定 
 
不确定 
 
中立 
 
确定 
 
非常确定 
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109．想像你决定创业，请对以下的说法选择你同意的程度 
              表述            （请在您的回答处标上“X”） 
1 如果我努力工作，
我就能创业 
 
 
非常不同意 
 
 
不同意 
 
 
中立 
 
 
同意 
 
 
非常同
意 
 
2 总体而言，我的技
术和能力将帮助我
创业……………. 
 
 
非常不同意 
 
 
不同意 
 
 
中立 
 
 
同意 
 
 
非常同
意 
 
3 我过去的经验对我
创业很有价
值…….. 
 
 
非常不同意 
 
 
不同意 
 
 
中立 
 
 
同意 
 
 
非常同
意 
 
4 我相信自己能够尽
最大努力来创业 
 
非常不同意 
 
 
不同意 
 
 
中立 
 
 
同意 
 
 
非常同
意 
 
5 在过去的三年里在
我们社区开了许多
新公司 
 
 
非常不同意 
 
 
不同意 
 
 
中立 
 
 
同意 
 
 
非常同
意 
 
6 如果我要创业我不
得不到另一个社
区………… 
 
非常不同意 
 
 
不同意 
 
 
中立 
 
 
同意 
 
 
非常同
意 
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110．以下列出了您社区的一些商业活动，请对以下的说法标出你同意的程度 
    
                     表述    （请在您的回答处标上“X”） 
1 在过去的三年里许
多人搬入我们的社
区…… 
 
 
非常不同意 
 
 
不同意 
 
 
中立 
 
 
同意 
 
 
非常同意 
 
2 我们社区的许多人
开始创业…… 
 
 
非常不同意 
 
 
不同意 
 
 
中立 
 
 
同意 
 
 
非常同意 
 
3 我们社区的许多人
谈论创业的机
会…….. 
 
 
非常不同意 
 
 
不同意 
 
 
中立 
 
 
同意 
 
 
非常同意 
 
4 地方政府官员建议
新的商机…… 
 
 
非常不同意 
 
 
不同意 
 
 
中立 
 
 
同意 
 
 
非常同意 
 
5 地方高校建议新的
商机…… 
 
 
非常不同意 
 
 
不同意 
 
 
中立 
 
 
同意 
 
 
非常同意 
 
6 村里的贷款人建议
新的商机…… 
……………. 
 
 
非常不同意 
 
 
不同意 
 
 
中立 
 
 
同意 
 
 
非常同意 
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111．我们希望了解一些您个人的性格特征，请标出以下对您描述的准确程度 
     表述                （请在您的回答处标上“X”） 
1 我总能成功完成新
仸务.…. 
 
 
完全不真实 
 
不真
实 
 
中立 
 
真
实 
 
完全真实 
2 我能达到我为自己
设定的目标…… 
 
 
完全不真实 
 
不真
实 
 
中立 
 
真
实 
 
完全真实 
3 面临障碍的时候我
依然很成功.…. 
 
 
完全不真实 
 
不真
实 
 
中立 
 
真
实 
 
完全真实 
4 我能做我决定做的
仸何事………. 
 
 
完全不真实 
 
不真
实 
 
中立 
 
真
实 
 
完全真实 
5 拥有自己的事业/生
意比花时间与家人
在一起更重
要..…… 
 
 
完全不真实 
 
不真
实 
 
中立 
 
真
实 
 
完全真实 
6 结交朋友对我来说
并不难 
 
完全不真实 
 
不真
实 
 
中立 
 
真
实 
 
完全真实 
7 我制定的计划几乎
都是可行的 
 
 
完全不真实 
 
不真
实 
 
中立 
 
真
实 
 
完全真实 
8 我得到我想要的常
常是因为我的努力
工作 
 
 
完全不真实 
 
不真
实 
 
中立 
 
真
实 
 
完全真实 
9 如果我的孩子开始
创业，我会为之感
到骄傲 
 
 
完全不真实 
 
不真
实 
 
中立 
 
真
实 
 
完全真实 
10 我对那些我认识的
拥有自己事业/生意
的人有很深的印象 
 
 
完全不真实 
 
不真
实 
 
中立 
 
真
实 
 
完全真实 
11 如果可以重新选
择，我仍然会选择
相同的职业生涯 
 
完全不真实 
 
不真
实 
 
中立 
 
真
实 
 
完全真实 
 228 
 
 
 
12 在仸何社会情况
下，我总是知道什
么是适当的 
 
 
完全不真实 
 
不真
实 
 
中立 
 
真
实 
 
完全真实 
13 我喜欢独处  
完全不真实 
 
不真
实 
 
中立 
 
真
实 
 
完全真实 
14 我经常担心别人如
何看待我…... 
 
 
完全不真实 
 
不真
实 
 
中立 
 
真
实 
 
完全真实 
15 我能很好的判断别
人 
 
 
完全不真实 
 
不真
实 
 
中立 
 
真
实 
 
完全真实 
 
 
I.风险认知和风险动机 
112． “想象一下，一个诚实的陌生人过来和你玩一个投硬币付款的游戏。如果硬币为正
面，你将得到第一列里的金额，如果是反面，你将得到第二列里的金额。正反面发生的可
能性各为50％。如果重复扔硬币，你将预期获得在第三列的金额。尽管获得第一列与第二
列的概率是相同的，但价值有高有低。研究表中的六个方案，选择一个你喜欢的。 
            
方案 获得好运 (RMB): 
50% 的机会 
获得背运 (RMB): 
50% 的机会 
期望价值 (RMB) 
1 500 500 500 
2 950 450 700 
3 1200 400 800 
4 1500 300 900 
5 1900 100 1000 
6 2000 0 1000 
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113.您有机会购买一种债券，它可以让您以50%的概率赢得5000元人民币和50%的概率什么
也得不到（同时还会失去您购买彩票的成本）。 您愿意为它支付多少？
____________元 
       
114. 假设您有足够的积蓄购买一种债券，它可以让您以50%的概率赢得5000元人民币和
50%的概率什么也得不到（同时还会失去您购买彩票的成本）。您最愿意为此支付
多少？____________元 
 
115.   
 说明：要求受访人逐列考虑以下彩票。请告诉受访者每种彩票的两种可能回报和相应概
率（可以看作是赢的机会）。在确认受访人明白他将赢得或失去什么后，可以简单
的解释如果有50％的机会赢100元和50%的机会赢200元，或30％的机会赢226.93，
70％的机会赢117.03，你愿意为彩票付出多少？两种概率和回报必须读给受访人
听。如果更容易些可以把下表给受访人看，受访人可能要考虑几秒钟。当所有三个
彩票填完整后，再次把下面的表格给受访人看，询问他/她是否满意出价。（允许
修改） 
 
彩票 A B C 
概率 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.3 
回报彩金（元） 100 200 226.93 117.03 182.37 73.26 
你愿意为彩票付多少钱    
 
A）假设您有机会购买彩票。您有50％的机会赢得100元人民币,50％的机会赢得200
元。你愿意出多少钱购买此彩票（人民币）？ 
B） 假设您有机会购买彩票。你有30％的机会赢得226.93元人民币,70％的机会赢
得117.03元。 你愿意出多少钱购买此彩票（人民币）？ 
C） 假设您有机会购买彩票。你有70％的机会赢得182.37元人民币,30％的机会赢
得73.26元。 你愿意出多少钱购买此彩票（人民币）？ 
 
以下三道问题可能有些敏感，请自愿作答。我们想了解一下你最近的生活中发生的重要事件，以
更好的了解您现在的生活处境。 
116. 在您的家中，过去三年中是否有家庭成员离异？ 
是______否_______ 
117. 在您的家中，过去三年中是否有家庭成员去世？ 
是______否_______ 
118. 在您的家中，去年是否有家庭成员生重病？ 
是______否_______ 
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采访人作答 
119．根据你的看法，受访人真实回答了所有问题 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意_______非常不同意_______ 
120. 根据你的看法，此调查的信息质量可以满足书面报告的要求 
非常同意______比较同意______同意_______不同意_______非常不同意_______ 
 
请写下其他有关意见： 
 
